Re: Felsenstein is a liar

From: Jim McGinn (jimmcginn_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 02/26/05 

Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2005 23:57:06 -0500 (EST)

ekurtz99@WhoKnowsWhere.com wrote:
> William Morse wrote:

> > The important idea in Hamilton's inclusive fitness concept is the
> > probability of an individual sharing an allele with another
individual.
> > Let us say, for a particular gene A, that there are alleles A1, A2,
A3,
> > A4, and A5. Only version A5 results in behavior that benefits
others at
> > the expense of the individual. Given that we know that a benefactor
is
> > A5, what is the probability that the recipient is A5? Obviously,
the more
> > close the relationship between the two, the more likely it is that
the
> > recipient is A5.
>
> I think it is necessary to add that the species must be social, and
must
> aggregate in groups in such a manner that related individuals
(siblings,
> cousins etc) tend to stay near each other, and thus be more likely
> beneficiaries of altruistic acts from a given relative than are
> unrelated individuals (eg monkeys might qualify, herd animals
probably
> won't, solitary animals definitely won't).

You are on the right track. (The question being what
are the selective origins of altruism.) And you can
expect that the sensibility of what you state here
to be completely ignored by neoDarwinists. But
there are other factors also. In no particular order:

1) Proximity: Whether or not they are near each other.
2) Effectiveness: The higher degree of EFFECTIVENESS of
biological causation that is contained within the bodies
of lifeforms (reproduction, meiosis) in comparison to
that that is external to the bodies of lifeforms
("nonbiological" causation [I put this in quotes because
it really isn't nonbiological, it's just what we tend to
think of as nonbiological. I could have also labelled
it lifeform's non-reproductive--non-meiotic--actions]).
3) Complimentariness: Whether or not a lifeforms other
strategies and behaviors are complimentary to strategies
and behaviors that involve altruism (social strategies,
parental care, sibling cooperation).
4) Combinations of 1, 2, and 3.

> It is the combination of physical proximity *and* probability of
genetic
> similarity that makes hamilton's rule work, if I understand it
correctly.

Well, not quite, but you are on the right track.
Hamilton's rule completely ignores 1, 3, and 4 and,
instead, gives us a cartoonish understanding of 2 based
on assumptions (R = genes IBD and other simple-minded
fitness accounting assumptions for c and b) that are,
at best, only partially correct/accurate. So, at best,
HR is only partially correct. All in all, aspects of it
are plainly mistaken. (Note: all of this becomes plainly
apparent when we work out the correct rules for fitness
accounting. When these rules are established, which
starts with the identification of the *commodity* of
fitness, it becomes obvious that we have little or no
choice but to reject Hamilton's rule. [But establishing
these 'correct rules' of fitness accounting is, from a
conceptual standpoint, no easy task!])

> > Now we can discuss the question of the likelihood of
> > sharing the allele A5 other than by descent, but that question is
> > irrelevant to Hamilton's rule. The reason to consider relatedness
in
> > terms of Hamilton's rule is that it affects the likelihood of
sharing a
> > particular allele A5.
>
> In another thread, PinP suggested that the IDB issue is an arcane and

> difficult one; in response to the question:

It's not arcane and difficult. It does, however, become
arcane and difficult in the context of the vague and
ambiguous terminology that Hamilton proposed. PinP's
and William's goal in this discussion--like boy scouts
following their scout master--is to preserve and
embellish this vagueness and ambiguity. You'll note,
for example, further along in this thread that as I
brought conceptual clarity to the issues that it
eventually became apparent to William that his premise
had evaporated. This then produced the behavior from
him that I've come to expect from all neoDarwinists:
he threw a hissy fit and refused to continue the
discussion. (Josh did the same.)

> > > 3) If [IDB and non IDB genes] are not different in terms of
their
> > > causative properties then why even bother to
> > > distinguish between them?
>
> He wrote:
>
> "Hamilton's answer ... to the third question probably
> would have required a two-part paper in the Journal
> of Theoretical Biology. "
>
> Why is this so? Is the issue *conceptually* more difficult than the
> description given above? (I acknowledge that it may be
*mathematically*
> difficult, but that is another matter)

No. It's not conceptually more difficult. PinP and
William have deep-seated beliefs in the validity of
neoDarwinistic semantics. The vagueness and ambiguity
of Hamilton's approach provides them the ammunition by
which they can continue to maintain these beliefs.
When conceptual clarity is brought to the issues they
have only two choices: 1) Admit that they are wrong,
which they will never do; or 2) Produce a diversionary
tactic: pretend that the answer is too complicated or
pretend that the answer exists in some textbook
somewhere.

Jim