Re: Earliest Animal Memory?


"Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:dbr3qc$2alo$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> "Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
> news:dboi5o$19gn$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>> "Inman Harvey" <inmanh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
>> news:dbnd7c$tlh$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> > Theo R. wrote:
>> > > What is the earliest and/or simplest animal whose CNS
>> possesses a form of
>> > > memory?
>> > >
>> > > Is it possible for even simpler animals (without a
> CNS)
>> to have a memory?
>> >
>> > How about Plants?
>> >
>> > Sunflowers (eg Malvastrum rotundifolium) have a memory,
> as
>> observed by
>> > Darwin. During the day they track the sun, overnight
> they
>> return to
>> > where they "expect" the sun to rise at dawn - which
> varies
>> with the
>> > season. They can be trained in only two days to "learn"
>> the direction of
>> > sunrise - thereby demonstrating their *memory*.
>> >
>> > For demonstrating short-term memory in plants, consider
>> the Venus'
>> > flytrap (needs 2 touches within about 35 seconds to be
>> triggered, a
>> > single touch is treated as a "false alarm"); or Mimosa
>> pudica will
>> > demonstrate habituation effects to repeated touching.
>> >
>> > Memory - Yes. Nervous System - Yes. *Central* Nervous
>> System - No.
>> > For these examples see
>> > The Action Plant: Movement and Nervous Behaviour in
> Plants
>> > Paul Simons, 1992, Blackwell Publishers,
> ISBN0-631-13899-4
>> >
>> > See also
>> > Trewavas AJ. 2003. Aspects of plant intelligence. Annals
>> of Botany 92:
>> > 1-20. [Google for online version]
>> >
>> > Inman Harvey
>
> Ignoring my past-midnight poetic ramblings in my last post,
> let me ask what the _real_ question(s) behind the many
> questions posed by Inman Harvey was. I would guess it's
> something less about memory per se, and more about, (1) what
> are the minimal requirements needed for "intelligent"
> ("goal-driven" or purposeful) actions as opposed to
> autonomic/reflex ones, and (2) what types of animals/plants
> (or whatever) are believed to possess the former. Is the
> question, does purposeful action primarily depend on some
> quantitative measure of the extent memory (e.g., in bytes);
> or the temporal "extent" of memory, or, the degree to which
> memory is applied to new or surprising problems? Or does the
> real question simply ask, what are the minimal aspects of
> memory active in purposeful problem solving in real time, if
> any, that are essentially independent of evolution, (i.e.,
> have never been, or are incapable of being, anticipated?)

First, you have to ask questions about the right issue. Since you are
pinpointing "goal-directed" and "purposeful[ness]," you are talking about
operant conditioning. At this point, the question ".what are the minimal
requirements needed for 'intelligent' ('goal-driven' or purposeful)
actions.?" can be seen to be misguided. Here, your proposed explanatory
concepts are behavioral-level concepts (but, of course, it is assumed that
these concepts are physiological-level hypothetical constructs). But operant
conditioning is already a directly-demonstrable, apparently basic,
behavioral-level process and, it could be argued that it is not in need of
translation into the metaphorical concepts of a storage and retrieval system
with its associated notion of "capacity." We certainly may ask "What is
necessary for operant conditioning?" and one kind of answer concerns how
physiology mediates such behavioral function. But it has been argued, by a
notable few, that the core concepts of cognitive psychology, and the fields
it has, ummmm, "touched," are inappropriate metaphors, both with respect to
the behavioral level at which they are "operationally defined," and at the
level of physiological processes that mediate behavioral processes. And,
here, "behavioral process" refers to those generated by a science that has
different underlying concepts (like operant and respondent behavior,
stimulus control, establishing operations, stimulus control, etc.). Although
it is frequently claimed that operant conditioning requires memory and
associated processes, those from the opposing view suggest that some
meanings of memory are simply references to conditioning (which has no
necessary commitment to storage etc.) or they are references to phenomena
that are more profitably discussed in terms of complex interaction of basic
behavioral processes (such as the notion that it is behavior that mediates
the delay in STM etc.). When properly phrased, the relevant issues may
certainly be dealt with by science, but that science is not mainstream
cognitive "science."



>
> It would seem that none of these questions could possibly be
> answered. Can even simple questions in this vein of what are
> evolved adaptations and what are not be answered? Are there
> even any actions at all that are not purely a result of
> neo-Darwinian evolution? I doubt any of these can be
> rigorously be proved scientifically--I think in the long run
> it devolves to philosophical questions depending, for
> example, on whether or not one is a strict determinist, or
> something else. But that's just my view (one of a gross
> amateur in the area of biology of any kind. :))
> ...tonyC

I guess my comments could be seen as somewhat critical of that view.





.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: A reply to Marvin Minsky.
    ... would be resistant to calling a CPU a CPU or a memory chip a memory ... Operant conditioning is memory. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: A reply to Marvin Minsky.
    ... would be resistant to calling a CPU a CPU or a memory chip a memory ... Operant conditioning is memory. ... A memory chip doesn't fall into the class of devices one would label as ... But that doesn't exist according to Longley et al (rad. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: A reply to Marvin Minsky.
    ... would be resistant to calling a CPU a CPU or a memory chip a memory ... Operant conditioning is memory. ... A memory chip doesn't fall into the class of devices one would label as ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: A reply to Marvin Minsky.
    ... would be resistant to calling a CPU a CPU or a memory chip a memory ... Operant conditioning is memory. ... A memory chip doesn't fall into the class of devices one would label as ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)