Re: origin of thoughts


"Catherine Woodgold" <an588@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote in message
news:dhv9l6$1mmc$1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>
> My $0.02: a definition of consciousness:
>
> Define A to be awareness of a particular stimulus (e.g. the colour red).
>
> Define B to be awareness of both A and B.
>
> Then B is consciousness.
>
> A brain that can do B needs to be far, far more complex than a brain
> that can just do A.
>
> As a partial explanation of why we have consciousness:
> consider that it would be relatively easy to design a brain
> that could do arithmetic using just a few neurons, but
> that such a brain could easily get things wrong, whether
> because of genetic mutation, injury, or change in temperature
> or hormone levels. But a brain that can
> do arithmetic with consciousness can watch itself and
> check what it's doing and have a fairly accurate idea
> of whether the calculation is correct or not. Far
> slower, but more robust.
> --
> Cathy Woodgold
> http://www.ncf.ca/~an588/par_home.html
> We are all Iraqis now.
>
What you say is probably true, but the implication that "having the right
kind of brain" automatically endows one with self-awareness is probably
false. As I have said here, and elsewhere (I will be submitting a paper in a
couple of days that deals with this issue), it is likely that awareness of
features of the world requires exposure to discriminative contingencies.
Similarly, self-awareness requires exposure to discriminative contingencies
that make aspects of our behavior (perceptual and otherwise) function as
discriminative stimuli. Non-human animals can be trained to "report" on
their behavior (subjective or otherwise) and drug discrimination is proof of
this. Now, one may claim that the animals were always "conscious of their
own behavior" and were just trained to report that they were. The
alternative is, of course, that the contingencies that produce the
"reporting" are what "makes the animal aware." This all boils down to the
so-called Lashley-Wade hypothesis, which suggests that inverted u-shaped
discrimination gradients require particular ontogenic histories (i.e.,
exposure to discriminative contingencies). In any event, the fact of the
matter is that we are at the point (and have been for decades) where these
questions are scientific ones - they are not just philosophical. The crucial
experiments, incidentally, are all behavioral.



Cordially,

Glen







.

Relevant Pages

  • Re: Consciousness: whats the problem?
    ... The camera has awareness of pixels, and focus, and exposure levels, but no ... after brain trauma. ...  It's was a self image that just naturally seemed to form in me ... concept of consciousness gets linked to having that self image. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: A reply to Marvin Minsky.
    ... If the idea is that "awareness" will suddenly show up when you get the ... That fact alone answers the question about why some parts of the brain seem ... are part of our consciousness. ... will cause the monitor to change when I touch it. ...
    (comp.ai.philosophy)
  • Re: origin of thoughts
    ... My $0.02: a definition of consciousness: ... Define A to be awareness of a particular stimulus. ... A brain that can do B needs to be far, far more complex than a brain ...
    (sci.bio.evolution)
  • Re: Does violating the laws of physics require intelligence?
    ... physical brain. ... The subjective dimension of awareness that perceives the object as ... Daniel Dennett's _Consciousness Explained_ ...
    (talk.origins)
  • Re: United States starting to execute the mentally impaired
    ... ruptured in his brain, and he collapsed on the bathroom floor. ... One morning just over a year after his accident, Rios was taken to the ... expert in consciousness disorders at Weill Medical College of Cornell ... patients will emerge from a vegetative state and which won't. ...
    (sci.med.diseases.lyme)