Re: Unconsciousness Regained



whitesickle@xxxxxxx wrote:


>
> Such a deterministic model opens a Pandora's box of moral dilemmas.
> If the conscious self and the exercise of free will are both illusory,
> then to what extent is it correct to punish people for crimes which are
> the direct result of automatic and unconscious brain processes? As
> Libet's work strongly suggests, a thief may only become aware of
> deciding to steal something after the decision has already been made in
> his or her own unconscious. Why should people be punished when they
> have no real freedom to choose their actions? To what is extent is
> philanthropy, good, and theft, bad, in a universe where conscious
> choices are simply epiphenomena?
>

I have offered a challenge to the Pandora's box of determinism
entertained by most mechanistic materialists, one I think will be
a little tougher nut to crack. BTW, the Humean constant
conjunctionalism usually entertained by these presumed challenges
to "free will" has itself been challenged
by a host of philosphers of science, the most notable being Roy
Bhaskar in his 'A Realistic Theory of Science':


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++


Feelings of Worthlessness

An Outline of a Divergent Theory of Emotional Instability

Objective: To account for ego/self-worth related emotion (e.g.,
needs for love, purpose, meaning, acceptance, attention, moral
integrity, recognition, achievement, wealth, power, dignity,
fame, immortality, religion, autonomy, justice, etc.) and
emotional disorder (e.g., anxiety, depression, addiction,
suicide, etc.) within the context of an evolutionary scenario;
i.e., to synthesize natural science and the humanities; i.e.,
to answer the question: 'Why are members of one particular
species of naturally selected organism (Homo Sapiens) expending
significant amounts of effort and energy on the survivalistically
bizarre non-physical objective of maximizing self-worth?'

General Observation: The species in which rationality is most
developed is also the one in which individuals have the greatest
difficulty in maintaining an ?adequate? sense of self-worth,
often going to extraordinary lengths in doing so (e.g., Evel
Knievel, celibate monks, 9/11 terrorists, etc.).

General Hypothesis: Rationality is antagonistic to psychocentric
stability (i.e., maintaining an "adequate" sense of self-worth).

Explanation #1 (psychodynamics): In much the manner our rationality
allows for the subordination of lower emotional concerns and
values (pain, fear, anger, sex, etc.) to more global concerns
(concern for the self as a whole), so too, these more global
concerns and values can themselves become reevaluated and
subordinated to other more global, more objective considerations.
And if this is so, and assuming that emotional disorder emanates
from a deficiency in self-worth resulting from precisely this
sort of experientially based reevaluation, then it can reasonably
be construed as a natural malfunction resulting from one's
rational faculties functioning a tad too well.

Explanation #2 (rationality theory): Being the blind arational
process that she is, Mother Nature instills in all her creatures
a sense of their own importance (or of the importance of their
needs) that is rationally inordinate. And, as a species reaches
a certain stage in its rational/cultural/memetic development, its
members increasingly come to question this inordinancy, and
increasingly come to require reasons (justification) for
maintaining it (e.g., needs for love, purpose, meaning, etc.).

Normalcy and Disorder (consciousness studies): Assuming this is
correct, then some explanation for the relative "normalcy" of most
individuals would seem necessary. This is accomplished simply by
postulating different levels or degrees of consciousness. From
this perspective, emotional disorder would then be construed as
A VALUATIVE AFFLICTION resulting from an increase in semantic
content in the engram indexed by the linguistic expression, "I
am insignificant",[1] which all persons of common sense "know" to
be true, but which the "emotionally disturbed" have come to
"realize", through abstract thought, devaluing experience, etc.

Indeterminism: "Free will" and the incessant activity presumed
to emanate from it is simply the insatiable appetite members
of our species have for self-significating/self-worth
enhancing experience (juxtaposed with the need to avoid the
pain of 'feelings of worthlessness') which, in turn, is simply
nature's way of attempting to counter the objectifying
influences of our rational faculties. As such, although "free
will" itself (the self-worth complex) is constrained within
parameters determined by natural selection (the maximizing of
self-worth), its presence in us, manifested in the need to
expend significant amounts of effort and energy on maintaining
emotional well-being (keeping up with the Joneses, climbing Mt.
Everest, posting to newsgroups, etc.) would, according to this
perspective, be construed as evidence that members of nature's
most rational species have become TOO VALUATIVELY OBJECTIVE
(requiring remedial measures) and, as such, LESS VALUATIVELY/
CONATIVELY DETERMINED by natural selection than members of
less rational more emotionally stable species. In this view,
indeterminism is manifested, not in the ability to change one's
mind about what to have for breakfast, but rather in a species
whose members appear less and less concerned with staying alive
(e.g., daily suicide bombings in the Middle East) and more and
more concerned with REASONS (justification) for staying alive
(e.g., needs for love, purpose, meaning, etc.).

Ethics: Since, according to this explanation, more rational equates
with more valuatively objective, the valuative objectivity
inherent in the moral maxim, 'Love (intrinsically value) your
neighbor as you love (intrinsically value) yourself' would be
construed as an implicit theory of rationality we humans have
been subconsciously entertaining for the past several thousand
years.[2] It would also mean that the author of Genesis got it
right in referring to the emergence of an awareness of right
and wrong as a form of knowledge. The emotive force of
moral argument apparently arises from the fact that perceiving
ourselves as rational is a crucial determinant in assessing
self-worth which, in a species that accomplishes its survival
from a conscious intention to do so (long range planning)
rather than as a cumulative effect of blindly responding to
stimuli, is just another way of talking and thinking about
"the will to survive".

Incompleteness:
Of course, no human is likely to measure up to this very
high standard of loving others as they love themselves
(valuative objectivity), but then another one of the myriads
of implications of this view of rationality is that no person,
belief, objective, theory, etc. is likely to be rational in
any but a relative sense of the term (the empirical analogue
of Godel's logical discovery that mathematical rationality can
never be found in its entirety within a formal system). Since
this applies to the present theory as well, it is one that
entails an implicit prediction of its own eventual demise.


[1] I have employed this unorthodox terminology, not to impress the
reader with my erudite understanding of emotional disorder, but
to suggest a new way of thinking and talking about the matter
-- one in which emotional disorder is understood in terms of the
behavior of abstract psychical entities. In particular, one
might surmise that this particular increase in semantic content
arises from an increase in the value one attaches to the ?truth?
of the engram or belief indexed by the linguistic expression,
?I am insignificant?, both of which are types of content which
apparently occupy the form of the engram, and all of which might
be considered as alternative ways of thinking and talking about
an increase in consciousness. As to the ontic status of the
these postulated entities, they are based on the identification
of pertinent features of nature in much the way the entities
postulated by physical scientists are, but with the advantage
that it is perhaps a bit easier to remain in touch with the fact
that they are, in the final analysis, constructs of human
imagination.

[2]. Being objective should not be confused with STRIVING TO BE
objective. This may seem like a trivial distinction, but it is
one that is profound for a theory of rationality in which 'being
rational' is simply a matter of 'being objective'. Striving to
be something is a strategic notion and, as such, can readily
entail a lack of objectivity about the significance of the end.
As such, for example, it can be relatively irrational to strive
to be rational, at least to the extent one becomes a monomaniac.
This is the implication in the Frankenstein story, in which our
intuitions are informing us that there is something irrational
about Dr. Frankenstein's obsession with the quest for knowledge
at all costs. This also explains why and how reasons can be more
or less rational (good vs bad reasons). Reasons are strategic
animals, whereas rationality appears to be more a matter of
objectivity and reasons can have more or less of it in them.



PR



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