Re: Addressing Scientific Reductionism
- From: "whitesickle@xxxxxxx" <whitesickle@xxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2006 13:35:47 -0500 (EST)
whitesic...@xxxxxxx wrote:
Wilkins:
That is a terrible article. It is no more the tenor of reductionism than
the rather overblown claims of those who call themselves holists. I blame
Koestler and the New Left writers of the 70s for the misunderstandings.
Ragland:
Well, I'm not real hot with alot of what I see in this new century.
When I came across the article I didn't even think or notice any
political affiliation but if it is New Left I guess I'm a Leftie. I
don't think they have created misunderstanding. I think you have lost
touch and aren't even aware of it.
Wilkins:
I wasn't making a political claim so much as identifying the culprits.
I have
in mind people like
Roszack Theodore 1974 "The monster and the titan: Science, knowledge,
and
Gnosis" Daedlus (Summer)
Ragland1:
Okay.
Wilkins:
Ordinary reductionism is sometimes called "physicalism", which is the claim
that anything (natural) that we can study can in theory be reduced to
statements about physics (or some as yet unrealised ideal physics). This
kind of reductionism is happy to allow that, for example, we need a special
biological science because we simply cannot make the inferences from
physics to biology due to the time it would take. Nonreductionists claim
there are special facts that do not reduce to physics.
Ragland:
So I assume you would include genetic reductionism as an example of
physical reductionism due to the fact we need a special biological science
because we simply cannot make the inferences from physics to biology due to
the time it would take.
Not exactly. I do think biological explanation is required due to the
computational load, but this is not germane to genetic reductionism.
Ragland1:
Okay.
- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
Wilkins:
One special case of reductionism/nonreductionism lies in the claim that a
science like biology does or doesn't have its own laws. On this view of
science, having laws in your theories is supposed to be the end goal of
explanation. Others, like myself, think that it is enough to have a domain
specific generalisation, and that these need not be exceptionless. Those
who think biology must have laws and does so, which are special to biology,
are nonreductionists.
Ragland:
You've kind of contradicted yourself. In one case regarding physical
reductionism you cite the need for a special biological science because
we simply cannot make the inferences from physics to biology due to the
time it would take yet on the other hand state those who think biology
must have laws i.e. special biological science are nonreductionists.
You may have your own views on this "special biological science" such
as when you mention, "Others, like myself, think that it is enough to
have a domain specific generalisation, and that these need not be
exceptionless" but nevertheless they are part of that "special
biological science" which if physics theoretically could, would
eliminate it. From a physical reductionist view you appear to paint the
need for a special biological science as necessary but ultimately
obsolete because we simply cannot make the inferences from physics to
biology due to the time it would take. Are you really a part of the
Biohumanities Project? Do you see any differences between physics and
biology? Do you think "mind" exists?
Wilkins:
Slow down. I think that biological science, the disciplines, are
detached in
large part from physics (and chemistry) because not all physical and
chemical
states in biology are necessary - there's a contingency in the
construction of
biological states out of physical states (for the same reason, we need
a
geology, an astrophysics, etc.).
On the other hand, any science must have generalisations or
abstractions in
order to proceed. I'm just rejecting the sometimes made claim that for
explanation in science to work you must have exceptionless laws. I
think it's
enough for contingent, or "special", sciences to explain things in
terms of
generalisations even when, unlike traditional "laws" they are
exception-ridden.
Perhaps Laplacean Demon biologists could eliminate all biology in
favour of
Schrödinger's equation. We certainly can't. But the ontological
commitments of
a physicalist do not dictate the epistemological constraints they must
work
with. I believe that everything in biology is physical. There is
nothing that
couldn't, given world enough and time, be totally explained by physical
facts
and laws. But we don't get knowledge by insisting that this happen.
Ragland1:
I would argue, convincingly I believe, that if we were able to explain
biology strictly
through physical laws and facts we would no longer be the same form of
life we
currently are. You write, "I think that biological science, the
disciplines, are detached in
large part from physics (and chemistry) because not all physical and
chemical
states in biology are necessary - there's a contingency in the
construction of
biological states out of physical states (for the same reason, we need
a
geology, an astrophysics, etc.)" That contingency is pretty important.
What
physical and chemical states in biology are not necessary? If your
using that as
the basis why you think the biological sciences are detached in large
part from
physics that is a pretty important question. Would you concede if these
physical
and chemical states in biology were removed i.e. the "contingency" it
would possibly
result in the death of the organism or at the very least a radical
evolutionary change?
You write, "On the other hand, any science must have generalisations or
abstractions in
order to proceed. I'm just rejecting the sometimes made claim that for
explanation in science to work you must have exceptionless laws. I
think it's
enough for contingent, or "special", sciences to explain things in
terms of
generalisations even when, unlike traditional "laws" they are
exception-ridden. Would
you characterize physical laws as "exceptionless"? Would you
characterize biology as
"exception-ridden"? It would seem you do since you state, "I think that
biological science,
the disciplines, are detached in large part from physics (and
chemistry) because not all
physical and chemical states in biology are necessary - there's a
contingency in the construction of
biological states out of physical states." The contingency is what
makes it exception ridden.
Wilkins:
Nevertheless note that while such things as van der Waals forces and
electron
valencies are unanalysed in biology, they play a major role in
explaining, for
example, how lipid membranes assemble or how DNA templates RNA, etc. It
is
enought o say they can be so decomposed if we need to (that is, if it
becomes
crucial to explanation). The rest of the time we bracket off physics
from biology.
Ragland1:
Okay.
Wilkins:
And yes, I am part of the Biohumanities Project. And no, I do not
believe in
the existence of an ontologically distinct "mind" apart from
biological, and
ultimately physical, facts about organisms.
Ragland1:
That's not what I'm asking. First, do you believe in the existence of
an ontologically distinct "mind" which is a part of the biological, and
ultimately
physical facts about the "human organism"? This is important. The mind
and
the brain are separate yet at the same time closely interrelated. Do
you accept
that? If so, how are they the same and yet different? Or do you think
the mind
is an illusion which can be understood strictly through particular
neurological
brain mechanisms without reference to a higher level? It takes many
different materials
to build a skyscraper. Where did the skyscraper come from? It takes
many different materials
to make up the brain. Where does the mind come from? How does the
"whole" become the sum
of its parts?
Wilkins:
People should simply drop the notion of "holism", which really has nothing
much to do with classical reduction.
Ragland:
I don't think so. I will concede both reductionism and holism are
interdependent although some theorists of emergence and complexity
theory would disagree. Thus far I've found more evidence of emergence
in "non-biological" areas such as grammar, language, intelligence,
consciousness, etc. I think holism does have something to do with
classical reduction even if the latter seems opposed to it.
Wilkins:
The devil is in the details. "Emergence" is one of those things I have
sought
in vain for an explanation of. So far as I can see, it means little
more that
"Whoa! Didn't expect *that*!"
Ragland1:
Hopefully as we learn more there will be a better understanding of
emergence.
On a theoretical note, I'll add if we change the parts that make up the
sum and
vice versa this will likely result in some form of emergence.
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Biohumanities Project
University of Queensland - Blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
Who are you going to believe? Me, or your own eyes?
.
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