Re: Addressing Scientific Reductionism
- From: John Wilkins <john@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 17 Mar 2006 11:43:00 -0500 (EST)
whitesickle@xxxxxxx wrote:
....
Ragland:
You've kind of contradicted yourself. In one case regarding physical
reductionism you cite the need for a special biological science because
we simply cannot make the inferences from physics to biology due to the
time it would take yet on the other hand state those who think biology
must have laws i.e. special biological science are nonreductionists.
You may have your own views on this "special biological science" such
as when you mention, "Others, like myself, think that it is enough to
have a domain specific generalisation, and that these need not be
exceptionless" but nevertheless they are part of that "special
biological science" which if physics theoretically could, would
eliminate it. From a physical reductionist view you appear to paint the
need for a special biological science as necessary but ultimately
obsolete because we simply cannot make the inferences from physics to
biology due to the time it would take. Are you really a part of the
Biohumanities Project? Do you see any differences between physics and
biology? Do you think "mind" exists?
Wilkins:
Slow down. I think that biological science, the disciplines, are detached
in large part from physics (and chemistry) because not all physical and
chemical states in biology are necessary - there's a contingency in the
construction of biological states out of physical states (for the same
reason, we need a geology, an astrophysics, etc.).
On the other hand, any science must have generalisations or abstractions in
order to proceed. I'm just rejecting the sometimes made claim that for
explanation in science to work you must have exceptionless laws. I think
it's enough for contingent, or "special", sciences to explain things in
terms of generalisations even when, unlike traditional "laws" they are
exception-ridden.
Perhaps Laplacean Demon biologists could eliminate all biology in favour of
Schrödinger's equation. We certainly can't. But the ontological
commitments of a physicalist do not dictate the epistemological constraints
they must work with. I believe that everything in biology is physical.
There is nothing that couldn't, given world enough and time, be totally
explained by physical facts and laws. But we don't get knowledge by
insisting that this happen.
Ragland1:
I would argue, convincingly I believe, that if we were able to explain
biology strictly through physical laws and facts we would no longer be the
same form of life we currently are. You write, "I think that biological
science, the disciplines, are detached in large part from physics (and
chemistry) because not all physical and chemical states in biology are
necessary - there's a contingency in the construction of biological states
out of physical states (for the same reason, we need a geology, an
astrophysics, etc.)" That contingency is pretty important. What physical
and chemical states in biology are not necessary? If your using that as the
basis why you think the biological sciences are detached in large part
from physics that is a pretty important question. Would you concede if
these physical and chemical states in biology were removed i.e. the
"contingency" it would possibly result in the death of the organism or at
the very least a radical evolutionary change?
Contingency is a property of our lack of knowledge, apart from quantum
effects, which average out at the level of description we are discussing here.
Something is contingent simply because we don't know what deterministic
processes caused it (but which we could, if we were to investigate each
singular occasion, account for).
WHile history is contingent at the level of description usually applied, it
means only that we don't know the conditions, processes and data that could
give the full account. And because information is lost over time, it's likely
we never coudl explain any singular case deterministically.
Biology has the contingency of history. If an organism happens to die, it
doesn't do so for no reason, just reasons that are bracketed off from our
investigation, either by necessity or practicality.
You write, "On the other hand, any science must have generalisations or
abstractions in order to proceed. I'm just rejecting the sometimes made
claim that for explanation in science to work you must have exceptionless
laws. I think it's enough for contingent, or "special", sciences to explain
things in terms of generalisations even when, unlike traditional "laws"
they are exception-ridden. Would you characterize physical laws as
"exceptionless"? Would you characterize biology as "exception-ridden"? It
would seem you do since you state, "I think that biological science, the
disciplines, are detached in large part from physics (and chemistry)
because not all physical and chemical states in biology are necessary -
there's a contingency in the construction of biological states out of
physical states." The contingency is what makes it exception ridden.
No, what makes it exception ridden is that the processes that occur at the
biological level are governed only by laws of physics. But not all possible
physical states are realised in biology, of course. So our generalisations are
more along the lines of "broadest general description that serves a given
epistemic purpose" than "causal regularities that never fail".
....
Wilkins:
And yes, I am part of the Biohumanities Project. And no, I do not
believe in the existence of an ontologically distinct "mind" apart from
biological, and ultimately physical, facts about organisms.
Ragland1:
That's not what I'm asking. First, do you believe in the existence of an
ontologically distinct "mind" which is a part of the biological, and
ultimately physical facts about the "human organism"? This is important.
The mind and the brain are separate yet at the same time closely
interrelated. Do you accept that? If so, how are they the same and yet
different? Or do you think the mind is an illusion which can be understood
strictly through particular neurological brain mechanisms without reference
to a higher level? It takes many different materials to build a
skyscraper. Where did the skyscraper come from? It takes many different
materials to make up the brain. Where does the mind come from? How does the
"whole" become the sum of its parts?
No, I do not believe that "mind" is something distinct from the state of the
brain and organism. The nearest thing to a distinct category for mind is
perhaps sociality and language. But there remains nothing in "mind" that is
not biological in that extended phenotypic sense, although the "hard problem"
of experience is indeed a hard problem. Because of that problem I also reject
the existence of qualia, or "feels".
Mind is the state of the entire system in an ecological and social context.
This is one sort of philosophical view. It is not the only one, but I think it
is the only supportable one in the light of biology and science generally.
Wilkins:
People should simply drop the notion of "holism", which really has
nothing much to do with classical reduction.
Ragland:
I don't think so. I will concede both reductionism and holism are
interdependent although some theorists of emergence and complexity theory
would disagree. Thus far I've found more evidence of emergence in
"non-biological" areas such as grammar, language, intelligence,
consciousness, etc. I think holism does have something to do with
classical reduction even if the latter seems opposed to it.
The problem with some kinds of holism is that they want to claim that there is
something above and beyond the complex interactions of the parts. But if you
deny this, and accept that the whole is the *vector* sum of the parts, as it
were, that is just reduction.
Wilkins:
The devil is in the details. "Emergence" is one of those things I have
sought in vain for an explanation of. So far as I can see, it means little
more that "Whoa! Didn't expect *that*!"
Ragland1:
Hopefully as we learn more there will be a better understanding of
emergence. On a theoretical note, I'll add if we change the parts that make
up the sum and vice versa this will likely result in some form of
emergence.
So you *are* a reductionist after all :-)
This is my last post on sbe on this matter. It is barely ontopic and I fear
our Peerless Moderator will become... testy. We wouldn't like him when he's testy.
[moderator's note: Well spotted. - JAH]
--
John S. Wilkins, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Biohumanities Project
University of Queensland - Blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
Who are you going to believe? Me, or your own eyes?
.
- References:
- Addressing Scientific Reductionism
- From: whitesickle@xxxxxxx
- Re: Addressing Scientific Reductionism
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- Addressing Scientific Reductionism
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