Re: Phenomenological Continuity and Discontinuity

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 06/04/04 

Date: Fri, 04 Jun 2004 20:28:09 GMT

On 4 Jun 2004 00:33:04 -0700, dsutherland7@hotmail.com (neepy) in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in message news:<40bf2ef0.93894059@netnews.att.net>...
>> On 3 Jun 2004 05:19:07 -0700, dsutherland7@hotmail.com (neepy) in
>> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >Mind = Brain. And the brain is part of the body.
>>
>> Ah, well. Mechanically the brain is a differential engine that
>> produces the mind and mental effects. Recognizing this is no more
>> difficult than recognizing other mechanical differences that allow us
>> to isolate genes, neurons, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
>> The mind is produced by the brain but is not the brain any more than
>> genes are the atoms and elementary particles in genes.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>The equals sign in my statement "Mind = Brain" can be interpreted in
>different ways. The point I was really trying to make is that, contra
>what you said, the vast majority of scientists working in the area of
>"mind/brain/body" (i.e. biological psychologists and neuroscientists)
>explicitly reject mind-body dualism. The only prominent dualist of
>recent years I can think of was John Eccles (who died quite recently).
> Anyway, if you want to see how the "problem" (maybe "pseudoproblem"
>is better) is tackled by contemporary scientists have a look at
>"Descartes' Error" by Antonio Damasio. The title says it all.
>Because I am feeling generous (today), I have even tracked down a
>review to give you a taster:
>http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/damasio.htm

After reading the review I just don't see how any of Damasio's
thoughts alter the nature of the problem. Granted naive mentalism is
erroneous, nothing in the review actually shows what the mind is or
how it does or doesn't arise in mechanical terms. It simply maintains
that evolution has conditioned brain structure and activity in a
manner required by the evolutionary requirements of the body. In other
words as far as I can tell it doesn't solve the mind-brain-body
dichotomy; it doesn't even resolve it; it just rejects it and claims
the only thing needed by the body is neurological activity. That may
be, but it really doesn't explain what neurological activity is that
the body needs. It's obvious the body needs neurological activity. The
question is why and how? All Damasio's opinions indicate that he
thinks the body needs neurological activity but that neurological
activity doesn't indicate a mind. He just doesn't indicate any
mechanical basis for this belief. That's what science does. Damasio's
arguments amount to nothing more than a series of unsubstantiated
claims as to what neuroscience will find when it gets to the end of
the rainbow, if it ever does. This may count for science in modern
psychology and neuroscience but not for the mechanics of sentience.
I appreciate your consideration in providing the reference and it
clarifies fairly effectively what I suspect modern neuroscientists and
psychologists hope is true. However I'll just stick to the mechanics
of sentience instead.

Regards - Lester

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