Re: The fun with the "categorization"

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Date: Fri, 09 Jul 2004 19:56:00 GMT

"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:6e2f1d09.0407090938.5004be66@posting.google.com...
> You are asking the wrong questions. Can you not see that the very way
> that you ask the questions defines what form the answers are supposed
> to take?

I can see that point of view in the context of the use of everyday
language, and have an intuition about what your getting at in this context,
and I thought that might have been part of the problem in replying to the
question when I posted it. I will have to ponder the implications of it.
Also, I will have a think about what you've written below.

>
> All "learning" is "unconscious" except for those that have been
> trained to observe their own behavior. But we cannot be trained to
> describe all of that and we sometimes find ourselves responding to
> stimuli, and we cannot say anymore than that - sometimes (as in the
> Hefferline experiments) some cannot even say that. In the case you
> mentioned, triads that are solvable are composed of words that have
> occurred frequently together in extended discussions, readings, etc.
> This tends to make the words a sort of single stimulus class.
> Technically speaking, such words (or larger phrases) are linked
> "intraverbally." That is, hearing or reading these words alter the
> probability of responses that tend to occur with them in discussions,
> text etc. The behavioral mechanism is stimulus control; the term
> "vertebrate" is more likely to be part of reinforced speech than
> "backswing" when the discussion is about "mammals" and "reptiles."
> This means that, for example, when the discussion is about "the
> beach," responses like "boat" and "surfing" increase in probability
> because, all things being equal, speech contain these terms is likely
> to be reinforced by attention from one's listeners. Otherwise one is
> "changing the topic." In experiments like the one you describe, we
> detect these sorts of behavioral changes, especially when you present
> three related words - this has the effect of strongly influencing the
> probability of other related responses. We can detect this effect,
> even if the responses strengthened do not include "giving the answer."
> So, stuff like this, as well as some of the "memory illusion" stuff is
> only confusing when you think in terms of "knowledge of semantics"
> rather than the variables that alter the probability of responses, and
> the contingencies responsible for our ability to describe our
> behavior.
>
> Similarly, if you want to see good research getting at issues like
> this, you could do enough reading to be able to understand the
> "equivalence class" literature that appears in JEAB and elsewhere.
>
>
>
> "MrPat" <mrpat@blue-g46 875£"yyonder.co.uk> wrote in message
news:<WkvHc.13257$Cr5.10923@fe2.news.blueyonder.co.uk>...
> > "David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
> > news:ingzGHBrNP7AFw13@longley.demon.co.uk...
> > > Has it occurred to you that it might suffice just to look more closely
> > > at what the experimenters are actually doing, ie their methods?
> > > --
> > > David Longley
> >
> > Well the extracts from the essay only give a brief overview of the
method;
> > they don't go into details.
> >
> > If you haven't read the second extract (quote) from the essay about
> > unconcious thought have a look, it is a short quote: how come people may
not
> > be consciously able to solve the triad of words, but they can state
whether
> > it is soluble or not. It would appear that this is only possible because
> > they are dealing with the semantics of the problem at some other level
than
> > concsious thought and this is how they know the problem is soluble or
not.
> > Otherwise explain how you think they know.
> >
> > I'm open to learn more about this and your viewpoint, if you aware of
the
> > details of the method in this experiment or similar priming type
experiments
> > where the presence of unconcious 'processes' are infered by the
> > experimenters, how would you criticize them? Please don't lauch into a
> > generalised statement about intensional language and lack of control of
> > variables using language that is too technical for me. See if you can
start
> > with simple primitive concepts that I understand and build on from
there-I'm
> > not an expert.
> >
> > It maybe that to do that is too onerous for you to attempt, but it would
> > help me to further understand these type of experiments and your
viewpoint.

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