Re: Aaron Sloman's "The Irrelevance of Turing Machines to AI" article

From: Wolf Kirchmeir (wwolfkir_at_sympatico.ca)
Date: 08/03/04 

Date: Tue, 03 Aug 2004 09:42:34 -0400

Neil W Rickert wrote:

> Wolf Kirchmeir <wwolfkir@sympatico.ca> writes:
>
> If the way [an ability] changes is fixed, then it is innate. If the way it
> changes depends on the environment, then it is only partially
> innate.

This seems to me to be the old notion of "instincts" in new clothing. I
don't see any point to it - it's a disttraction from the real question:
how do abilities develop?

>>Now you might want to claim that the child always had the ability to
>>make these fine distinctions,
>
>
> No, I don't make that claim. My view is that learning to
> discriminate is a large part of what we consider to be learning.

If by that you mean that discrimination develops, that's what I've beens
saying. If you mean something else, then kindly explain what you mean by
"learning."

>>>> The mechanism is operant
>>>>conditioning in conjunction with changes within the brain, since it
>>>>appears that there is a sequence in the development of different
>>>>discrimination behaviours.
>
>
>>>This does not make a lot of sense either. Operant conditioning
>>>already presupposes some notion of similarity, so cannot be used
>>>to explain how that notion is acquired.

No, operant conditoning does not presuppose a notion of similarity, it
only presupposes the ability to discriminate. Abilities aren't notions,
nor do they require notions.

What, exactly, do you mean by "notion", anyway? Unregenerate behaviorist
that I am, I think of "notion" inn terms of your behaviour. The ability
to discriminate is inborn. A "notion" comes much later. I know you have
"notion of X" because of the way you talk about X. Babies don't talk
about "same" and "different", but toddlers, do - because we train them
to do so. But we could not train them to _talk_ about "same" and
"different" if they didn't already have the ability to perceive
same/different. I repeat: an ability is not a notion. I thought I made
that clear with my references to the learning materails found in
children's book stores, etc. If you don't have small children, I suggest
you spend a few weeks in their company.

>
>>I don't think operant conditioning pre-supposes some notion of
>>similarity _in the conditioned organism_. The notion is part of a theory
>>about what we observe, which means it's an abstraction from behaviour.
>
>
> No two circumstances are identical. What would be the benefit of
> conditioning, if the circumstances where that conditioning applies
> would never occur again. It seems that there is a dependence on
> similarity of circumstances if conditioning of any kind is to be
> useful.

I didn't talk about identity, I talked about similarity. Your notion of
"operant conditioning" is silly. Besides, I've explicitly referred to
situations that are "similar enough." The behaviorist literature is full
of accounts of experiments that have determined the degree of similarity
different organisms can discriminate.

[snip plaintive call for a definition fo "similarity"]

I'm getting tried of this. "Similarity/difference" derive from
non/identity. I gave you a definition in terms of a numbetr computed
from comparison of the elements of two sets. You are are careful not to
quote that part of my post. Thus, I see you as reading for debating
points, not for insight. BTW, I don't claim that my definition is
anything more than an abstraction and a starting point, as I believe I
made clear. I'd be interested to know how you define "similarity".

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