Re: Perceptual symbol systems

From: Sergio Navega (snavega_at_intelliwise.com)
Date: 08/10/04 

Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 11:03:57 -0300

"Traveler" <traveler@nospam.com> escreveu na mensagem
news:hh2ah0t4pke7cchuj3p6dn9j1r70gbt3el@4ax.com...
> In article <4113f221$1_3@news.athenanews.com>, "Sergio Navega"
> <snavega@intelliwise.com> wrote:
>
> >"Traveler" <traveler@nospam.com> escreveu na mensagem
> >news:v4g5h01i294h931ca0ji6ss9pnltg6j4hn@4ax.com...
> >> In article <4112b4dc_6@news.athenanews.com>, "Sergio Navega"
> >> <snavega@intelliwise.com> wrote:
> >> >
> >> >I may find some truth in the idea that intelligence involves the
> >> >manipulation of "symbols", but not that kind of symbol that a
> >> >philosopher (or a GOFAI researcher) thinks. The danger of using
> >> >this word is to confuse "internal symbols" (patterns of activations
> >> >which vaguely stand for something external) with "public symbols"
> >> >(which are the physical markings that we use to communicate with one
> >> >another).
> >>
> >> It is a good thing you saw fit to put "internal symbols" between
> >> quotes because there are no such things. What I mean is that a neural
> >> spike may be considered a symbolic event from the point of view of an
> >> outside observer looking in, but from the point of view of the brain
> >> itself, it is just another spike. So the mechanism of the brain could
> >> not possibly be thought of as manipulating symbols.
> >
> >The big jump we have to give here is not to consider a single spike as
> >representing one "symbol", but to look at the dynamical (and transient)
> >behavior of a group of neurons as standing for some external stimuli
> >(or at least standing for some specific properties of that external
> >stimuli).
>
> I agree that it does have correspondence with external phenomena, but
> only from the outside observer's point of view. Not from the point of
> view of the brain. In trying to understand brain function, it is
> important, IMO, to put oneself in the shoes of an ontological
> solipsist and ignore the external world. IOW, if you want to
> understand the neuron, be the neuron! If you want to understand a cell
> assembly, be the cell assembly! Neurons and assemblies do not see an
> outside world. All they see are spikes and temporal patterns of
> spikes. Nothing else. Spikes and patterns of spikes should be the
> primary basis for a science of brain organization. The outside world
> is important only as far as testing our models is concerned.

I agree that this is what one should do, provided that one is trying
to build a neural system. But are we trying to build a neural system
or are we interested in building an artificial intelligent mechanism?
These questions are not the same. I don't think we should constrain our
vision by looking specifically to a neural system. What I think is necessary
is a more abstract vision of the processes going on inside that
machine. And in order to do that, one has to consider the environment,
because it seems obvious that our brain reflects and alters its
environment (in other words, it is a complex and interdependent system).

>
> Certainly, we can use external observations as a guide which will
> direct us toward possible models. But, in formulating our models, we
> must not think in terms of symbols or knowledge representation. That
> is a red herring and a waste of time.
>
> >> >> What I am saying is that we must look for more fundamental
principles.
> >> >> Neurons do not manipulate symbols and they do not categorize.
> >> >
> >> >But a group of neurons (or the *behavior* of a group of neurons) may
> >> >be equivalent (functionally equivalent) to some kind of symbol
> >> >processing machine (symbol here understood in that "internal" sense
> >> >I have mentioned above).
> >>
> >> Again, to an outside observer, yes. But not to the brain itself. This
> >> should be clear to anyone willing to give it a modicum of thought.
> >> Hence the reason that GOFAI and its supporters are bankrupt. This
> >> realization should have changed the approach taken by the AI community
> >> a long time ago. But I guess incestuous ideas begotten within a close
> >> knit group only beget more incestuous ideas.
> >
> >I share your discredit toward GOFAI, but one have to ponder why
> >they have believed that during so much time (and why there's still
> >supporters of this idea).
>
> It is a phenomenon that I have taken to calling "group think." It is a
> behavior among groups wherein peer pressure and the willingness to
> conform prevent members of the group from thinking outside the box.
> This applies to all groups, including political, religious and
> scientific ones. It is a form of self-imposed blindness.

This is a reason why I always try to consider what are the fundamental
points behind the theories that compete with mine. Bertrand Russell
once said "I would never die for my beliefs, because I might be wrong".

> > The fact is that sometimes we really act
> >as if we were processing symbols.
>
> We do process symbols. But that is an external behavior based on
> external observation. It is not the basis of intelligence.
>
> >Any solution conceived to be
> >human-like will have to present similar behaviors (even if, internally,
> >very different processes are running). Thus, I see GOFAI as
> >presenting a series of constraints that our systems must obey.
>
> If that is all that they did, I would have nothing to complain about.
> But they went much further than that, to the detriment of AI research.
> They declared that intelligence is based on symbol processing, which
> could not be further from the truth, as I have shown.
>
> >> >> Categorization is just one of many by-products of intelligence. I
have
> >> >> been preaching (for want of a better word) for a long time that
> >> >> fundamental intelligence is temporal in nature.
> >> >
> >> >Perhaps I can also say that I've also been "preaching" that
intelligence
> >> >is a subset of the behavior of machines capable of pattern
manipulation.
> >> >Such pattern manipulation machinery uses, in our brain, temporally
> >> >implemented processes.
> >>
> >> I disagree. To manipulate a symbolic pattern, one needs to know what
> >> the pattern represents.
> >
> >I don't think so.
>
> You are kidding me?

Given a set of rules and a symbolic pattern, one can manipulate it
and do something useful without ever needing to know what the symbols
stand for. I have nothing against this claim. However, what GOFAI's
admirers claim is much more problematic. They say that by manipulating
symbolic patterns one can present intelligent behavior *in the natural
world*. This is the unsupported claim.

> > But never mind, the kind of symbol I'm interested
> >have some special properties.
>
> This should not be dismissed so casually, IMO. The operational closure
> of the brain is an important consideration.

Can you ellaborate that?

> >> After a symbol stand for something else,
> >> otherwise it is not a symbol. The brain does not such thing. Why?
> >> Because it has no idea what the pattern represents. A neural spike is
> >> just a spike.
> >
> >One of the interesting things that have been developed in the last
> >decade or so is the idea of "perceptual symbol systems", as proposed
> >by Lawrence Barsalou. GOFAI fails because they use amodal symbols.
> >In perceptual symbol systems one uses modal symbols, entities that
> >stand for something (like any symbols must do) but that keep "something
> >else" about that thing. In this regard, perceptual symbol systems
> >conserve some qualities of the thing it represents.
>
> Of course they do. But this is not what intelligence is based on.
> Again, the intelligence does not see the outside world. It only sees
> neural spikes and patterns of spikes. The intelligence may conclude
> that there is an outside world but that is irrelevant to the working
> of the neurons and cell assemblies. These do not care.
>
> Try looking up the term "the operational closure of the nervous
> system" on the web. Some psychologists are way ahead of the GOFAI
> community. The excellent work of Alexander Riegler on anticipation
> comes to mind:
>
>
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/people/riegler/papers/riegler01anticipation.pdf

I'll take a look at it. But to the question it seem to raise (does
anticipation
requires an internal model in the mind or does it is fundamentally embedded
in the organization of the subject?) I can only say that it can be any of
these
alternatives, according to the context in which this is asked.

Sergio Navega.

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