Re: Perceptual symbol systems

From: Glen M. Sizemore (gmsizemore2_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 08/11/04 

Date: 11 Aug 2004 10:56:05 -0700

SN: Calvin and Ojemann have this interesting book called
"Conversations
> with Neil's brain". Neil was a man which accepted to be "poked in the
> brain" during a surgery in his brain. He reports several sensations,
> such as scents, images, feelings. These were the result of electrical
> stimulations directly to the brain's tissue. This is an example of
> behavior (his verbal report during the surgery) which was produced
> because of nonsensory methods. Who can deny that his brain had
> "stored" some kind of information which produced that verbal report?
>
> GS: I can and do. But then I respect the meanings of terms, while you and
> other cognitivists simply alter meanings to suit your philosophical
> assumptions.

SN: If it is that difficult for you to understand what one means by
"store",
perhaps you would say that a piece of paper with a telephone number
written on it and which is put inside a drawer *is not* an example of
"storage of information".

GS: No, that is an example of storage.

SN: If you exclude this interpretation of the word
"store", then you and other behaviorists are quite peculiar in
relation
to the understanding of the remainder of mankind.

GS: As I said, if you put a piece of paper in a drawer so it can later
be retrieved, you have, indeed, stored it. What I claim is that the
environment that shapes behavior is not stored in any sense, just as
the environment that shapes the characteristics of species are not
stored.

> We have been over this many times - the least you could do is
> give some sign that you understand my position; after all, I understand
> yours perfectly, and have for more than twenty years. Again, the brain is
> changed by one's history, but it does not follow that anything has been
> "stored." By the way, Penfield did the same thing and similar claims were
> made about his work. But one thing that was clear was that the "memories"
> sometimes depended on the current context and worse, they were frequently
> "memory illusions." A person would remember ol' Aunt Betsy cooking bread
in
> the house in Boston - only Aunt Betsy died before the move to Boston, etc.

SN: Illusions or not, the fact is that behavior was produced because
of
nonsensory stimulation.

GS: So what? My position does not suggest that that should be
impossible.

SN: If that's difficult for you to grasp,[]
GS: It isn't. It just doesn't have anything to do with what I said
and, as I pointed out, looking closely at the results of stimulation
"experiments" like those of Penfield, and the jerks you cite, reveals
anything but evidence for "storage."

SN: []let me try to give an even more difficult situation: that
creative behavior is often
the result of novel manipulations of representations. But I guess no
behaviorist would dare to study (or even consider) creative behavior.

GS: Guess again.

> SN: Why is it so insane to call this a "representation"? Why is it
> inadequate to study these representations? Why should researchers
> be in danger for thinking about these things?
>
> GS: I suggest you read a paper entitled something like
"Representationalism
> and the Obfuscation of Memory" by some folks that are too stupid to see
how
> behavioristic they are. Also, think about why it wasn't until fairly
> recently that it was discovered (or at least taken seriously) that people
> will remember things quite vividly that never occurred, such as the
Roediger
> and Mcdermott (sp?) effect, and what this suggests about "information" in
> the environment being stored as representations.

SN: The subject of false memories (as studied by Elisabeth Loftus,
Daniel Schacter and others) is something that can be used to support
my case that it is interesting and productive to think about
representations, "storage" and manipulation of information in the
brain.

GS: No, what it shows is that even when you demonstrate unequivocally
that storage and representation cannot be involved (because the
"target word" is not presented, so it obviously can't be stored)
cognitive "scientists" will insist that storage and retrieval are
relevant. Did you read "Representationalism and the Obfuscation of
Memory" yet?

SN: But this step can only be given
by people which has a minimum understanding of what "information"
means.
Do you think that "information" is a notion that must not be
considered?

GS: You mean the technical term or the colloquial? Anyway, I think
that most cognitive scientists use the ordinary meanings of
"information" (which leads immediately to a homunculism) and when
called on it they cite Shannon.

> > SN: And who said we can't have representations of representations? Why
> > would that be impossible or even awkward? Just because something
> > seems to be derived from another, it doesn't have to be so up to
> > infinity. Representing representations is a topic studied in
> > metacognition.
> >
> > GS: When I push the button up on my flashlight, a bunch of photons
> > come out. When I pull the trigger on a pistol, a bullet comes out. Is
> > any of that "representation?" Anyway, the problem with saying that the
> > world must be copied in order to be seen (and it IS always humorous
> > when mainstream psychologists do attempt some kind of analysis of
> > concepts) but not all of the copies need copies to be seen, is that it
> > simply invents two kinds of seeing to cover an obvious flaw in
> > reasoning. If seeing requires copies, then copies must require copies
> > to be seen because seeing requires copies. If one just says "Oh seeing
> > a representation doesn't require copies" then one wonders why any
> > seeing requires copies at all.
>
> SN: When an engineer "sees" a bridge in his mind before it put it on paper
> and before it is built, he/she is manipulating this representation
> (in other words, he/she is "thinking").
>
> GS: I disagree. What a person does is some of the same things they would
do
> if they were "thinking on paper," which is probably more how they do it.
>
> SN: When a mathematician verifies
> a proof of a theorem in his mind, he/she is thinking about it, or
> to say it in another way, he/she is manipulating representations.
>
> GS: I disagree. What a person does is some of the same things they would
do
> if they were "thinking on paper," which is probably more how they do it.

SN: Papers and computers and notebooks and beach sand are all physical
supports
that help the externalization of part of one's own representations
(and also
to intermediate the communication with others). They substantially
improve
one's internal manipulation of information, but they are not
necessary.
In other words, you can think with your brain and a piece of paper,
but
you cannot think with a piece of paper and no brain.

GS: Man, you are just full of insights today! Anyway, there is a
difference between thinking with no props and thinking with them; the
former is usually much less efficient. Try multiplying 1,347,234 and
694,562 in your head. Just a wee bit easier on paper, don't you think?

"Sergio Navega" <snavega@intelliwise.com> wrote in message news:<411a13e3$1_2@news.athenanews.com>...
> "Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> escreveu na mensagem
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