Re: Perceptual symbol systems

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 08/11/04 

Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 20:44:47 GMT

A truly fascinating message sequence that puts the lie squarely to
behaviorism and materialism in strictly mechanical terms.

On 11 Aug 2004 10:56:05 -0700, gmsizemore2@yahoo.com (Glen M.
Sizemore) in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>SN: [. . .] Who can deny that his brain had
>> "stored" some kind of information which produced that verbal report?
>>
>> GS: I can and do. But then I respect the meanings of terms, while you and
>> other cognitivists simply alter meanings to suit your philosophical
>> assumptions.

Yes, yes because behaviorists respect the meanings of terms materially
but fail to consider alternatives that suit cognitivists philosophical
assumptions but not materialists' philosophical assumptions.

>SN: If it is that difficult for you to understand what one means by
>"store", perhaps you would say that a piece of paper with a telephone number
>written on it and which is put inside a drawer *is not* an example of
>"storage of information".
>
>GS: No, that is an example of storage.

Aha! So, would differences between one telephone number and another
written on a piece of paper put in a drawer be an example of storage?
And would you or other materialists recognize those differences as a
copy of the original telephone number?

>SN: If you exclude this interpretation of the word
>"store", then you and other behaviorists are quite peculiar in
>relation
>to the understanding of the remainder of mankind.
>
>GS: As I said, if you put a piece of paper in a drawer so it can later
>be retrieved, you have, indeed, stored it.

Exactly! And if differences between one telephone number and another
put in a drawer together with what is common to both can be used to
reconstruct the original, together the original can be retrieved. So
you have indeed stored the original telephone number. Oh, goody, we
finally agree on something.

> What I claim is that the
>environment that shapes behavior is not stored in any sense, just as
>the environment that shapes the characteristics of species are not
>stored.

And what you claim is irrelevant because you offer no proof of the
claim except your contention that you recognize no material copies of
the environment in the brain. The fact is that you would recognize no
differential copy of the environment in the brain but that that would
represent storage subject to retrieval in some sense thus contradict
your claim. Oh QED yes indeedy!

>> We have been over this many times - the least you could do is
>> give some sign that you understand my position; after all, I understand
>> yours perfectly, and have for more than twenty years.

Yes, well another self serving claim not apparently subject to proof -
or, as Wolf might say, validation - except through the self proclaimed
and long suffering martyrdom of materialists everywhere. Well, I think
we know and understand your position exactly now. Materialists insist
that the only conceivable copies subject to storage and retrieval in
the brain are material copies that they can recognize as material
copies upon examination under a microscope and that in the absence of
such images there can simply be no such things as copies, storage, or
retrieval by or in the brain.

> Again, the brain is
>> changed by one's history, but it does not follow that anything has been
>> "stored." By the way, Penfield did the same thing and similar claims were
>> made about his work. But one thing that was clear was that the "memories"
>> sometimes depended on the current context and worse, they were frequently
>> "memory illusions." A person would remember ol' Aunt Betsy cooking bread
>in
>> the house in Boston - only Aunt Betsy died before the move to Boston, etc.

This obviously proves that nothing could have been stored since
materialist copies of artifacts would have been the only way to
retrieve material copies and to remember events. Of course if
differential storage and retrieval techniques were employed, this
would never explain how events could be mis re-membered at all.

>SN: The subject of false memories (as studied by Elisabeth Loftus,
>Daniel Schacter and others) is something that can be used to support
>my case that it is interesting and productive to think about
>representations, "storage" and manipulation of information in the
>brain.
>
>GS: No, what it shows is that even when you demonstrate unequivocally
>that storage and representation cannot be involved (because the
>"target word" is not presented, so it obviously can't be stored)
>cognitive "scientists" will insist that storage and retrieval are
>relevant. [. . .]

Except you have demonstrated unequivocally that material copies of
storage and representation cannot be involved, not that differential
storage and representation cannot be involved.

>SN: But this step can only be given
>by people which has a minimum understanding of what "information"
>means.
>Do you think that "information" is a notion that must not be
>considered?
>
>GS: You mean the technical term or the colloquial? Anyway, I think
>that most cognitive scientists use the ordinary meanings of
>"information" (which leads immediately to a homunculism) [. . .]

Of course it does when you are talking about material copies which,
unfortunately, many cognitive scientists do without analyzing the
issue critically. However, in your case you analyze the issue
critically and still come up with the wrong - ie materialist - answer.

>> > SN: And who said we can't have representations of representations? Why
>> > would that be impossible or even awkward? Just because something
>> > seems to be derived from another, it doesn't have to be so up to
>> > infinity. Representing representations is a topic studied in
>> > metacognition.

There is no problem with representations of representations as long as
your idea of representations are differential because they can always
be stored and retrieved problematically at least. Otherwise seen as
material representations and not differential representations, of
course, there could be no representations of representations at all.

>> > GS: When I push the button up on my flashlight, a bunch of photons
>> > come out. When I pull the trigger on a pistol, a bullet comes out. Is
>> > any of that "representation?" [. . .]

Unfortunately when you pull the trigger on your brain no light comes
out either.

Regards - Lester