Re: Perceptual symbol systems
From: Sergio Navega (snavega_at_intelliwise.com)
Date: 08/11/04
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Date: Wed, 11 Aug 2004 19:24:40 -0300
"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> escreveu na mensagem
news:6e2f1d09.0408110956.39f178a2@posting.google.com...
> SN: Calvin and Ojemann have this interesting book called
> "Conversations
> > with Neil's brain". Neil was a man which accepted to be "poked in the
> > brain" during a surgery in his brain. He reports several sensations,
> > such as scents, images, feelings. These were the result of electrical
> > stimulations directly to the brain's tissue. This is an example of
> > behavior (his verbal report during the surgery) which was produced
> > because of nonsensory methods. Who can deny that his brain had
> > "stored" some kind of information which produced that verbal report?
> >
> > GS: I can and do. But then I respect the meanings of terms, while you
and
> > other cognitivists simply alter meanings to suit your philosophical
> > assumptions.
>
> SN: If it is that difficult for you to understand what one means by
> "store",
> perhaps you would say that a piece of paper with a telephone number
> written on it and which is put inside a drawer *is not* an example of
> "storage of information".
>
> GS: No, that is an example of storage.
So this means that if this piece of paper contained not a phone number,
but a numbered account of a swiss bank full of money, that would not,
in your vision, be an example of storage of information. What a sad
vision of reality you behaviorists have.
> SN: If you exclude this interpretation of the word
> "store", then you and other behaviorists are quite peculiar in
> relation
> to the understanding of the remainder of mankind.
>
> GS: As I said, if you put a piece of paper in a drawer so it can later
> be retrieved, you have, indeed, stored it. What I claim is that the
> environment that shapes behavior is not stored in any sense, just as
> the environment that shapes the characteristics of species are not
> stored.
Your conception of "storage" obviously involves using the word only
in relation to material things. That's quite odd, and even more
in our times, where it seems licit to say that we have "stored
text files in our computers". If one acknowledges the use of
"storage of information" in relation to computers, one is obliged
(provided one wants to be coherent) to also acknowledge the idea
of some sort of "informational change" inside brains.
> > We have been over this many times - the least you could do is
> > give some sign that you understand my position; after all, I understand
> > yours perfectly, and have for more than twenty years. Again, the brain
is
> > changed by one's history, but it does not follow that anything has been
> > "stored." By the way, Penfield did the same thing and similar claims
were
> > made about his work. But one thing that was clear was that the
"memories"
> > sometimes depended on the current context and worse, they were
frequently
> > "memory illusions." A person would remember ol' Aunt Betsy cooking bread
> in
> > the house in Boston - only Aunt Betsy died before the move to Boston,
etc.
>
> SN: Illusions or not, the fact is that behavior was produced because
> of
> nonsensory stimulation.
>
> GS: So what? My position does not suggest that that should be
> impossible.
But your position denies any form of "storage" in the brain. If
the brain, in your conception, has nothing "stored" (neither
information), how come it presents behavior by itself?
> SN: If that's difficult for you to grasp,[]
> GS: It isn't. It just doesn't have anything to do with what I said
> and, as I pointed out, looking closely at the results of stimulation
> "experiments" like those of Penfield, and the jerks you cite, reveals
> anything but evidence for "storage."
>
> SN: []let me try to give an even more difficult situation: that
> creative behavior is often
> the result of novel manipulations of representations. But I guess no
> behaviorist would dare to study (or even consider) creative behavior.
>
> GS: Guess again.
So are you able of talking about creativity? How would you explain
the creative behavior of artists, scientists and even politicians
(I'm also considering "bad creations")? I'm obviously asking for
a scientific take at the subject, and not the usual mumbo-jumbo
about stimuli and response.
> SN: The subject of false memories (as studied by Elisabeth Loftus,
> Daniel Schacter and others) is something that can be used to support
> my case that it is interesting and productive to think about
> representations, "storage" and manipulation of information in the
> brain.
>
> GS: No, what it shows is that even when you demonstrate unequivocally
> that storage and representation cannot be involved (because the
> "target word" is not presented, so it obviously can't be stored)
> cognitive "scientists" will insist that storage and retrieval are
> relevant. Did you read "Representationalism and the Obfuscation of
> Memory" yet?
Didn't find the paper yet. A pointer might help.
> SN: But this step can only be given
> by people which has a minimum understanding of what "information"
> means.
> Do you think that "information" is a notion that must not be
> considered?
>
> GS: You mean the technical term or the colloquial? Anyway, I think
> that most cognitive scientists use the ordinary meanings of
> "information" (which leads immediately to a homunculism) and when
> called on it they cite Shannon.
I mean information in the mathematical way, as introduced by Shannon.
I have no idea what a behaviorist could do with Shannon's definition,
but I know quite a lot of important consequences for cognitive science
(without resort to homunculi).
> SN: Papers and computers and notebooks and beach sand are all physical
> supports
> that help the externalization of part of one's own representations
> (and also
> to intermediate the communication with others). They substantially
> improve
> one's internal manipulation of information, but they are not
> necessary.
> In other words, you can think with your brain and a piece of paper,
> but
> you cannot think with a piece of paper and no brain.
>
> GS: Man, you are just full of insights today! Anyway, there is a
> difference between thinking with no props and thinking with them; the
> former is usually much less efficient. Try multiplying 1,347,234 and
> 694,562 in your head. Just a wee bit easier on paper, don't you think?
Easier on paper, but not impossible to the well trained mind. By
the way, using some simple heuristics anyone can do math much more
efficiently. And guess what: these heuristics are "stored" in our
brain.
Sergio Navega.
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