Re: Perceptual symbol systems

From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 08/15/04 

Date: Sun, 15 Aug 2004 17:42:03 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:

> On Thu, 12 Aug 2004 20:38:52 GMT, patty <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net>
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>>>On Thu, 12 Aug 2004 17:05:13 GMT, patty <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net>
>>>in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>If there is some brain change in response to environmental factors
>>>>>and if the brain change cannot be a material copy of environmental
>>>>>factors, it has to be a differential copy of environmental factors.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>He is saying (Glen, please correct me if i misspeak) that there is not
>>>>even a *copy* (material or whatever), and there is not even a process of
>>>>copying.
>>>
>>>
>>>OK. I agree. I have complimented Glen in the past on his analysis of
>>>homuncular regression characteristic of material copying. But that
>>>isn't the end of the problem if one then admits there are changes to
>>>the brain as the result of environmental factors. One might be able to
>>>deny material copying if one also denies changes to the brain as the
>>>result of environmental factors. But if one correctly denies material
>>>copying-storage-retrieval and admits changes to the brain as the
>>>result of environmental factors, then one is forced to say what the
>>>source of the change is. And if brain changes are not material, they
>>>can only be differential.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> He uses the analogy that DNA does not contain a copy of the
>>>>environmental pressures that shaped a species. In the case of DNA it is
>>>>obvious (at least to me) that the changes of the environmental pressures
>>>>could not be *reproduced* from the information contained in the DNA
>>>>regardless of how sophisticated our technology becomes. That information
>>>>is simply not there.
>>>
>>>
>>>So, what is the nature of this information that isn't there? If it
>>>isn't material then it must be what?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> But in the case of the image of the rose in my
>>>>brain, his assertion is rather startling; because i can *reproduce* that
>>>>information about that rose somewhat accurately on paper with a paint
>>>>brush. It is hard (almost impossible) for me to conceive that the
>>>>information about the rose is not contained in my brain.
>>>
>>>
>>>Oh, it is. The only question is the nature of the information about
>>>the rose. Glen claims that there are only changes in the brain but
>>>fails to say what those changes are. He say the changes cannot be
>>>material due to considerations of homuncular regression, and I agree.
>>>So the changes have to be non material. And if they are not material,
>>>they are immaterial and have to be differential in form.
>>>
>>>Regards - Lester
>>
>>What is the distinction between material differences (changes in the
>>configuration of substance or process in her brain) and (changes?) that
>>are differential in form ?
>
>
> This is a good question, but I want to make it clear at the outset
> that Glen does not use the terms "material copy" or "differential
> copy". That is my construction of what he says. Glen uses the terms
> copy, storage, and retrieval for the analysis of homuncular regression
> where I would use the terms material copy, storage, and retrieval
> because that's the only way homuncular regression actually occurs.
>
> Material changes are just those in which changes are subordinated to
> the thing in itself. It's not uncommon in cognitive science for people
> to describe the perception of a table or chair, for example, in terms
> of copies and the storage and retrieval of the copies as analogs for
> perception and memory. However if all that's being indicated is that
> the image or parts of the image are being copied, stored, and recalled
> as it is, then the processes of copying, storing, and recall are just
> material in nature and we could expect to find some neuroelectrical
> image of the table or chair in the brain. This is called a homuncular
> regression because this material copy would still require someone, a
> homuncule in other words, to see the image whose seeing was already
> supposed to have been explained by the copying, storage, and recall.
>
> Non material or immaterial changes on the other hand are those in
> which the thing in itself is subordinated to the change. The result is
> differential change. If the image of a table or chair is focused and
> transmitted, the image remains a material copy of the original. If,
> however, the image is negated or inverted against a problematic
> reference, the result is differential or non material in form in the
> sense that the result bears no definable relation to the original
> without the standard against which the image was negated or inverted.
>
> Let's see if we can be somewhat more literal in terms of examples Wolf
> is so fond of. Suppose we have some environmental image named A with a
> content of A = xxxxyyy and some sentient reference B = xxxxyzz and we
> negate A in reference to B, the result is B - A = C = zz. (Or B could
> be negated in reference to A as long as negation occurs of one in
> relation to the other.)
>
> Now C = zz is not a material copy of A or B. It is differential or
> immaterial in form because there is no way to determine to what
> material circumstance C applies. Yet it is possible to reconstruct A
> from C given B. So there is no homuncular regression involved. C can
> be used, copied, stored, retrieved, etc. or recombined with other
> differences only given the availability of B.
>

Hmmm ... for your B - A = zz, if we take A as an optical image on the
retina and B as the history of previous experience, then zz *is the*
experience that the history has of the optical image. And, as you say,
there is no homuncular regression involved.

patty

> Material changes are different in this regard. There is no sentient
> intermediation involved in material copying, storage, retrieval, or
> recombination. They just remain material images however changed.
>
> The mechanical basis for sentient intermediation are differences
> between material or other sentient differences. Differences can be
> taken between all differences and can continue to be worked with
> differentially. They can also be used to reconstruct material images
> as long as standards of reference against differences are taken are
> available.
>
> This is the mechanical basis for mental effects. The mind itself is
> similarly based but results from the compounding of elementary
> sentient operations.
>
> This is why we don't see our perceptions. We perceive material images
> through sentient intermediation of differences, but the differences
> themselves are not perceived. This is also the reason we can see or
> imagine images without being able to see what they are based on. And
> this is also the reason we make mistakes in reconstructing what we
> remember and imagine we saw in strict material terms.
>
> Regards - Lester