Re: death of the mind.

From: Glen Foy (spam33_at_butter.toast.net)
Date: 08/28/04 

Date: Sat, 28 Aug 2004 14:50:05 -0400

It's difficult to converse with you because you use the specialize
vocabulary of Behaviorism. If I spoke to you in terms of lexical closures,
tail recursive functions and hash tables, would you understand? Probably
not, unless you are a hacker.

Still, I find your passion for this point of view interesting, and would
like to learn more. Could you suggest some references? Should I start with
Watson and Skinner, or is there a general introduction you would recommend?

Enjoyed chatting with you.

-Glen

"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:4130c5cc$1_1@news.athenanews.com...
> GF: A model, it seems to me, is in part operant conditioning. We develop
> > expectancies (a good term) based on previous experience.
> >
> > GS: No, by definition, we acquire some class of responses that have a
> > particular effect on the environment.
> >
> > GF: And it is true that this kind of simple-minded association of one
> thing
> > with
> > another will take you a long way, possibly to the kitchen.
> >
> > GS: Simple-minded? Want to take a test on the subject matter smart-ass?
>
> GF: I was not implying that either Behaviorism or Behaviorists are
> simple-minded. Both are rather subtle, it seems to me. But association
is
> a simple mechanism.
>
>
>
> GS: I don't know what that means. What is it that you are calling
> "association?" If you mean "conditioning processes" are simple, then you
are
> wrong. People have tried for decades, for example, to come up with general
> laws of schedule-controlled behavior with limited success. That is because
> the field is enormously complex and behavior is the product of the dynamic
> interaction of several variables (like rate of response, rate of
> reinforcement, average reinforced inter-response time, number of responses
> per reinforcer, delay of reinforcement, etc. etc. etc. etc.). The
beginning
> of my solution, incidentally, is to regard traditional schedules as part
of
> one big parameter space and investigate the nature of the steady- or
> stable-states produced, whether or not hysteresis is observed, etc. From
> here one may get a better idea of characteristics of the equations
relevant
> to the phase space, all while constructing phenomenological laws that are
> relevant to many schedule types.
>
> > GF: But this doesn't explain problem solving. Let's say that in you
> > journey to the kitchen you discover that your wife has locked the
> > kitchen door. (too many late night snacks) You are not deterred.
> > You decide to go outside and crawl through the kitchen window.
> >
> > You have never done this before. You have not been conditioned to
> > crawl through windows when doors are locked. You have never
> > previously associated windows with entry ways. What you have done is
> > actually rather complex.
> >
> > GS: If, in fact, the person had never entered a room through anything
but
> > the doorway, or never entered a patch of woods from different
directions,
> or
> > never entered a room through 2 different doors, or seen anyone enter a
> room
> > through a window, or had it described to them (perhaps they can't read,
or
> > they "have no language") then they might not enter the room through the
> > window. Basically what you are trying to say, though, is that responses
of
> > novel FORM can occur but can't be accounted for by operant conditioning.
> > This is false. And it is false because definitions of operant response
> > classes are not about FORM. They are about function. Part of the
utterance
> > "lifted" can be the same RESPONSE CLASS as that part in "goed." That is,
> > "goed" is of novel FORM, but its occurrence is attributable to the
> > reinforcement of regular verbs.
>
> GF: I will grant you that some kind of functional generalization may
develop
> based on experience entering rooms, entering a patch of woods, etc.
>
>
>
> GS: At least you read what I write - that is more than I can say for most
> who comment on my posts.
>
>
>
> GF: That generalization is ITSELF a model,[]
>
>
>
> GS: I disagree. But the main point is that behaviorists are interested in
> the current and historical variables that produce the phenomena, while
> mentalists pay lip-service to these variables (and, thus, they have few
> techniques of behavioral control - developmental psychologists, for
example,
> use habituation, classical conditioning, and operant conditioning - all
> behavioral control techniques generated by a real experimental science)
and
> are interested in making up explanations about unobserved events. Events
> that have been simply assumed to exist for millennia.
>
>
>
> GF: involving movement from here to there, obstructions, alternatives,
etc.
> Is this what you mean by "functional response class"?
>
>
>
> GS: Yes. This sort of behavior is very difficult to describe. However,
what
> should be clear is that instead of making up the nonsense that you and
> others do, one could investigate what sorts of histories are necessary to
> observe certain "navigational phenomena."
>
> GF: But you haven't explained how this functional generalization is given
> form.
>
>
>
> GS: Do you mean that I have not explained the physiology of operant
stimulus
> control?
>
>
> GF: In order to give it novel form you must use the knowledge embodied in
> models.
>
>
>
> GS: We do not observe "knowledge" or "models," and we do not, some
believe,
> need to invoke them to explain the observations said to require their
> existence. They are assumptions. In the case of generalized response
> classes, one may demonstrate one's scientific prowess by producing and
> modifying them "at will."
>
>
>
> GF: In the example, you have to decide whether or not you can fit
> through the window, whether or not the window is too high to reach, etc.
> You have no direct experience with this because you have never climbed
> through THAT window before.
>
>
>
> GS: But, nevertheless, the behavior is a function of a relevant history.
> That is the nature of stimulus control. You can make up all the stories
you
> want about what is allegedly going on in the mind, and this has been done
> for centuries - the result is mainstream psychology.
>
>
>
> "Glen Foy" <spam33@butter.toast.net> wrote in message
> news:4130b36d@news03.toast.net...
>
>

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