Re: death of the mind.

From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 08/29/04 

Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2004 22:49:15 GMT

Alex Green wrote:

> Wolf Kirchmeir <wwolfkir@sympatico.ca> wrote in message news:<500Yc.26145$_H5.1005269@news20.bellglobal.com>...
>
>>Alex Green wrote:
>>[...]>>before I deride them.
>>
>>>
>>>Do organisms react to the image on that part of the CNS called the
>>>retina or do they react to things themselves?
>>
>>The answer should be obvious. No animal reacs to the "thing itself" All
>>animals react to what the sensors sense. Is this a quibble? Most of the
>>time, but sometimes it's a crucial distinction.
>
>
> Then the reaction is, at least in part, due to a state in the CNS.
>
>
>>>If the two retinas
>>>contain different images do organisms react to both of them? Do they
>>>report one image or two?
>>
>>Depends on the animal. See chameleons, birds, etc. Ever watch a chicken
>>watch you?
>>
>>Side bar: I get the impression from a lot of posts (not just yours) that
>>too many posters have limited experience of the variety of animals out
>>there. And of the variety of humans, too, for that matter.
>>
>>
>>>Where does binocular fusion occur?
>>
>>In the visual cortex. I mean, where else???? The retinal data from the
>>each eye is split, part going to the same hemisphere, and most (if the
>>size of the nerve-bundle means anything) going to the opposite
>>hemisphere. There is interchange of information between the two
>>hemispheres via the corpus callosum ("thick body" - nice name, eh?)
>>Unofrtunately, knowing the architecture of the brain doesn't help much
>>in "understanding" how binocular fusion occurs. But here's a clue: a
>>friend of mine suffered an anuerysm that destroyed part of his VC. among
>>oither things. He now has a gap in the left half opf his visual field.
>>He can detect this gap _only_ by moving his eye/head so that he sweeps
>>the whole visual field. Then the objects covered by the gap dis/appear.
>>He can't see the gap any other way.
>
>
> This is interesting evidence for a non-cortical location in the brain
> for experience.
>
>
>>>If an
>>>organism reacts to a silouette where is the original thing?
>>
>>???? Do you mean a silhouette in the conventional sense of a strongly
>>back-lit subject? Or do you mean "a silhouette egenrated by the VC?" If
>>the former, the silhouette is the original thing - you can at best only
>>see what the lighting makes it possible to see. If the latter, what's
>>your reason for assuming there is a silhouette in the VC?
>
>
> A silouette is interesting because the 'data' from the entity that
> forms the silouette is very sparse, the entity is 'known' solely from
> the pattern on the retina supplied by light from things that are not
> the entity. If an organism reacts to a silouette it would seem to be
> reacting to an internal state based on extraneous data rather than
> reacting directly to an external stimulus.
>
>
>>>>By the way, you don't know *** about behaviorism.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>I am sure behaviourism has a role in providing insight into the
>>>functioning of the brain.
>>
>>Then learn soemthing about behaviorism. Hint: a lot of the puzzles you
>>raise can be well reformulated into two or more clearly stated puzzles
>>if you know enough about behvaiorism (and neurophysiology, etc). Fuzzy
>>puzzles are unsolvable. I'm no expert in behaviorism, neurophysiology,
>>etc, but I know enough to recognise a fuzzy puzzle. Usually. :-)
>
>
> "In short the behavorists tried to explain learning without referring
> to mental processes"
> http://www.uib.no/People/sinia/CSCL/web_struktur-832.htm
>

A better summary article delineating the various factions and evolution
of behaviorism is <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behaviorism>.

> Behaviourism, in collecting data about the entire output of a set of
> actions, is attempting to recreate the internal state that gave rise
> to these actions (strangely without the admission that this is what it
> is doing).
>

But there are no "internal states" in a behaviorist data. You are
inventing for them variables which they explicitly claim are irrelevant
to their control and prediction of behavior.

> When a cat strikes a mouse it transmits data about its internal state
> through the movement of the paw. A moving paw in itself could mean
> anything but the fact that the paw hit the mouse shows that the cat
> had an intention. The behaviourist that records 'paw hit mouse and
> killed it' is peering into the cat's intention, the behaviourist that
> simply records 'paw moved' is being true to idealistic behaviourism
> because the death of the mouse was just an accident if cats do not
> have mental states.
>

A cat will paw just as ferociously at a bouncing ball. Did she have the
intention to kill the ball? A cat will paw at a lever and then go get
her reward in a dish across the room. Did she have the intention to
kill the lever? How do you scientifically distinguish your attributions
of states (that interpretative process going on *in your head*), from
the alleged intentional states *in the cat* ?

patty

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