Re: First Causes

From: Alex Green (dralexgreen_at_yahoo.co.uk)
Date: 09/14/04 

Date: 14 Sep 2004 03:19:01 -0700

lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) wrote in message news:<4144695e.8291314@netnews.att.net>...
> On Sat, 11 Sep 2004 16:47:32 GMT, Paul Victor Birke
> <nonlinear@rogers.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> >OK Lester, slowly absorbing your comments!
> >
> >thanks
> >
> >Paul
> >
> >PS If I could just say you are arguing that a change is by definition a
> >difference and the first change as it were must therefore be a delta or
> >difference in its essential form. If this too crude a summary?
> >
> >Paul
>
> Hi Paul -
>
> It's hard to agree or disagree. Differences certainly result in change
> and all change originates in differences. But if we rely on change in
> conventional terms to define differences, we may well exclude other
> aspects of differences which do not necessarily result in change. I'm
> thinking here of apparently static differences which define space, for
> example.
>

Asserting that space can only be defined by differences is equivalent
to stating that all information must be encoded. ie: a location of one
point is taken then a location of another point is taken and an output
1 is made if they are different. This is actually equivalent to
building in an assumption that information systems theory (and pre
twentieth century physics) applies to all phenomena.

See: http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~lka/strongai.htm

It is evident from the homunculus argument that somewhere in the brain
the state or form of brain activity takes over from simple encoding.

> The fact is that we don't actually know that all differences result in
> change, and the analysis of differences on that basis alone is too
> simplistic. What we know and can prove is that differences in the form
> of contradiction, negation, and not are the foundation of everything
> whatever they may mean in dynamic terms of change.
>
> Part of the problem is that there are different words in the language
> that all refer to the general idea of differences but do so in various
> seemingly unrelated ways. I'm uncomfortable adding further notions to
> the mix if avoidable, and ideas like first change or delta seem to add
> unnecessary complexity. Where needed for simplicity, I just use the
> symbol "-" to denote differences in the sense of contradiction, not,
> or negation.
>
> >Lester Zick wrote:
> >
> >> On Sat, 11 Sep 2004 13:36:10 GMT, Paul Victor Birke
> >> <nonlinear@rogers.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>>Dear Alex
> >>>
> >>>Is not one of the >>theories of time<< that in fact everything exists
> >>>in some kind of >>now<<. In the >>now<< mix of everything you could
> >>>theorectically have the negation I suppose.
> >>>
> >>>Paul (Engineer)
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Paul
> >>
> >> There seems to be something of a common misunderstanding here; so, I'm
> >> enclosing part of my reply to Alex here to see if we can clear it up.
> >>
> >> ----------------
> >>
> >> There seems to be a misconception here. It sounds to me like you are
> >> considering first causes in historical terms where I intended it more
> >> in the sense of omnipresent. Evolution is certainly considered an
> >> omnipresent cause as would be a prime mover unmoved or the god of
> >> classic religions.
> >>
> >> There is no first cause in historical terms. This is the chicken and
> >> egg problem I mention in my first reply to your post. Causes and
> >> consequences are always mixed up with one another in an ongoing
> >> sequence of interactions. Religion normally and science occasionally
> >> project original causes like creation or the big bang, but these are
> >> highly speculative and largely problematic in my estimation.
> >>
> >> A first cause in the sense of omnipresence is simply a mechanical
> >> reductio used as the driving cause of everything; and differences,
> >> negation, contradicition, not, etc. certainly fill that role. It isn't
> >> that there are no antecedent things between which differences exist.
> >> It's more that without differences no interactions are possible.
> >>
> >> Now, having cleared up the issue of historical versus omnipresent
> >> causation, you can still reasonably ask whether things or differences
> >> take precedence. This problem can be resolved by demonstration and
> >> proof. There is no thing or group or collection of things which can be
> >> proven universally the cause of differences, but differences can be
> >> proven universally the cause of all things.
> >>
> >> The proof is straightforward and simple. We just consider the nature
> >> of alternatives to differences. For the simplest case, let's consider
> >> that everything is the result of P "not" in the sense of negation or
> >> differences. Then alternatives to P "not" are cast in the inherently
> >> self contradictory form of Q "not not". And self contradiction is the
> >> cause of nothing.
> >>
> >> The same is true if we consider P "differences" or P "contradiction"
> >> as the omnipresent cause of everything. In either case Q "different
> >> from differences" or Q "contradiction of contradiction" is inherently
> >> self contradictory and P "differences" or P "contradiction" is proven
> >> the universal cause of everything, and no thing or things can be
> >> proven the universal cause of differences for the simple reason that
> >> there are always non self contradictory alternatives to every thing.
> >>
> >> The reason this is important is that identifying differences in the
> >> sense of contradiction or negation as the omnipresent cause of
> >> everything allows us to identify the categories which things can be in
> >> terms of the compounding of differences in terms of one another. For
> >> example, without going into a lot of explanatory rationale, I consider
> >> things defined in terms of one level differences to be material in
> >> nature and things defined in terms of compound levels of differences
> >> to be sentient in nature.
> >>
> >> What I'd like to stress here is that I'm not dealing in mere hyperbole
> >> and supposition. If there is some demonstrably universally omnipresent
> >> or first cause for everything, it can only be demonstrable through the
> >> universally self contradictory nature of alternatives. Which means in
> >> turn that any universally demonstrable first cause of everything
> >> itself must entail contradiction and cannot just entail any thing
> >> defined in terms of contradiction or differences.
> >>
> >> Regards - Lester
>
>
> Regards - Lester

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