Re: Intelligence and Statistics

From: David Longley (David_at_longley.demon.co.uk)
Date: 09/25/04 

Date: Sun, 26 Sep 2004 00:55:55 +0100

In article <4155fccb$0$44088$5fc3050@dreader2.news.tiscali.nl>, JPL
Verhey <matterDELminds@hotmail.com> writes
>
>"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:pASBvXEYSZVBFwDp@longley.demon.co.uk...
>> In article <10lat47dm2645b8@news20.forteinc.com>, Sergio Navega
>> <snavega@intelliwise.com> writes
>>>"David Longley" <David@longley.demon.co.uk> escreveu na mensagem
>>>news:6bh1ZDDV0TVBFwh7@longley.demon.co.uk...
>>>> In article <10l98s1tkn3ua5b@news20.forteinc.com>, Sergio Navega
>>>> <snavega@intelliwise.com> writes
>>>> >"Glen M. Sizemore" <gmsizemore2@yahoo.com> escreveu na mensagem
>>>> >news:20040924173200.152$Ok@news.newsreader.com...
>>>> >> Do you agree that it is reasonable to characterize feature
>>>> >> extraction/discrimination
>>>> >> circuitry as accomplishing (at least in part) an unsupervised
>>>statistical
>>>> >> analysis of incoming
>>>> >> sensory data? Do you agree that it is reasonable to characterize
>>>> >> the
>>>> >> mechanisms responsible for
>>>> >> conditioning as (again, at least in part) accomplishing a sort of
>>>> >regression
>>>> >> analysis to discover
>>>> >> the relationship between inputs and conditioning signals treated
>>>> >> as
>>>> >> dependent variables?
>>>> >>
>>>> >> GS: I know you weren't asking me, but I'll answer anyway. No.
>>>> >> Just as I
>>>do
>>>> >> not think it is reasonable to assert that gravitationally
>>>> >> interacting
>>>> >bodies
>>>> >> "implement differential equations."
>>>> >
>>>> >Bill did not say such a thing. He said that it is **reasonable** to
>>>> >*characterize* it as accomplishing unsupervised statistical
>>>> >analysis,
>>>> >in the same vein that we can *characterize* the behavior of
>>>> >celestial
>>>> >bodies by a set of differential equations. We went to the Moon
>>>> >because
>>>> >of this "characterization". We are begining to interface brains to
>>>> >prosthetic mechanical arms because of similar neural
>>>> >"characterizations".
>>>> >That's quite "reasonable", don't you think?
>>>> >
>>>> >Sergio Navega.
>>>> >
>>>>
>>>> Mathematical models, simulations, programs or theories facilitate(d)
>>>> our
>>>> *behaviour* in pursuit of those objectives. That's the extensional
>>>> stance at work. You persistently misunderstand the nature of this,
>>>> and
>>>> it's that unreasonable behaviour which accounts for, and sustains,
>>>> your
>>>> pernicious, cognitivist metaphysics.
>>>
>>>Thank you for supporting what I have just said.
>>
>> I haven't supported anything you have said, you just don't grasp what
>> you are being told.
>>
>>> Just to be fair, let
>>>me reproduce your assertion (with a single letter suppression):
>>>
>>> "Mathematical models, simulations, programs or theories facilitate
>>> our *behaviour* in pursuit of those objectives"
>>>
>>
>> These are sets of behaviours which we use to better manage other
>> behaviours.
>
>Yes Davidov, we understand that they are all behaviors.

No you don't, and you don't know what effective procedures are either.

> In other words,
>also concepts that refer to other concepts or refer to behavior are in
>fact behaviors as well. So even you will understand that "behaviorism"
>or "behavior" are concepts or models as well, occuring in the mental
>realms of conceptual thought and language, belonging to a wider spectrum
>of behavior referred to as consciousness, which includes many more
>behaviors such as emotion, going to a dentist etc.

What we see you doing here is nothing less than an illustration of how
easily, and how frequently, people progressively run off the rails of
reason into nonsensical metaphysics and error. You do this because you
don't know what you're talking about, and you don't know what you're
talking about because you're self, not formally trained.

Your way of learning doesn't offer enough accountability, and that's
*why* modern empiricism is so firmly grounded on a web of external
quantifiable evidence. Your (and others' here) neglect of this, really
does take you all rather close to madness in this respect. You simply
make whatever you like up as you go along. You talk yourself into
believing what you think is true, or what you would like to be true.

Language, ie the language of science, is not private. In science, it is
largely extensional, and where it's not, this is just a pragmatic,
expedient matter. Formally, efforts will be made to make it more so, not
less - so you err on entirely the wrong side. What you need to grasp is
that it certainly isn't mental. Sadly, after all this time, you simply
don't understand why. That tells everyone something about your
"intelligence", and that, really, is pretty much all that I'm really
interested in illustrating.

>
>The concept of behavior, as well as any other behavior it refers
>to..which can be other concepts or the behavior of peddling your legs
>riding a bicycle, is as much a mental behavior as any other. Even the
>observation of peddling legs, or picking keys by pigeons, are mental
>behaviors of the scientist recording them in his/her data ***. So are
>the concepts of matter and energy transformations - which would be the
>preffered concepts used by die-hard phycists describing any observed
>behavior.
>
>Also Quine understood, that all that we do is relate experiences with
>other experiences and try to make sense of them. We, anything we know of
>and think about, are all MENTAL i.e. private bodybrain behaviors, DL,
>and you are no excpetion. That you try to be non-Mental,
>non-Spooky-Dooky and try to depict others as "mentalists" won't help -
>it just makes you look more and more rediculous. You, and your "history"
>are a very large stockpile of mentalist and intellectualist knowledge,
>most of which is redundant and unrelated, and that experiential reality
>resides, arises between your own two ears.
>
>But it is clear from your behavior here in this NG, that you have no
>idea whatsoever if and in what way any of your own mental behaviors help
>you to "beter manage other behaviors". You certainly try hard to manage
>or control other people's mental output here with your Priestly and
>arrogant attitude, but your failure to do so and the easy to observe
>fact that you cannot change your own behavior either.. is bad news for
>behaviorism.
>
>
> 

-- 
David Longley
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