Re: The Identity Theory of Mind
From: Paul Bramscher (brams006_nospam_at_tc.umn.edu)
Date: 09/28/04
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Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 13:19:51 -0500
I think the larger question is whether Western philosophy is generally
taught in a dualistic/metaphysical and disengaged (from social problems,
science, etc.) method, and whether most philosophers are actually
interested in influencing science at all.
Some of the more interesting philosophers, I find, are actually
scientists by trade, philosophizing in the sly, commenting directly on
the results of their own empirical work.
Paul Bramscher wrote:
> Lester Zick wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 28 Sep 2004 10:17:46 -0300, "Sergio Navega"
>> <snavega@intelliwise.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>
>>> "Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> escreveu na mensagem
>>> news:4155e080.19588644@netnews.att.net...
>>
>>
>>
>> [. . .]
>>
>>
>>>> I routinely pose this question once a year so I might as well do it
>>>> here. Can you name any philosopher apart from Aristotle and the
>>>> syllogism who contributed anything to the history of ideas and
>>>> science that was demonstrably true and definitively correct?
>>>
>>>
>>> That's quite an interesting question. There's obviously those
>>> philosophers who made "definitively correct" contributions to
>>> logic, arithmetic and other such things, but they would, in
>>> this case, be called mathematicians. Or one could cite so many
>>> philosophers who introduced insightful ideas on the structure
>>> and evolution of communication among humans, but they would,
>>> in this case, be called linguists. Or then those who found a
>>> way to speculate about some things of an empirical nature,
>>> but they would be called scientists.
>>>
>>> That's the problem with philosophers. When they come up with
>>> something that has an empirically strong side, they aren't
>>> seen as philosophers anymore, they are scientists or
>>> mathematicians, or linguists, etc. I believe that philosophers'
>>> task should be to elaborate their abstract thoughts without
>>> being "limited" by reality (and that's why I criticize
>>> philosophies which try to *restrict* empirical work, such
>>> as the ones which try to conceive normative practices).
>>>
>>> What philosophers do is to provide "abstract thought patterns"
>>> that can be suggestive or even *analogically useful* to
>>> scientists. A scientist may be positively influenced by such
>>> thought patterns, up to a point where he/she (the scientist)
>>> may come up with an interesting hypothesis to be empirically
>>> tested. The "origins" of this hypothesis may well be the "mental
>>> diversions" of someone else. But what's really important is not
>>> the origins, but the nature of the results obtained by its
>>> serious application. I'm not fond of discussing highly philosophical
>>> themes, but I really appreciate the vast number of insights that
>>> often come from the minds of philosophers.
>>
>>
>>
>> Okay, Sergio. Extremely well analyzed. However, I would like to add
>> that I have yet to see any scientific advance specifically prompted by
>> some philosopher's philosophy, and I think that is the philosophers'
>> problem and responsibility. It's not just about problematic daydreams.
>>
>> In Aristotle's case the syllogism was prompted by the specific desire
>> and need to have some way to reason about ideas. In my case the
>> philosophy was and is intended to produce a vision of a scientific
>> metaphysics, some specific idea of how reality works in general such
>> that it could and does yield what we see and know outside and in and
>> does so in strict mechanical terms.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>
> Thank goodness for empirical positivism. ;-)
>
> There is one way that philosophers might attempt to advance science,
> though not theories. And this is following up on Popper's definition of
> scientific statements as being those which are falsifiable.
>
> There are clearly (at least) two ways to falsify any statement. One is
> to point out a contradiction in terms, an internal contradiction such
> that the hypothesis as claimed is self-contradictory. Less strong,
> philosophers might dicussion necessary conclusions from the hypothesis
> (external to it, but necessarily implied) which are in some way
> contradictory with one another, or with the original hypothesis.
>
> The other, generally the realm of other scientists, is to produce a
> physical/empirical counter-example to the claim.
>
> This would be philosopher-as-theory-demolitionist. Questioning
> assumptions is a valid means to advancing science, and perhaps actually
> the preferred method.
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