Re: The Identity Theory of Mind

From: Sergio Navega (snavega_at_intelliwise.com)
Date: 09/28/04 

Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 16:07:04 -0300

"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> escreveu na mensagem
news:41598a1e.51280883@netnews.att.net...
> On Tue, 28 Sep 2004 10:17:46 -0300, "Sergio Navega"
> <snavega@intelliwise.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> >"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> escreveu na mensagem
> >news:4155e080.19588644@netnews.att.net...
>
> [. . .]
>
> >> I routinely pose this question once a year so I might as well do it
> >> here. Can you name any philosopher apart from Aristotle and the
> >> syllogism who contributed anything to the history of ideas and
> >> science that was demonstrably true and definitively correct?
> >
> >That's quite an interesting question. There's obviously those
> >philosophers who made "definitively correct" contributions to
> >logic, arithmetic and other such things, but they would, in
> >this case, be called mathematicians. Or one could cite so many
> >philosophers who introduced insightful ideas on the structure
> >and evolution of communication among humans, but they would,
> >in this case, be called linguists. Or then those who found a
> >way to speculate about some things of an empirical nature,
> >but they would be called scientists.
> >
> >That's the problem with philosophers. When they come up with
> >something that has an empirically strong side, they aren't
> >seen as philosophers anymore, they are scientists or
> >mathematicians, or linguists, etc. I believe that philosophers'
> >task should be to elaborate their abstract thoughts without
> >being "limited" by reality (and that's why I criticize
> >philosophies which try to *restrict* empirical work, such
> >as the ones which try to conceive normative practices).
> >
> >What philosophers do is to provide "abstract thought patterns"
> >that can be suggestive or even *analogically useful* to
> >scientists. A scientist may be positively influenced by such
> >thought patterns, up to a point where he/she (the scientist)
> >may come up with an interesting hypothesis to be empirically
> >tested. The "origins" of this hypothesis may well be the "mental
> >diversions" of someone else. But what's really important is not
> >the origins, but the nature of the results obtained by its
> >serious application. I'm not fond of discussing highly philosophical
> >themes, but I really appreciate the vast number of insights that
> >often come from the minds of philosophers.
>
> Okay, Sergio. Extremely well analyzed. However, I would like to add
> that I have yet to see any scientific advance specifically prompted by
> some philosopher's philosophy, and I think that is the philosophers'
> problem and responsibility. It's not just about problematic daydreams.

It really doesn't seem easy to find an specific example where
previous philosophical reasonings led directly to an important
scientific discovery. Perhaps that would explain your skepticism.
But the fact is that very often the solution to a hard scientific
problem depends on a "spark", an illumination that seems to come
from nowhere. I think that sometimes this spark comes from
analogical structures, copies of other kinds of reasonings (or
even diagrams) that can be used to suggest new things in new areas.
Crick & Watson's discovery of the DNA structure is one example of
such a thing (although a lot of hard work was necessary before the
"spark" hit their minds).

> In Aristotle's case the syllogism was prompted by the specific desire
> and need to have some way to reason about ideas. In my case the
> philosophy was and is intended to produce a vision of a scientific
> metaphysics, some specific idea of how reality works in general such
> that it could and does yield what we see and know outside and in and
> does so in strict mechanical terms.

Perhaps worse than Aristotle's syllogisms are Plato's attempt to find
the "perfect forms" that should be used to guide human reasoning. The
desire to find perfect ways to reason is very old. Fortunately, we have
been wise enough to discriminate the good aspects of having normative
strategies that influence human reasoning and the bad aspects that can
only impair creativity and progress. An example of the former is the
essential education one must have in order to produce scientifically
consistent and valid work. An example of the latter is rad. beha...
well, you know what I mean...

I guess the most important point is to recognize that we do have to
be rigorous at times, but flexible and creative at other times.
The real wisdom seems to be when to choose one over the other.

Sergio Navega.

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