Re: The Identity Theory of Mind

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 09/28/04 

Date: Tue, 28 Sep 2004 20:16:31 GMT

On Tue, 28 Sep 2004 13:15:43 -0500, Paul Bramscher
<brams006_nospam@tc.umn.edu> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 28 Sep 2004 10:17:46 -0300, "Sergio Navega"
>> <snavega@intelliwise.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>
>>>"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> escreveu na mensagem
>>>news:4155e080.19588644@netnews.att.net...
>>
>>
>> [. . .]
>>
>>
>>>>I routinely pose this question once a year so I might as well do it
>>>>here. Can you name any philosopher apart from Aristotle and the
>>>>syllogism who contributed anything to the history of ideas and
>>>>science that was demonstrably true and definitively correct?
>>>
>>>That's quite an interesting question. There's obviously those
>>>philosophers who made "definitively correct" contributions to
>>>logic, arithmetic and other such things, but they would, in
>>>this case, be called mathematicians. Or one could cite so many
>>>philosophers who introduced insightful ideas on the structure
>>>and evolution of communication among humans, but they would,
>>>in this case, be called linguists. Or then those who found a
>>>way to speculate about some things of an empirical nature,
>>>but they would be called scientists.
>>>
>>>That's the problem with philosophers. When they come up with
>>>something that has an empirically strong side, they aren't
>>>seen as philosophers anymore, they are scientists or
>>>mathematicians, or linguists, etc. I believe that philosophers'
>>>task should be to elaborate their abstract thoughts without
>>>being "limited" by reality (and that's why I criticize
>>>philosophies which try to *restrict* empirical work, such
>>>as the ones which try to conceive normative practices).
>>>
>>>What philosophers do is to provide "abstract thought patterns"
>>>that can be suggestive or even *analogically useful* to
>>>scientists. A scientist may be positively influenced by such
>>>thought patterns, up to a point where he/she (the scientist)
>>>may come up with an interesting hypothesis to be empirically
>>>tested. The "origins" of this hypothesis may well be the "mental
>>>diversions" of someone else. But what's really important is not
>>>the origins, but the nature of the results obtained by its
>>>serious application. I'm not fond of discussing highly philosophical
>>>themes, but I really appreciate the vast number of insights that
>>>often come from the minds of philosophers.
>>
>>
>> Okay, Sergio. Extremely well analyzed. However, I would like to add
>> that I have yet to see any scientific advance specifically prompted by
>> some philosopher's philosophy, and I think that is the philosophers'
>> problem and responsibility. It's not just about problematic daydreams.
>>
>> In Aristotle's case the syllogism was prompted by the specific desire
>> and need to have some way to reason about ideas. In my case the
>> philosophy was and is intended to produce a vision of a scientific
>> metaphysics, some specific idea of how reality works in general such
>> that it could and does yield what we see and know outside and in and
>> does so in strict mechanical terms.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>Thank goodness for empirical positivism. ;-)
>
>There is one way that philosophers might attempt to advance science,
>though not theories. And this is following up on Popper's definition of
>scientific statements as being those which are falsifiable.
>
>There are clearly (at least) two ways to falsify any statement. One is
>to point out a contradiction in terms, an internal contradiction such
>that the hypothesis as claimed is self-contradictory.

So, why is such a technique not an experimental and hence scientific
validation? The assay of sefl contradiction is as much experimental as
bean counting.

> Less strong,
>philosophers might dicussion necessary conclusions from the hypothesis
>(external to it, but necessarily implied) which are in some way
>contradictory with one another, or with the original hypothesis.
>
>The other, generally the realm of other scientists, is to produce a
>physical/empirical counter-example to the claim.

So, I'm still looking for an empirical counter example to falsify my
contention that everything is differences because nothing can be
different from differences.

>This would be philosopher-as-theory-demolitionist. Questioning
>assumptions is a valid means to advancing science, and perhaps actually
>the preferred method.

Regards - Lester

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