Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth
From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 10/28/04
- Next message: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Previous message: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- In reply to: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Next in thread: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Reply: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ]
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 2004 16:01:54 GMT
Lester Zick wrote:
> On Thu, 28 Oct 2004 01:50:18 GMT, patty <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net>
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>>> Tautologies and Empirical Truth
>>> --------------
>>>
>>>In a frank discussion with Wolf Kirchmeir yesterday concerning whether
>>>tautologies constitute empirical evidence he took occasion to remind
>>>me quite candidly that tautologies are always true. And the moral he
>>>drew from this was that tautological truths can't be empirical because
>>>empirical observations are always problematic and tautologies are not.
>>>
>>>Then I got to pondering. It seemed a shame to have something that was
>>>always true and not be able to draw some useful information from it.
>>>Here was this beacon of universal truth, and we had no use for it. I
>>>understood that philosophers and scientists consider tautologies
>>>useless despite their universal truth. However, I decided that the
>>>final chapter on usefullness of the tautology had yet to be written.
>>>
>>>Let's suppose we have a tautology, any tautology. And we recognize the
>>>universal truth of that tautology. What conclusions can we draw from
>>>this?
>>>
>>>If a tautology is universally true, alternatives to the tautology
>>>cannot be true and must be universally false. And, further, this
>>>must be true of all tautologies.
>>>
>>>Consequently, everything including empirical evidence represents a
>>>tautology or it cannot be true and must be false.
>>>
>>>Thus any empirical observation which is problematic must represent
>>>part of a tautology. For example, three inches and not three inches or
>>>blue and not blue. These are empirical observations and form parts of
>>>tautologies or they cannot be problematic and must be false.
>>>
>>>In point of fact each part of a tautology is an empirical observation,
>>>and this is what we mean by an empirical observation despite the
>>>conventional interpretation of empirical observations as inherently
>>>problematic.
>>>
>>>Further each part of the tautology is subject to evaluation either in
>>>terms of problematic correctness or in terms of self contradiction. If
>>>either part of a tautology is self contradictory, it must be false and
>>>the other part must be universally true whether empirical in
>>>conventional problematic terms or not.
>>>
>>>In other words, even though tautoligies in themselves are not
>>>problematic and cannot represent empirical observations, the reverse
>>>is not true and empirical observations can and do represent parts of
>>>tautologies.
>>>
>>
>>Well for some interpretation of your words, i think you are skirting
>>dangerously close to rediscovering a bit of wisdom from an eminent 20th
>>century philosopher.
>>
>>This is the way i see it ...
>>
>>A truth is stated from some web of belief. Outside of that web it may,
>>or may not be true. The question is whether some agent in the web must
>>sense something outside of the web to determine a truth. For example a
>>person in the web of literate English speakers would say it true that a
>>bachelor is unmarried and male. No one in that web needs to check
>>outside of that web to be quite confident that truth applies in all
>>cases - no matter what.
>>
>>But outside of that web (literate English speakers) this may not be the
>>case. Let me set a scene. There was an attractive widow and her young
>>daughter named Bernice. The widow was seeking a new husband. Frequently
>>in the presence of Bernice she would ask a man, "Are you a bachelor?"
>>and if he answered yes, she would gladly accept his advances; otherwise
>>she would sternly rebuff him. Now occasionally Bernice would mingle
>>with these same men in the market and on occasion she would be
>>introduced to their wifes. Now you can see that from Bernice's web of
>>belief a bachelor may be married or not, you must ask him to find out.
>
>
> Yeah, that'll really do a lot of good.
>
>
>>So we see, that whether a truth is analytic or synthetic is totally
>>dependent on your web of belief. Or in your words "even though
>>tautologies in themselves are not contingent and cannot represent
>>empirical observations, the reverse is not true and empirical
>>observations can and do represent parts of a web of belief." ... but i
>>have substituted "contingent" for your "problematic" and "web of belief"
>>for your use of "tautology".
>
>
> patty, you really need to take that web of belief back to the church
> where you bought it and get a refund. It doesn't matter where ideas
> originate. It matters where they wind up through demonstration.
>
If "web of belief" connotes "church" to you, then please substitute
"network of tautologies, generalities, and contingent observations" and
reread.
> Problematic means contingent.
Well at least i got that one right :)
patty
- Next message: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Previous message: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- In reply to: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Next in thread: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Reply: Lester Zick: "Re: Tautologies and Empirical Truth"
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ]
Relevant Pages
|
