Re: Finding useful functions- part 1

From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 11/06/04


Date: Sat, 06 Nov 2004 16:25:19 GMT

On Fri, 05 Nov 2004 15:43:03 -0500, Wolf Kirchmeir
<wwolfkir@sympatico.ca> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>[...]
>>
>> So please to explain extension/intension in an orthodox way or stop
>> complaining how people use the terms. They are nothing more than
>> robust neologistic euphemisms for objective/subjective. So, please to
>> explain, sahib, how to get from one to the other without subjective
>> heuristics.
>
>The extension of a term is that which it refers to. The intension of a
>term is how the term relates to other terms, which, loosely speaking, is
>how the speaker thinks of it. The distinction explains why people argue
>about whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable. Their intensions for
>"fruit", "vegetable" and "tomato" differ, but the extension of "tomato"
>is the same for all disputants, whether they agree on its classification
>or not.

OK. Well put. I buy the definitions of extensional and intensional.
Now at least we have something to discuss.

The extension of a term is that to which it refers. But there is still
the issue as to how the extension of a term can be arrived at without
intensional heuristics. We analyze things in physical science in
relation to one another. So the question then becomes whether
behavioral analysis is a physical or a logical science.

Physical sciences are logical, but they are subordinated to the
physical things they deal with. They are physical first and logical
second whereas behavioral sciences are logical first and physical
second.

Extensions can't emerge without intensional analysis in some form. You
may have extensional heurisms but only the extensions are extensional.
The heurism itself is intensional in this usage of these terms.

>It's not exactly the same as subjective/objective, since objectively
>speaking whether a tomato is a fruit or a vegetable depends on how you
>define those classes, and on the objectively identifiable properties of
>the tomato. Which means that we can agree that objectively a tomato is a
>fruit, yet we both head for the produce section when we want a couple fo
>pounds for that mess of chili we want to make tonight (you're not one of
>those 'orrible folk who use tomato paste for chili, are you? Ugh!)

Well, even the best cooks and chefs use prefer canned tomatoes because
their quality is more consistent and often better than fresh tomatoes.
And somehow I doubt they head for either the fruit or produce section
when they want them.

I still consider extensional/intensional objective/subjective meanings
the same. Probably a distinction without a difference. It reminisces
me of the old problem of identity. And I think here we are faced with
resolving the origin of identity in mechanical terms, and that origin
is clearly subjective in the context of behavioral analysis.

Regards - Lester



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