Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
From: Lester Zick (lesterDELzick_at_worldnet.att.net)
Date: 02/15/05
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Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2005 21:27:47 GMT
On Tue, 15 Feb 2005 13:17:29 -0600, Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
> > Albert wrote:
><snip>
>>>>Unfortunately, Albert, empiricism doesn't yield truth. It only yields
>>>>falsity.
>>>
>>>It yields particulars that may be interpreted as truth or falsity
>>> depending on the proposition.
>>
>> How can particulars be interpreted as true? Or false, for that matter?
>
>Interpretation is always subjective.
Interpretation isn't the issue. The interpretation of particulars as
true or false is the issue.
>> Falsity is only established by contradiction. But truth can only be
>> established for particulars in relation to generals. That's the only
>> interpretation possible.
>
>Many interpretations are possible. Your claim seems to be that
>there is only one true interpretation possible.
Not in this case. My claim is that particulars cannot be judged as
true or false in themselves. They can only be judged as true or false
in relation to other things, in terms of the tautological regression
supporting their truth or falsity, that is.
>>>>And qualifying the concept of truth as apparent or accepted
>>>>doesn't change the issue.
>>>
>>>Which issue is that?
>>
>> Use of the term "apparent truth".
>
>How can the term 'apparent truth' be the issue when you agree
>above that it is only a qualifier? Sounds circular to me.
Because there is no truth established in empirical terms only falsity
through contradiction. I agree that "apparent" is a qualifier in the
context of truth. There problem is there is no establishment of truth
in empiricism. So the qualifier "apparent" is irrelevant to what is
established: the lack of contradiction. It's an attempt to substitute
an idea of empirical truth when there is no empirical truth to be
established in empirical terms.
The best we can say is that there is consistent lack of falsification
in our experience for certain relations. But even that is ambiguous
because our experience is not only incomplete it is woefully miniscule
in terms of possible experiences and always will be.
>> Empiricism doesn't establish truth;
>> it only establishes falsity. So there can be no apparent truth, only
>> apparent falsity.
>
>It establishes the truth of a particular.
Not possible because a particular is neither true nor false in itself.
Truth and/or falsity can only be established in relation to generals.
This is true for empiricism too. In a case of empirical contradiction
or lack thereof there is something a particular is in contradiction to
or not. So even in empirical contradiction there is no presence or
absence of contradiction possible for a particular in itself.
>>>>Appearance or acceptance can only be of
>>>>falsity in the context of empiricism.
>>>
>>>I think I know what you are trying to say. But I believe it to
>>>be useless. We must daily make decisions based on inadequate data.
>>
>> Never suggested otherwise. It's useful for the evaluation of
>> empiricism which as a philosophy of science doesn't relate to daily
>> decisions we have to make despite our ignorance.
>>
>>
>>>>A problematic mathematical
>>>>conjecture could appear or be accepted as true. But empirically
>>>>unfalsified evidence cannot appear or be accepted as true.
>>>
>>>What the hell is 'empirically unfalsified evidence'?
>>
>> It's what empiricism produces. The only possible result of a lack of
>> falsification.
>>
>>>Theories can be falsified. But how is an observed phenomenon
>>>falsified? We may not be able to interpret it correctly, but
>>>having once existed it cannot be falsified. We just don't know
>>>what the truth of it is.
>>
>> And we can never know the truth of an observation, perceptual or
>> conceptual empirically. All we can know is the lack of contradiction.
>> Empiricism doesn't produce theories. Nor does it show how theories are
>> produced or perceptions perceived. It only maintains that perceptions
>> are true no matter how they are perceived. Which is certainly false as
>> perception is no more inherently valid than theories underlying
>> perception.
>>
>>
>>>>Let me see if I can explain it this way. Mathematikers take systems
>>>>they maintain are not about reality and apply them empirically to
>>>>reality then claim the lack of falsification proves something about
>>>>the truth of their empirical conclusions. Then when they realize they
>>>>are dealing with empirical conclusions, they try to ameliorate their
>>>>claims to truth by making them provisional. It doesn't work.
>>>
>>>Not being a mathematician, and not having done what you claim
>>>that they do, I cannot comment
>>
>>
>> My claim is that empricists substitute a claim of apparent truth for
>> truth when empiricism has nothing to do with truth but only falsity.
>
>OK.
Regards - Lester
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