Re: Epistemology 201: The Science of Science

From: aeo6 (aeo6_at_cornell.edu)
Date: 02/24/05 

Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2005 14:14:27 -0500

Albert said:
> Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> > Albert said:
> >
> >>Tony Orlow (aeo6) wrote:
> >><snip>
> >>
> >>>If God views all moments in
> >>>history as they must be then that view is static and history is
> >>>predetermined.
> >>
> >>If history is determined by the free will of participants
> >>exercised in their Present, then it simply does not follow that
> >>it is predetermined.
> >
> > It is not determined by free will, because free will doesn't exist.
>
> Your lack of reading comprehension is leading you astray yet
> again, Tony. There is an 'If' as the first word in that sentence.

I saw the "if". Your sentence is a logical statement of implication of
the form "if this then that":

"determination of history by free will" -> "no predertmination to
history"

Since your premise is incorrect, the conclusion cannot be deduced from
it. Weren't you the one that wanted all starting assertions for logical
arguments to be true? If you can prove to me that free will determines
history, and not will determined in turn by its own history, then you
will have made a point, finally. However, you have made no effort to
demonstrate this central point.

The comprehension problem is not mine, Albert.
>
> > This
> > is as I said to Allan. Free will is the contradiction of
> > predetermination.
>
> No, it is not.
You said in the "if" sentence that predetermination does not follow from
free will. Since no one has been retarded enough to assert that it does,
I can only conclude that what you are saying is that free will precludes
predetermination. If that is true then predetermination also precludes
free will, logically (see below). They are mutually contradictory.
>
> > If you assume free will you disprove predetermination,
> > and if you assume predetermination you disprove free will.
>
> No.
Explain.
>
> > You are
> > assuming free will in your attack on predetermination, which proves
> > nothing since it's based on the assumption that you're right.
>
> No. I am making no attack on predetermination. I am saying and
> have said nothing more than there is no contradiction between the
> concept of free will (whether you believe it exists or not) and
> predetermination (whether you believe it exists or not).
Then you have changed positions. We were originally talking about the
omniscience of God, which you said was not equal to predetermination.
Now you say those two are the same, but predetermination is compatible
with "free" will? What does "free" mean here, then? And, don't bother
calling me a liar. That WAS your position.
>
> > The problem here is a failure to find contradiction between absolute
> > knowledge of people's choices and their freedom to choose.
>
> The only problem is in your mind.
I have no problem. I have dispensed with free will and its inherent
contradictions.
>
> > Either that
> > knowledge is absolute and you are bound to act according to it, or you
> > are free to contradict that knowledge by acting otherwise, therefore
> > making that knowledge not absolute. You cannot have it both ways.
>
> I see that you are confused by more than just time. You also
> seem to believe that *you* would be in possession of
> foreknowledge and are therefore free to turn it into a lie by
> acting contrary to it. That, of course, is a new condition, that
> simply invokes a paradox: Foreknowledge of choice A, is made
> false by choice B, then the foreknowledge of choice B, is made
> false by choice A, etc., etc. ad infinitum, ad nauseum. You will
> note that in my illustrative gedanken, I avoided that paradox by
> not revealing the foreknowledge until you made your choice.
My point doesn't involve your foreknowledge or knowledge of whether God
was right or wrong. It isn't dependent on time. It simply consists of
the idea that absolute knowledge is equivalent to fact, so that absolute
knowledge of the future is determination of the facts of that future.
According to any reasonable definition of "free" will that I can glean,
it is antithetical to predetermination. That's what makes it "free".

Again, could you enlighten me as to exactly how you define "free" in the
context of will?
>
> >>>If you can change future history from what God already
> >>>sees in his view,
> >>
> >>You change future history only by acting in the Present. What a
> >>being outside of time sees does not alter the fact that the only
> >>determinant is your own choice.
> >>
> >>>then that view isn't static,
> >>
> >>Only the Past may be thought of as static, and then only from
> >>some Present.
> >
> > Allan, and I think Wolf originally, was suggesting that it made a
> > difference whether God is within time and knowing the future through
> > perfect prediction, or outside of time and knowing the future by simply
> > seeing it. The point I am making is that this just changes the question
> > superficially, so that it takes the form: Can we change this picture of
> > history that God sees, or is it static and unchangeable in God's eyes?
> > The first implies free will, the second God's omniscience. Does God's
> > knowedge change or does God already know everything there is to know?
> >
> >>>in which case this view
> >>>does not tell God everything that will happen,
> >>
> >>What will happen from the perspective of the Present, can only be
> >>known by viewing the Past from some point in the Future.
> >
> > You mean we can only know the past at any given moment? Yes, and we can
> > only guess the future, because we're not omniscient.
>
> OK.
> >
> >>>unless God also knows
> >>>everythign about how will can change the course of history.
> >>
> >>Another point entirely.
> >
> > Not at all.
>
> No. Another point, specifically, God's knowledge of all possible
> futures.
Does God know which of the possible futures is the actual one that will
happen? I think an omniscient god would.
>
> > If the picture of history that God sees can change because
> > of our will, but God knows exactly what makes it change and how, then
> > God could predict the changes in that picture of history, and retain
> > omniscience by, again, perfectly predicting our will. Of course, in this
> > case, the picture would not be of actual history, but of a possible
> > history that changes according to rules that affect the possibilities.
> > If there are no rules that govern these changes in history, then God
> > cannot predict those changes, and is therefore not omniscient.
Read this again. Slowly. Three times.
> >
> >>>Either an
> >>>omniscient God is viewing exactly what history must be,
> >>
> >>Based only on your own choices in your own Present.
> >>
> >>
> >>>or only what
> >>>history might be, in which case God is not omniscient.
> >>
> >>What 'might' be can only be guessed in a Present. What must be
> >>is the Past.
> >
> > So, you missed the idea that God is outside of time, and therefore have
> > no idea what we are talking about. Why am I not surprised?
>
> Huh?
Why are you talking about the past, and present, and guessing if we are
talking about an omniscient God outside of time? Did you miss that? Huh?
>
> >>>This is why I say
> >>>it makes no difference to the argument.
> >>
> >>Yes, you keep saying that. Yet, the fact remains that there is
> >>no contradiction between a concept of free will and a
> >>foreknowledge based on an ability to move freely out of time.
> >>This point was illustrated for you earlier in a thought
> >>experiment. You agreed at that time that there was no contradiction.
> >
> > That "thought experiment" was irrelevant for reasons I have repeatedly
> > pointed out to you.
>
> No. It is not irrelevant to the proposition that free will does
> not contradict foreknowledge.
Yes it is. Foreknowledge is predetermination. You have determined the
future beforehand. That's what it means. What is "free will" free from,
if not predetermination? The question is whether you are ever free to
contradict absolute foreknowledge, which is included in omniscience, and
which is equivalent to predetrmination.
>
> > It avoided the contradiction because the prediction
> > was correct, when the question is whether the prediction can ever be
> > incorrect. See, if you can give me an example where God is all knowing,
> > and yet you are free to violate that knowledge, get back to me.
>
> Your hang up is apparently the use of the word 'God'; Which is
> why I attempted on several occasions to make my point without
> recourse to the word. It is the very reason that in my
> illustrative gedanken there was no God, but only a hypothetical
> time traveler. You might help yourself to a proper understanding
> by omitting all references to God. The proposition does not
> require God, merely a time traveler.
Yes, and if the Time traveler has the wrong answer, then how do you
explain it? More importantly, could the Time Traveler ever POSSIBLY have
the wrong answer, or are you bound, whether you know it or not, to agree
with the future as it is already known?

Albert, it all boils down to this, in rawest possible terms:

1. Absolute Foreknowledge=Predetermination
2. Free Will = ~Predermination => Predetermination->~Free Will
3. Therefore, taking 1. and 2., Absolute Foreknowledge -> ~Free Will

Now, please explain precisely where this argument breaks down. Here are
the two choices:

A. Definition 1 is wrong. Please explain the difference between absolute
foreknowldge and predetermination;

B. Statement 2 is wrong and there is no contradiction between free will
and predetermination. Please explain what free will is "free" from, if
not predetermination.

I hope this clarifies and reduces things enough for you to discern
clearly my logical assertion, and identify exactly what it is you object
to. 

-- 
Smiles,
Tony

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