Re: about modeling human decisions?
From: Bob Wheeler (bwheeler_at_echip.com)
Date: 03/10/05
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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2005 18:41:19 -0500
Stephen Harris wrote:
> "Bob Wheeler" <bwheeler@echip.com> wrote in message
> news:9aae5$42305f54$466ea752$12937@nf1.news-service.com...
>
>>Bruce Weaver wrote:
>>
>>>David Jones wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>kiki wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>HI all,
>>>>>
>>>>>I want to create self-automata models of human beings and model how
>>>>>human-beings collectively make decisions and how people with
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>different
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>levels of knowledge and sense influence each other...
>>>>>
>>>>>Are there any researches about how to build this kind of models?
>>>>>
>>>>>Thanks a lot!
>>
>>>Here's another paper to look at:
>>>
>>
>>To take another tack, the "rational man" idea assumes that humans have
>>infinite calculating capability and that game theory, for example,
>>represents actual human behavior. In fact, humans have very limited
>>calculating ability. They solve problems by heuristics, which are simple
>>rules quite consistent with the actual functioning of the brain. For
>>example, in choosing the "best" of several items, humans will tend to pick
>>the first, or last one, or the one which is most familiar, and will ignore
>>almost all of the "technical" characteristics of the items.
>>
>
>
> "The frameworks of game theory and mechanism design have exerted
> significant influence on formal models of multiagent systems by
> providing tools for designing and analyzing systems in order to
> guarantee certain desirable outcomes. However, many game theoretic
> models assume idealized rational decision makers interacting in
> prescribed ways. In particular, the models often ignore the fact
> that in many multiagent systems, the agents are not fully rational.
> Instead, they are computational agents who have time and cost
> constraints that hinder them from both optimally determining their
> utilities from the game and determining which strategies are best
> to follow. ...
> http://www.cs.uwaterloo.ca/~klarson/papers/LarsonThesis.pdf
>
> Because of this, the game theoretic equilibrium for rational agents
> does not generally remain the same for agents with bounds on their
> computational capabilities. This creates a potentially hazardous
> gap in game theory and automated negotiation since computationally
> bounded agents are not motivated to behave in the desired way.
>
> My thesis statement is that it is possible to bridge this gap. By
> incorporating computational actions into the strategies of agents, I
> provide a theory of interaction for self-interested computationally
> bounded agents. This allows one to formally study the impact that
> bounded rationality has on agents' strategic behavior. It also
> provides a foundation for game-theory and mechanism design for
> computationally limited agents."
>
>
Interesting. It will take a while for me to read this. How does this
limitation on computation square up with actual psychological studies
that suggest the "human mechanism" is comparative rather than computational?
-- Bob Wheeler --- http://www.bobwheeler.com/ ECHIP, Inc. --- Randomness comes in bunches.
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