Re: A theory of beliefs
From: patty (pattyNO_at_SPAMicyberspace.net)
Date: 07/23/04
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Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2004 14:14:17 GMT
David Longley wrote:
> In article <2IRLc.144611$JR4.20145@attbi_s54>, patty
> <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> writes
>
>> David Longley wrote:
>>
>>> In article <diLLc.137821$a24.126481@attbi_s03>, patty
>>> <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> writes
>>>
>>>> David Longley wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> In article <eAFLc.6635$8_6.5721@attbi_s04>, patty
>>>>> <pattyNO@SPAMicyberspace.net> writes
>>>>>
>>>>>> Ron Peterson wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In sci.econ Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Not true. A proposition can be proven universally true by
>>>>>>>> demonstrating that alternatives are universally self contradictory.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That only works for propositions with a logical or mathematical
>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ... don't even work for that! You can only prove a proposition
>>>>>> relative to the assumptions of some system. A universally true
>>>>>> proposition is a pipe dream.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> patty
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Pipe dream(s) indeed.
>>>>> But you can set your doubts lower still - "propositions" are
>>>>> intensions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well i take a proposition to be a *statement* in some language, for
>>>> example "1 + 2 = 3". Do you still call that an "intension" ?
>>>>
>>>> patty
>>>
>>> It doesn't matter what *you* take a proposition to be (there are no
>>> private languages).
>>
>>
>> Well language does change with its usage. I think fue people today
>> distinguish between a statement and the abstract thing to which it
>> refers. If you substitute "statement" for "proposition" in the dialog
>> above, then my statements and ron's would not switch from true to false.
>>
>>> Proposition is an alternative term for intension.
>>>
>>
>> Ok, i'll try to remember that.
>>
>>> Contrast "Philosophical Investigations" with "Tractatus
>>> Logico-Philosophicus" if evidential behaviourism hasn't yet convinced
>>> you of the folly of such talk.
>>>
>>
>> I'm working on it, Wittgenstein is hard reading.
>>
>>
>>> Why is it still with us (we have been through this before surely)?
>>> The fact that there are lots of folk around who don't understand the
>>> nature of our folk psychological folly shouldn't persuade one of
>>> anything other than the fact that there are lots of folk about who
>>> don't see that it's folly, and why. But you'll find that more people
>>> believe in astrology etc than most of the scientific facts that
>>> regulate how they live - yet most people will follow what most
>>> people think as common-sense. Go figure!).
>>>
>>
>> Well regarding that i was struck by something Glen said today:
>> ""
>> GS: In what sense would they be meaningless to behaviorists? Have you
>> forgotten that all behaviorists are indoctrinated into folk psychology
>> (as well as academic mentalism) before they become behaviorists?
>> Whether the statement "humans cannot survive without them" is true is
>> moot. The way we talk about behavior has some utility or else a
>> culture would not sustain it for long in the absence of other
>> maintaining reasons. Such terms are not, however, of much scientific use.
>> ""
>>
>> So that "the way we talk about behavior" (read: our folk psychology)
>> *does* have some utility to our culture. Maybe we should be careful
>> how we change it. Don't you think?
>>
>> patty
>
>
> That's why those in the Experimental and Applied Analysis of Behaviour
> do what they do - i.e. research. If it was all fine as it is why would
> they bother?
>
> This is a question I've been urging those in c.a.p (and elsewhere) to
> give some more serious thought to than they have to date. It seems to me
> that all too many take for granted what the above experts say is highly
> problematic!
>
> It strikes me as odd that mathematicians and computer scientists think
> they know better! It should strike them as odd too given their
> demonstrable incompetence to date!! That's intensional opacity for you.
But intensional opacity is a fact that is enforced by physical barriers.
I could say the skull or the blood brain barrier, but that would be just
a metaphor, we know we are talking only of language here. What is
clear, though, is that this intensional opacity is here to stay. For
you in particular to keep railing against it (i really don't think
this comes from the EAB), is just propaganda - me thinks it is very
unscientific.
> Even though some of the leaders in the field have recently described
> "AI" as "brain dead", the fact that they demonstrably don't know much
> about the science of behaviour doesn't seem to provide them with any
> clues as to *why* that may be so. In fact, pointing this out explicitly
> just seems to offend them!
If you stopped being so unscientifically judgmental about intensional
opacity, then perhaps your point would come through louder and clearer.
It is so very hard for me to separate your science from your politics.
Your combination of the two, at least for me, is making for bad science
and bad politics.
Now, on the other hand, i can see that it is a mistake to glorify
mentalism and folk psychology; and that does happen in today's world.
Perhaps somebody has to stand up and tell the rest of the story. I
respect that. But in the process of doing that, let's not swing the
pendulum to the point of vilifying what is best in our very humanity.
A little balance here, please!
patty
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