Re: A theory of beliefs
From: Ron Peterson (ron_at_shell.core.com)
Date: 07/26/04
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Date: Mon, 26 Jul 2004 16:27:02 -0000
In sci.econ Lester Zick <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Jul 2004 13:35:55 -0000, Ron Peterson <ron@shell.core.com>
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>The concept of truth for mathematics is that a proposition is derivable
>>from the assumed axioms. That concept of truth doesn't work for the
>>scientific knowledge.
> If the concept of truth doesn't work for scientific knowledge, I don't
> see how it is possible to falsify any theory of science.In other words
> if it is possible to falsify something, there is an implicit standard
> of truth applicable to science and scientific theories.
I said *that* concept of truth.
Why do you need a standard of truth for scientific theories? And, what
is a standard of truth?
>>The sciences form hypotheses which are essentially models of the real
>>world. We use those models to guide our actions to meet our needs
>>and desires. If the models don't correspond to reality, the models are
>>discarded and new models are invented.
> Which is exactly what happens in the axiomatic sciences like geometry
> and math as well. The models just happen to be constructed in the form
> of axioms instead of laws.
It's not the same thing. The sciences match up the models with some of
the things that we perceived as being part of the real world.
Mathematics has no need to do that.
-- Ron
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