Re: Runaway Global Warming Possible!

From: Joshua Halpern (vze23qvd_at_verizon.net)
Date: 03/13/05 

Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2005 03:24:57 GMT

Fred J. McCall wrote:
> "Ian St. John" <istjohn@noemail.usa> wrote:
> :Fred J. McCall wrote:
> :> lparker@emory.edu (Lloyd Parker) wrote:
> :>> simberg.interglobal@org.trash (Rand Simberg) wrote:
> :>>> On Mon, 7 Mar 2005 22:05:23 -0500, in a place far, far away, "Ian
> :>>> St. John" <istjohn@noemail.usa> made the phosphor on my monitor

> :>>>>> Then tell us what we've found.
> :>>>>
> :>>>> They did. In the final report. Nothing.
> :>>>
> :>>> If you're referring to the Duelfer report, you apparently didn't
> :>>> read it, because it didn't say they found nothing. It said in fact
> :>>> that there were WMD, and the clear intent to redevelop them in mass
> :>>> quantities as soon as he could get the sanctions lifted.
> :>>
> :>> Liar. You are a bald-faced liar. It said NO WMD.
> :>
> :> Wrong, Lloyd.
> :
> :Well, that makes Fred a bald faced liar.
>
> Wrong. I already posted the text from the portion of the report that
> mentions them.

You mean this part from the key findings?

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was
essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions
were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably
with a different mix of capabilities to that
which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a
nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,
irrespective of international pressure and the resulting
economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic
missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

or this one

The former Regime had no formal written strategy or
plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither
was there an identifi able group of WMD policy makers
or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants
understood WMD revival was his goal from their long
association with Saddam and his infrequent,
but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

or this one

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence
Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings
of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation
suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles
after 1991.

While other WMD programs were strictly prohibited, the
UN permitted Iraq to develop and possess delivery
systems provided their range did not exceed 150 km. This
freedom allowed Iraq to keep its scientists and technicians
employed and to keep its infrastructure and manufacturing
base largely intact by pursuing programs nominally in
compliance with the UN limitations. This positioned Iraq
for a potential breakout capability

or this one

Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the
nuclear progress and talent that had been developed up
to the 1991 war, the program ended and the intellectual
capital decayed in the succeeding years.

or this one

While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions
have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally
destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in
1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad
resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter,
a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see
sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its
fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.

or this one

ISG did not discover chemical process or production
units configured to produce key precursors or CW
agents. However, site visits and debriefs revealed
that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfi guring and
‘making-do’ with available equipment as substitutes
for sanctioned items.

or this "smoking gun" not

ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots,
which suggests that Iraq may have prototyped experimental
CW rounds. The available evidence is insufficient to
determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe
of activities.

or this list of maybe, whatfor and soforths

• ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology
(M16) scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these
laboratories. However, sources indicate that M16 was
planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur
mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.

• Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and
disposal sites revealed no evidence of CW-related research
or production, however many of these sites were either
sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews
with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16 yielded
very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.

• The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories
were never declared to the UN.

and most seriously if true

The IIS program included the use of human subjects for
testing purposes.

or this

ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition
Storage Depot—the storage site that was judged to have the
strongest link to CW. An extensive investigation of the
facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike
previously assessed.

or this

With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges
that Baghdad abandoned its existing BW program in the belief
that it constituted a potential embarrassment, whose discovery
would undercut Baghdad’s ability to reach its overarching
goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.

or this

In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam
facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced
BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq,
after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting
BW-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the
mid-1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear
and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of
discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.

Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing
an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless,
after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use
capability—some declared—readily useful for BW if the Regime
chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still
possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific
know-how of its BW cadre.

or this

In spite of the difficulties noted above, a BW capability
is technically the easiest WMD to attain. Although
equipment and facilities were destroyed under UN supervision
in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know how through the
scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG
has also identified civilian facilities and equipment in
Iraq that have dual-use application that could be used for
the production of agent.

or this maybe smoking gun

Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al ‘Azzawi, head of the bacterial
program claims she retained BW seed stocks until early
1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has not found a means
of verifying this. Some seed stocks were retained by
another Iraqi offi cial until 2003 when they were recovered
by ISG.

The guy probably had them in his fridge.

or the special *** Cheney, Colin Powell special

In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no
evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent
production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.

> :But what do you expect from those
> :who have lost the war over facts and have nothing left to do but either
> :defend the war as 'just plain stupid' or claim some premonition of future
> :crimes.

Certainly you think that no one will actually READ the report, cause it
does NOT say that WMDs were found.

> :
> :http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
> :
> :The poliical content of the report must be carefully removed and the facts
> :come to light. No WMDs or facilites to produce WMDs. Everything else is
> :'mindreading' and political figleafing.
>
> "...a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been
> discovered...."
>
> So says the report. You keep screaming "None!" Even one is more than
> none. You're wrong. Under your rules, that makes you a bald faced
> liar.

Really, really go read the report and the key findings.

josh halpern
>

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