Re: Ethical Relativism (Cultural Differences Argument)

From: Immortalist (Reanimater_2000_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 07/28/04 

Date: Wed, 28 Jul 2004 07:59:39 -0700

"Abakus" <abakus@ntlworld.com> wrote in message
news:XozNc.973$bi1.369@newsfe4-gui.ntli.net...
>
> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:0K-dnbye05aDq5jcRVn-hw@comcast.com...
> > (1) Different cultures have different moral codes.
>
> Certainly
>
> > (2) Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong
> are
> > only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.
>
> Of course
>
> > It is not sound.
>
> Isnt it? This sounds intriguing. Let's read on
>
> >The trouble is that the conclusion does not really follow from
> > the premise-that is, even if the premise is true, the conclusion still
> might be
> > false. The premise concerns what people believe: in some societies. people
> > believe one thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The
> > conclusion, however, concerns what really is the case. The trouble is that
> this
> > sort of conclusion does not follow logically from this sort of premise.
>
> What "really is the case"? Interesting. What is really the case?
>

A confusion of "contingency" with "necessity." The conclusion is contingently
dependent upon environmental circumstances not a necessary condition that follows
from the covert definition of the subject.

> > --------------------------------
> >
> > Cultural Relativism is a theory about the nature of morality. At first
> blush it
> > seems quite plausible. However, like all such theories, it may be
> evaluated by
> > subjecting it to rational analysis; and when we analyze Cultural
> Relativism we
> > find that it is not so plausible as it first appears to be.
>
>
> Too many words, too little content. Can we cut to the chase?
>

Cultural relativism is not what it first appears to be since it is an arousing
argument.

> > ...at the heart of Cultural Relativism there is a certain form of
> argument. The
> > strategy used by cultural relativists is to argue from facts about the
> > differences between cultural outlooks to a conclusion about the status of
> > morality. Thus we are invited to accept this reasoning:
> >
> > (1) The Greeks believed it was wrong to eat the dead, whereas the
> Callatians
> > believed it was right to eat the dead.
> >
> > (2) Therefore, eating the dead is neither objectively right nor
> objectively
> > wrong. It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to
> culture.
>
>
> This is exactly the same thing that was said at the beginning. Do we need to
> say everything twice?
>

Many presentations provide a synopsis or table of contents, or sometimes an
(abstract.)

>
> > Or, alternatively:
> >
> > (1) The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans
> believe
> > infanticide is immoral.
> >
> > (2) Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively
> wrong.
> > It is merely a matter of opinion, which varies from culture to culture.
>
>
> Yes, yes, we get the point.
>
>
> > Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fundamental idea. They are
> both
> > special cases of a more general argument, which says:
> >
> > (1) Different cultures have different moral codes.
> >
> > (2) Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong
> are
> > only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.
>
>
> Yes, this is the same paragraph we saw at the top. How many times do you
> have to repeat the same thing?
>

Many presentations provide a synopsis or table of contents, or sometimes an
(abstract.)

>
>
> > We may call this the Cultural Differences Argument. To many people, it is
> very
> > persuasive. But from a logical point of view, is it a sound argument?
>
>
> Well, are you going to make your bloody point or what?
>

A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that
makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless
to be false. Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its
premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.

According to the definition of a deductive argument (see the entry on Deduction
and Induction), the author of a deductive argument always intends that the
premises provide the sort of justification for the conclusion whereby if the
premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well. Loosely
speaking, if the author's process of reasoning is a good one, if the premises
actually do provide this sort of justification for the conclusion, then the
argument is valid.

In effect, an argument is valid if the truth of the premises logically guarantees
the truth of the conclusion. The following argument is valid, because it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to nevertheless be
false:

    Either Elizabeth owns a Honda or she owns a Saturn.
    Elizabeth does not own a Honda.
    Therefore, Elizabeth owns a Saturn.

It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually
to be true in order for the argument to be valid. An argument is valid if the
premises and conclusion are related to each other in the right way so that if the
premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true as well. We can
recognize in the above case that even if one of the premises is actually false,
that if they had been true the conclusion would have been true as well. Consider,
then an argument such as the following:

    All toasters are items made of gold.
    All items made of gold are time-travel devices.
    Therefore, all toasters are time-travel devices.

Obviously, the premises in this argument are not true. It may be hard to imagine
these premises being true, but it is not hard to see that if they were true,
their truth would logically guarantee the conclusion's truth.

It is easy to see that the previous example is not an example of a completely
good argument. A valid argument may still have a false conclusion. When we
construct our arguments, we must aim to construct one that is not only valid, but
sound. A sound argument is one that is not only valid, but begins with premises
that are actually true. The example given about toasters is valid, but not sound.
However, the following argument is both valid and sound:

    No felons are eligible voters.
    Some professional athletes are felons.
    Therefore, some professional athletes are not eligible voters.

Here, not only do the premises provide the right sort of support for the
conclusion, but the premises are actually true. Therefore, so is the conclusion.
Although it is not part of the definition of a sound argument, because sound
arguments both start out with true premises and have a form that guarantees that
the conclusion must be true if the premises are, sound arguments always end with
true conclusions.

It should be noted that both invalid, as well as valid but unsound, arguments can
nevertheless have true conclusions. One cannot reject the conclusion of an
argument simply by discovering a given argument for that conclusion to be flawed.

Whether or not the premises of an argument are true depends on their specific
content. However, according to the dominant understanding among logicians, the
validity or invalidity of an argument is determined entirely by its logical form.
The logical form of an argument is that which remains of it when one abstracts
away from the specific content of the premises and the conclusion, i.e., words
naming things, their properties and relations, leaving only those elements that
are common to discourse and reasoning about any subject matter, i.e., words such
as "all", "and", "not", "some", etc. One can represent the logical form of an
argument by replacing the specific content words with letters used as
place-holders or variables.

For example, consider these two arguments:

    All tigers are mammals.
    No mammals are creatures with scales.
    Therefore, no tigers are creatures with scales.

    All spider monkeys are elephants.
    No elephants are animals.
    Therefore, no spider monkeys are animals.

These arguments share the same form:

    All A are B;
    No B are C;
    Therefore, No A are C.

All arguments with this form are valid. Because they have this form, the examples
above are valid. However, the first example is sound while the second is unsound,
because its premises are false. Now consider:

    All basketballs are round.
    The Earth is round.
    Therefore, the Earth is a basketball.

    All popes reside at the Vatican.
    John Paul II resides at the Vatican.
    Therefore, John Paul II is a pope.

These arguments also have the same form:

    All A's are F;
    X is F;
    Therefore, X is an A.

Arguments with this form are invalid. This is easy to see with the first example.
The second example may seem like a good argument because the premises and the
conclusion are all true, but note that the conclusion's truth isn't guaranteed by
the premises' truth. It could have been possible for the premises to be true and
the conclusion false. This argument is invalid, and all invalid arguments are
unsound.

While it is accepted by most contemporary logicians that logical validity and
invalidity is determined entirely by form, there is some dissent. Consider, for
example, the following arguments:

    My table is circular. Therefore, it is not square shaped.

    Juan is bachelor. Therefore, he is not married.

These arguments, at least on the surface, have the form:

    x is F;
    Therefore, x is not G.

Arguments of this form are not valid as a rule. However, it seems clear in these
particular cases that it is, in some strong sense, impossible for the premises to
be true while the conclusion is false. However, many logicians would respond to
these complications in various ways. Some might insist--although this is
controverisal--that these arguments actually contain implicit premises such as
"Nothing is both circular and square shaped" or "All bachelors are unmarried,"
which, while themselves necessary truths, nevertheless play a role in the form of
these arguments. It might also be suggested, especially with the first argument,
that while (even without the additional premise) there is a necessary connection
between the premise and the conclusion, the sort of necessity involved is
something other than "logical" necessity, and hence that this argument (in the
simple form) should not be regarded as logically valid. Lastly, especially with
regard to the second example, it might be suggested that because "bachelor" is
defined as "adult unmarried male", that the true logical form of the argument is
the following universally valid form:

    x is F and not G and H;
    Therefore, x is not G.

The logical form of a statement is not always as easy to discern as one might
expect. For example, statements that seem to have the same surface grammar can
nevertheless differ in logical form. Take for example the two statements:

    (1) Tony is a ferocious tiger.
    (2) Clinton is a lame duck.

Despite their apparent similarity, only (1) has the form "x is a A that is F".
>From it one can validly infer that Tony is a tiger. One cannot validly infer from
(2) that Clinton is a duck. Indeed, one and the same sentence can be used in
different ways in different contexts. Consider the statement:

    (3) The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries.

It is not clear what the logical form of this statement is. Either there are
dignitaries that the King and Queen are visiting, in which case the sentence (3)
has the same logical form as "The King and Queen are playing violins," or the
King and Queen are themselves the dignitaries who are visiting from somewhere
else, in which case the sentence has the same logical form as "The King and Queen
are sniveling cowards." Depending on which logical form the statement has,
inferences may be valid or invalid. Consider:

    The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries. Visiting dignitaries is always
boring. Therefore, the King and Queen are doing something boring.

Only if the statement is given the first reading can this argument be considered
to be valid.

Because of the difficulty in identifying the logical form of an argument, and the
potential deviation of logical form from grammatical form in ordinary language,
contemporary logicians typically make use of artificial logical languages in
which logical form and grammatical form coincide. In these artificial languages,
certain symbols, similar to those used in mathematics, are used to represent
those elements of form analogous to ordinary English words such as "all", "not",
"or", "and", etc. The use of an artifically constructed language makes it easier
to specify a set of rules that determine whether or not a given argument is valid
or invalid. Hence, the study of which deductive argument forms are valid and
which are invalid is often called "formal logic" or "symbolic logic".

In short, a deductive argument must be evaluated in two ways. First, one must ask
if the premises provide support for the conclusion by examing the form of the
argument. If they do, then the argument is valid. Then, one must ask whether the
premises are true or false in actuality. Only if an argument passes both these
tests is it sound. However, if an argument does not pass these tests, its
conclusion may still be true, despite that no support for its truth is given by
the argument.

Note: there are other, related, uses of these words that are found within more
advanced mathematical logic. In that context, a formula (on its own) written in a
logical language is said to be valid if it comes out as true (or "satisfied")
under all admissible or standard assignments of meaning to that formula within
the intended semantics for the logical language. Moreover, an axiomatic logical
calculus (in its entirety) is said to be sound if and only if all theorems
derivable from the axioms of the logical calculus are semantically valid in the
sense just described.

For a more sophisicated look at the nature of logical validity, see the articles
on "Logical Consequence" in this encyclopedia. The articles on "Argument" and
"Deductive and Inductive Arguments" in this encyclopedia may also be helpful.

http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/val-snd.htm
http://www.google.com/search?q=Validity+and+Soundness

>
> > It is not sound. The trouble is that the conclusion does not really follow
> from
> > the premise-that is, even if the premise is true, the conclusion still
> might be
> > false. The premise concerns what people believe: in some societies. people
> > believe one thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The
> > conclusion, however, concerns what really is the case. The trouble is that
> this
> > sort of conclusion does not follow logically from this sort of premise.
>
>
> And we get the same fucking paragraph all over again. Are we going to get
> some sort of reasoning anytime this century?
>

Many presentations provide a synopsis or table of contents, or sometimes an
(abstract.) You are confusing the two.

>
> > Consider again the example of the Greeks and Callatians. The Greeks
> believed it
> > was wrong to eat the dead; the Callatians believed it was right. Does it
> follow,
> > from the mere fact that they disagreed, that there is no objective truth
> in the
> > matter? No, it does not follow; for it could be that the practice was
> objectively
> > right (or wrong) and that one or the other of them was simply mistaken.
>
>
> "Objectively right". Somebody is trying to introduce a sneaky concept
> without defining what it means. Hmmm, this is getting interesting.
>

The premise concerns what people believe: in some societies. people believe one
thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The conclusion, however,
concerns what really is the case. The trouble is that this sort of conclusion
does not follow logically from this sort of premise.

>
> > To make the point clearer, consider a very different matter. In some
> societies,
> > people believe the earth is flat. In other societies, such as our own,
> people
> > believe the earth is (roughly) spherical. Does it follow, from the mere
> fact that
> > they disagree, that there is no "objective truth" in geography?
>
> Oh my god, now we get a statement of fact as an example for an argument
> about statements of value! Is this supposed to be the argument we have been
> promised? How much sillier can this get?
>
> >Of course not; we
> > would never draw such a conclusion because we realize that, in their
> beliefs
> > about the world, the members of some societies might simply be wrong.
> There is no
> > reason to think that if the world is round everyone must know it.
> Similarly,
> > there is no reason to think that if there is moral truth everyone must
> know it.
>
>
> If there is a "moral truth"? What on earth would a moral truth look like?
>

The claim is that it is not known whether a "moral truth" is known or if a "moral
truth" is not known, these possibilities are (contingencies.)

> > The fundamental mistake in the Cultural Differences Argument is that it
> attempts
> > to derive a substantive conclusion about a subject (morality) from the
> mere fact
> > that people disagree about it.
>
> No, no , no, no. Who can be so incredibly moronic to really state that
> imbecility? And who can be so stupid as to paste it?

> The fact that people disagree is a *consequence* of the fact taht there is
> no moral absolutes.

There you go claiming that a contingency is an analytic necessity. You have not
shown how this is either true nor have you shown how it is false. You are merely
expressing your opinion about the matter.

For instance;

(1) Different cultures have different moral codes.

(2) Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality. Right and wrong are
only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture.

It is not sound. The trouble is that the conclusion does not really follow from
the premise—that is, even if the premise is true, the conclusion still might be
false. The premise concerns what people believe: in some societies. people
believe one thing; in other societies, people believe differently. The
conclusion, however, concerns what really is the case. The trouble is that this
sort of conclusion does not follow logically from this sort of premise.

> Where are the moral absolutes that people could use as
> standards and therefore we could find out who is right and who is wrong?
> There arent any.

I don't see your evidence here, people could have different beliefs and there
could still be moral absolutes or no moral absolutes, you have given no reason to
choose either or.

> That is why the comparison with the believers in a flat
> earth is either completely idiotic or sneakily dishonest.
>

How about in 1915 when there were believers in Newtonian space while new Einstein
claimed space was curved?

As Kant would claim you can NEVER know things-in-thenselves only
things-as-they-appear.

> > It is important to understand the nature of the point that is being made
> here. We
> > are not saying (not yet, anyway) that the conclusion of the argument is
> false.
> > Insofar as anything being said here is concerned, it is still an open
> question
> > whether the conclusion is true. We are making a purely logical point and
> saying
> > that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. This is important,
> because
> > in order to determine whether the conclusion is true, we need arguments in
> its
> > support. Cultural Relativism proposes this argument, but unfortunately the
> > argument turns out to be fallacious. So it proves nothing.
>
> You have presented a false image of what cultural relativism is, have built
> a crappy strawman, and then produced a fallacious and stupid
> pseudo-argument.
>

You are aroused by my presentation and must reduce the cognitive dissonance
produced by contradictory thoughts, you can't think of anything so far so you
instead describe what you would "like" this argument to represent.

> regards
> Abakus
>
>
>