Re: Existence as predicate

From: The Sophist (sophist_at_brown.edu)
Date: 08/30/04 

Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 08:19:35 -0400

Keynes wrote:
> On Sun, 29 Aug 2004 13:17:01 -0400, The Sophist <sophist@brown.edu> wrote:
>
>
>>Terry Firma wrote:
>>
>>>This is an attempt at refuting Kant's claim that a thing's existence can't
>>>be a predicate:
>>>
>>>Since everything is connected ("hangs together") - there are no absolute
>>>dividing lines / there is no empty space - everything must have a *common
>>>denominator*; this common denominator must be necessary (since everything is
>>>necessary / has at least one cause); therefore general existence must have a
>>>necessary component/aspect in order to exist (therefore existence is a
>>>quality/predicate).
>>
>>Let's see. David Lewis denied that everything is connected, and while
>>his view may be false, I know of no conclusive arguments to that effect.
>> I am not sure what you mean when you say that there is no empty space.
>> However, even if everything were connected, this would not entail the
>>existence of a common denominator. Even if we assume that things must
>>share something in common to be connected, object 1 might be connected
>>to object 2 by sharing A, and object 2 might be connected to object 3 by
>>sharing B, and objects 1 and 3 might then be connected without sharing
>>anything in common. You seem to assume that things which are not
>>necessary must have causes, which seems not to be the case (popular
>>interpretations of present quantum theory deny this). Finally, even if
>>everything that existed needed to have a component in common, that would
>>not entail that this common component would be existence.
>>
>>Rather a stunning amount of mistakes for such a short argument, I must say.
>
>
> What is disconnected must be free of the web of causation.

Well, presumably. Causation would be a kind of connection.

> Causal connections of the past are considered necessary to
> produce the present.

By who?

> The past is all about necessity.

What does that even mean?

> We consider the future to be conditional and the past to
> be unconditional.

You should be careful about using the pronoun "we."

> This must be a flaw in our concept of time,
> because we suppose the future to be of a different nature than
> the past, and at the same time accept the past as a fossilization
> of the future (of past 'times')..

Perhaps this is indeed a flaw in your conception of time. 

-- 
Aaron Boyden
The main division between the so-called Continental and Analytic 
traditions has been disputes over whether the task of being unclear 
should be carried out in natural language or in a formal system.

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