Re: Existence as predicate

From: Immortalist (Reanimater_2000_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 08/30/04 

Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2004 09:39:06 -0700

"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachSPAMBAN@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:881c8779.0408291601.7c80f331@posting.google.com...
> > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > OaWdnTXyl-dlm6_cRVn-hw@comcast.com>...
> > > "Terry Firma" <tarald.a@online.no> wrote in message
> > > news:txmYc.3877$WW4.54154@news4.e.nsc.no...
>
>
> > > This is an attempt at refuting Kant's claim that a thing's existence can't
> > > be a predicate:
>
>
> > There are many philosophers today,
> > following Hume, Kant, Frege, and Russell, who
> > claim that existence is not a property, or that 'exists' is not a predicate.
> > Sometimes they say that 'exists' is a second-order predicate (or
"second-level"
> > predicate); or they make other sorts of claims about it, such as that it is a
> > unique sort of predicate. Typically, the discussions in which this claim
arises
> > are discussions of the existence of physical objects. So, for example, the
Eiffel
> > Tower exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would like to be
able
> > to say that it is the fact that the Eiffel Tower has the property of
existence.
> > It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a property of the Eiffel
Tower.
> > Yet the philosophers listed--with qualifications the philosophical Wikipedian
is
> > encouraged to elaborate--deny that existence is a property. In fact, this is
the
> > common view among philosophers today.
>
>
> In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> first-order and as a second-order predicate.
>
> As you know, there are two basic types of existential statements:
>
> (1)
> - "Fs exists."
> - "Fs do not exist."
>
> (2)
> - "a exists."
> - "a does not exist."
>
> The best interpretations of (1) are as follows:
>
> - "There is something such that it is a F."
> - "There is nothing such that it is a F."
>
> or, as Frege would put it:
>
> - "The number of Fs is a natural number other than zero."
> - "The number of Fs is zero."
>
> The best interpretations of (2) are as follows:
>
> - "There is exactly one thing such that it is a F_1, ..., F_n, and is
> called 'a'."
> - "There is nothing such that it is a F_1, ..., F_n, and is called
> 'a'."
>
> For example:
> - "Pegasus exists."
> --->
> "There is exactly one thing such that it is a horse and winged, and is
> called 'Pegasus'."
> - "Pegasus doesn´t exist."
> --->
> "There is nothing such that it is a winged horse called 'Pegasus'."
>
> "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a property
> of individuals:
>
> ["E!": "exists"]
>
> Everything exists and nothing does not exist: AxE!x
>
> Everything, i.e. everything existent, has the property of
> existence--and has it essentially, since nothing can exist without
> existing. Of course, my existence and I can both cease to be, but we
> cannot cease to be independently of each other.
>
> But there´s one crucial point:
> Seen from the strictly logical point of view, there are no true
> sentences of the form "a does not exist", which would be
> self-contradictory, but only ones of the form "It is not the case that
> a exists"!
>
> In classical logic, where--by stipulation--there are no irreferential
> singular terms, "(~F)a" and "~(Fa)" are equivalent, so we can always
> simply write "~Fa". But if empty names are explicitly allowed, as in
> free logic, then this equivalence has to be annulled.
> That is to say, concerning the negation of existential sentences the
> difference between predicate and sentence negation (internal n. vs.
> external n.) does matter!
>
>
> #PH

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if we
completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing when we
further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly the
same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept;
and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.

A complete list of an object's properties would not be expanded by adding another
property, namely existence; therefore, existence is not another property over and
above all the other properties.

"...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One would
like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has the
property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
property of the physical object.

The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the definition
does treat existence as a property.

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