Re: Existence as predicate
From: Tarald Andresen (tarald.a_at_online.no)
Date: 08/31/04
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Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2004 09:35:05 +0200
> By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing--even if
we
> completely determine it--we do not make the least addition to the thing
when we
> further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be exactly
the
> same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the
concept;
> and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept
exists.
>
> A complete list of an object's properties would not be expanded by adding
another
> property, namely existence; therefore, existence is not another property
over and
> above all the other properties.
But one can't designate something as an object in an absolute sense (except
infinity itself); i.e. as something divisable from other "objects"/matter
(the division is an act of subjective interpretation of nature). "Objects"
then has a "double-nature"; both as "individuals" and as belonging to -
being "elements" in/aspects of - an undivisable nature; i.e. they are both
singular and in a sense belonging to the category "existence qua existence".
Thus the existence of an object has a quality beyond being an "object",
namely as existence per se, and this transcendental aspect of an object is
the common denominator it shares with everything else. Likewise this means
that the existence of an object has a a predicate *beyond* its
characteristica qua an *object*, namely the predicate of also being
*existence qua existence*.
> "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it true? One
would
> like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object has
the
> property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that existence is a
> property of the physical object.
>
> The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
definition
> does treat existence as a property.
But that's precisely what it (also) is, beyond refering to an object qua
object (its definition as something separate from other things)..
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