Re: Existence as predicate

From: Witt (oorionus_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 08/31/04 

Date: Tue, 31 Aug 2004 13:54:14 GMT

  "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:WuGdna-J5rcGa67cRVn-oA@comcast.com...
>
> "Paul Holbach" <paulholbachSPAMBAN@freenet.de> wrote in message
> news:881c8779.0408301717.1492ae27@posting.google.com...
> > > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<
> > > EYqdnUfMwtwFxa7cRVn-jA@comcast.com>...
> > > > "Paul Holbach" <paulholbachSPAMBAN@freenet.de> wrote in message
> > > > news:881c8779.0408291601.7c80f331@posting.google.com...
> >
> >
> > > > In my opinion "to exist" can and should be employed both as a
> > > > first-order and as a second-order predicate.

  Agreed.
  In FOPL: E!x =df Ey(x=y), or, E!x =df x=x, or, E!x =df EyAz(z=x <-> z=x).
  In SOPL: E!x =df EF[(F)x].

> > > > [...]
> > > > "to exist" can also be treated rather unproblematically as a
property
> > > > of individuals:

  If we define a property as a predicate that deals directly with the object
x, then,
  (F)x says that x has the property (F). (F) is a primary predicate of x.

  x exists, EF[(F)x], is a secondary predicate of x.

> >
> > > By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a
thing--even if we
> > > completely determine it--we do not make the
> > > least addition to the thing when we
> > > further declare that this thing ("is"); Otherwise, it would not be
exactly
> the
> > > same thing that exists, but something more
> > > than we had thought in the concept;
> > > and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept
exists.

  (E!x & Gx) <-> Gx. i.e. (EF[(F)x] & Gx) <-> Gx.
  Existence is the logical sum of primary predicates.
  (G)x -> E!x and (~G)x -> E!x and EF[(F)x] -> E!x, are valid.
  But, ~(Gx) -> E!x and ~((~G)x) -> E!x and ~(E!x) -> E!x, are not valid.

> >
> >
> > The concept of existence is pretty uninformative, and so is eg the
> > concept of self-identity. -- So what?!
> > This fact doesn´t mean that the objects which fall under these
> > concepts cannot possess them as their properties. [Frege: "I call the
> > concepts under which an object falls its properties."]
> >
> > By the way, even if we regard the concept of necessary existence as a
> > possible property of an individual, no ontological "proof" will ever
> > work, for if I conceive of God as a/the being which exists
> > necessarily, this in no way implies that there actually is anything
> > which has the property of necessary existence!

  Agreed.
  Definitions do not presume existence. For example:
  The existent present king of France exists, is false.
  The existent present king of France is a king, is false.

> >
> > > A complete list of an object's properties
> > > would not be expanded by adding another
> > > property, namely existence; therefore,
> > > existence is not another property over and
> > > above all the other properties.

  (E!x & Gx) <-> Gx.

> >
> >
> > Existence is a property b e s i d e all the other properties. ;-)
> >
> > The descriptive value of concepts such as existence and self-identity
> > is indeed close to zero.
> > You really don´t know much about me if you learn that I´m
> > self-identical.
> > This fact notwithstanding, I deny that the degree of informativeness
> > determines whether a concept can be had by individuals as a property!
> >
> >
> > > "...physical object exists. This is a true claim; what makes it
true? One
> would
> > > like to be able to say that it is the fact that the physical object
has the
> > > property of existence. It seems that the claim asserts that
existence is a
> > > property of the physical object.
> > >
> > > The foregoing definition of 'exists' is incorrect just because the
definition
> > > does treat existence as a property.

  Existence is a secondary property/predicate not a primary
property/predicate.

> >
> >
> > I´m afraid, you´re begging the question!
> >
> > Generally, the possession of the logical properties of existence and
> > self-identity is a necessary condition for an entity´s existence, but
> > it´s not a sufficient one, because everything must also possess some
> > "substantial" properties other than existence and self-identity.
> >
>
> Define existence.

  E!x =df EF[(F)x].
  This definition of existence applies to concrete and to abstract entities.

  OH

>
> > #PH
>
>

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