Re: Coextensive properties?

From: Lester Zick (
Date: 10/12/04

Date: Tue, 12 Oct 2004 15:44:38 GMT

On 12 Oct 2004 07:33:36 -0700, (George Greene) in wrote:

>"Bill Modlin" <> wrote in message news:<>...
>> "David Longley" <> wrote in message
>> > ... "Properties" like the psychological verbs of
>> > propositional attitude, are *intensional* - aka "mental" and
>> therefore,
>> > not, de re, truth-functional
>> Most of the properties I'm interested in correspond to what would
>> normally be called objectively measurable variables: things like spatial
>> extents and weight and temperature for example. Are such things
>> intensional?
>It's worse than that: they're properties of CONCRETE things;
>what we are dealing with in logic and in psychology (where "intensional"
>things like propositions can be "believed" or "doubted") are
>ABSTRACT (as OPPOSED to concrete) things. The whole vocabulary almost
>isn't even appropriate for concrete things. A car can have a whole lot
>of properties but whether the properties themselves are or are not
>intensional is almost beside the point. For the distinction to arise,
>you have to be dealing with incomplete knowledge and (therefore) different
>possible worlds. If there is only the one concrete physical world
>and all the facts about it are known, then the distinction is largely

I didn't realize CONCRETE was a technical term. And how, pray tell,
does a concrete thing differ from a non concrete thing apart from the
properties predicated of it? And why would the properties predicated
of concrete things not follow identical rules and be of as much
interest as properties as those non concrete things of interest to
logic and philosophy? And for that matter how the hell can the rules
of properties followed by concrete things not be of interest in logic?

Regards - Lester