Re: Gettier Problems (answers)

From: Immortalist (Reanimater_2000_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 10/19/04 

Date: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 11:56:56 -0700

"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:4padd.1259$5i5.454@newsread2.news.atl.earthlink.net...
>
> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:6vadnRnv-cvlc-zcRVn-og@comcast.com...
> >
> > "Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
> > news:3Yjcd.6569$NX5.5763@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
> >>
> >> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >> news:iMadnaYEv-MxMu3cRVn-hg@comcast.com...
> >> > ---------------------------------------------
> >> >
> >
> >> >
> >> This all seems to hinge on what it means to have knowledge. I suggest
> >> that
> >> the definition that seems to be operating in this whole discussion is
> >> flawed. One has knowledge when one's expectations about the subject
> >> matter
> >> are not seen to be contradicted. Thus Newton knew that light was not
> >> affected by gravity, and this knowledge was not contradicted by any
> >> observation. Einstein came to know that light IS affected by gravity and
> >> suggested observations that showed this was true. Knowledge is related
> >> to
> >> our ability to verify. In the cases you describe, verification is easy
> >> and
> >> so most of the positions are not knowledge. When you don't have
> >> knowledge
> >> is when you don't take the trouble to verify the verification, either by
> >> yourself or by the work of others as in the scientific community. What
> >> you
> >> have then is a guess. The universe is of such a nature, and human
> >> fallibility is such, that one isolated, casual, observation does not lead
> >> to
> >> knowledge.
> >>
> >
> > What verifies the verification of the verification? Repeatable experiments
> > performed around the globe as you imply? I agree. But in some cases one
> > isolated
> > observation can verify and provide evidence and knowledge. Negation of one
> > disjunct of an exclusive either or statement. By the law of identity and
> > contradiction A is equal to A and A is not equal to not A. One
> > disconfirming
> > instance necessarily affirming its contrary is how much science works.
>
> One disconfirming instance, sustantiated by one unrepeatable(or unrepeated)
> observation, usually does not change a scientific principles. The
> disconfirming instance, even if there's only one, needs much verification,
> especially for well accepted "laws".
> >

If the disconfirming instance is easily repeatable around the globe as I implied.
Your agreeing with me on that right?

> > Also in some of the examples to decide in the affirmative is harmless and
> > only
> > wastes time while deciding in the negative can be life threatening. I mean
> > in an
> > evolutionary sense of the evolution of inference capacities we would be
> > biased to
> > decide and move out on harmless affirmations when their negation could be
> > harmful. As in an animal responding to a partial shape or movement in the
> > bushes.
> > If it acts to protect itself or attack it has a better chance then
> > ignoring the
> > possible illusion.
> >
> Yes indeed! If I see a shadow suggesting a rock is falling on my head, I
> jump. Still, I would not say that that shadow caused me to have knowledge
> of what was above me. I didn't have knowledge, just a suspicion; the
> potential damage made me jump even for a low probability event but my
> jumping was not evidence that I had 'knowledge'.
>

Not a good example because it is hard to differentiate the neural structure from
hypertrophied human nature structures. There are likely species specific neural
constructions designed by natural, sexual and cultural selection, that make
particular complex human inferences instinctual biases.

> > -------------
> >
> > If the dispute is to be settled rationally, there must be some means for
> > settling
> > it. It would do no good of each side simply to assert its position without
> > argument. So how would a standard of knowledge (or "criterion of truth,"
> > in the
> > language of the Stoics) be defended? It could only be defended by
> > reference to
> > some standard or other. If the standard under dispute is invoked, then the
> > question has been begged. If another standard is appealed to, the question
> > arises
> > again, to be answered either by circular reasoning or by appeal to yet
> > another
> > standard. So either the process of invoking standards does not terminate,
> > or it
> > ends in circular reasoning, and thus the dispute over the standard cannot
> > be
> > settled rationally.
>
> I agree; the process of invoking standards does not end, as we know more we
> have new tests. A standard of knowledge should not be tested by debate
> alone; the standard is whether the knowledge proves to correspond to what we
> observe in the real world, over time. As we learn more of the real world
> that will change. There is no Aristotelian 'yes', 'no' standard, the
> standard really is 'does it work?'. Good knowledge works, it explains and
> predicts. As we explore reality, macro and micro there may come a time when
> the old kowledge doesn't work for the new data; the standard says the
> knowledge is --not false, but no longer as useful!
>

There is a new area in philosophy that is needing participants and that is how to
interpret Evolutionary Psychology's evidences for the evolution of inference
neurology. Actually this frontier is wide open and something new might come of it
from under the sun.

http://www.google.com/search?q=Evolutionary+Psychology

> >
> > Fallibilism admits that we may be justified in believing what is false.
> > Justification involves a risk of error, and this risk of error we identify
> > with a
> > probability of error. A minimum condition on justification, then, will be
> > that a
> > belief have a relatively high probability of being true. If I do not think
> > that
> > my belief is highly probable, then I cannot take it that I am succeeding
> > in
> > satisfying my epistemic goal of accepting only what is true.
> >
> > The use of probability is particularly appealing as a way to explain how
> > one
> > arrives at justification concerning general information or other
> > information that
> > has not been entirely collected (about the future, for example). The
> > specific
> > information that we possess makes probable information which we do not
> > possess.
> > On the other hand, a general belief about my competence, say in
> > identifying red,
> > may help to make probable a particular belief I have, such as that I see
> > something red.
> >
> > There is a significant initial obstacle to building an account of
> > justification
> > on high probability, however. It is known as
> >
> > The lottery paradox.
> >
> > Let us suppose that 99.9% probability is to be sufficient
> > for justification. (If you think it is too high or too low,
> > pick your own number.) Now let there be a fair lottery with
> > 1000 tickets. All have been sold, and one has been drawn.
> > Given the equal probability that any one of the tickets will
> > win (1 in 1000, or .001), the probability that a given ticket
> > will lose is .999, or 99.9%. On the hypothesis that this is
> > the degree of probability required for knowledge, we can
> > conclude that the proposition that the #1 ticket is a
> > lose is justified. But because the probabilities for
> > each one of the tickets' losing is the same, the
> > proposition that the #2 ticket is a loser is
> > also justified.
> >
> > If we apply this reasoning to each ticket, we will be justified in
> > accepting of
> > every one of them that they are losers. A simple step takes us to the
> > conclusion
> > that they all are losers. But we know that one of them has been drawn and
> > hence
> > is the winner. So we are justified in accepting that all the tickets are
> > losers
> > and that one is a winner: a paradox.
> >
> > Some people have tried to disarm the paradox by rejecting the
> > "conjunctive"
> > principle that I called a "simple step." A good reason for suspicion is
> > that each
> > of the individual propositions is said to be justified without taking the
> > justification of the others into account. One starts all over in
> > considering each
> > ticket. But if we keep in mind that we were just now justified in
> > accepting that
> > the #1 ticket is a loser, when we consider the #2 ticket, things are
> > different.
> > The probability that it is a loser is now lower, falling below 99.9%. In
> > that
> > case, it is not justified. The lesson Lehrer draws from the paradox is
> > that high
> > probability of propositions in isolation is not enough. We need to take
> > into
> > account all the other information we have at our disposal, which is
> > characteristic of a coherence theory. But development of such a theory
> > will have
> > to wait until Chapters 5 and 6. In the meantime, we shall examine the
> > possibility
> > of probability as justification in detail.
> >
> > http://hume.ucdavis.edu/phi102/tkch4.htm
> >
> >> > 1. Suppose you're driving through rural Pennsylvania. As a matter of
> >> > fact,
> >> > the
> >> > region you're driving through contains a lot of fake barns: mere wooden
> >> > fronts
> >> > that just look like barns from the road. But you don't know this, and
> >> > have
> >> > no
> >> > reason to suspect it. You look off to your left and you see something
> >> > that
> >> > looks
> >> > like a barn, so you believe "That's a barn." In fact, it is a barn.
> >> > It's
> >> > one of
> >> > the few barns in the region. But you're just lucky. If you had looked
> >> > at a
> >> > fake
> >> > barn instead, you would have believed that it was a barn.
> >> >
> >> > In this case, it seems that your belief that you're driving by a barn
> >> > is
> >> > justified or reasonable. After all, it looks like a barn; and you've
> >> > never
> >> > heard
> >> > about a region full of fake barns. And your belief is also true. But
> >> > we're
> >> > reluctant to say that you know that you're driving by a barn.
> >> >
> >> > Cases of this sort are known as Gettier cases, after the philosopher
> >> > Edmund
> >> > Gettier. Before Gettier, philosophers thought that knowledge was
> >> > equivalent to
> >> > justified true belief. That is:
> >> >
> >> > You know that P iff:
> >> >
> >> > (i) P is true,
> >> >
> >> > (ii) you believe that P,
> >> >
> >> > and (iii) you are justified in believing P (you have good evidence for
> >> > P).
> >> >
> >> > But then Gettier came along and presented examples in which the subject
> >> > has a
> >> > justified true belief which, intuitively, fails to count as knowledge.
> >> > The
> >> > fake
> >> > barn case we just discussed is an example of that sort. (That
> >> > particular
> >> > example
> >> > was created by Carl Ginet). Here's another Gettier case:
> >> >
> >> > ---------------------------------
> >> >
> >> > 2. You have a justified belief that someone in your office owns a Ford.
> >> > And as it
> >> > happens it's true that someone in your office owns a Ford. However,
> >> > your
> >> > evidence
> >> > for your belief all concerns Nogot, who as it turns out owns no Ford.
> >> > Your
> >> > belief
> >> > that someone in the office owns a Ford is true because someone else in
> >> > the
> >> > office
> >> > owns a Ford. Call this guy Haveit. Since all your evidence concerns
> >> > Nogot
> >> > and not
> >> > Haveit, it seems, intuitively, that you don't know that someone in your
> >> > office
> >> > owns a Ford. So you don't know, even though you have a justified belief
> >> > that
> >> > someone owns a Ford, and, as it turns out, this belief happens to be
> >> > true.
> >> >
> >> > These cases are counter-examples to the claim that justified true
> >> > belief
> >> > is
> >> > sufficient for knowledge.
> >> >
> >> > The Gettier Problem is to state what, in addition to or instead of
> >> > justified true
> >> > belief, is needed to have knowledge.
> >> >
> >> > Notice that the Gettier Problem only arises because we were trying to
> >> > say
> >> > that
> >> > you could know that someone owns a Ford on the basis of evidence that
> >> > falls short
> >> > of certainty. If we instead said that knowledge requires infallible or
> >> > absolutely
> >> > certain evidence, then it would be clear why you're not in a position
> >> > to
> >> > know
> >> > that someone owns a Ford. You don't have infallible evidence that
> >> > someone
> >> > owns a
> >> > Ford.
> >> >
> >> > This solution would do the trick. It would make our account of
> >> > knowledge
> >> > immune
> >> > to Gettier-type counterexamples. But it would also make it next to
> >> > impossible to
> >> > have knowledge. So it seems like a bit of overkill. Most philosophers
> >> > who
> >> > have
> >> > attacked the Gettier Problem have tried to find some solution which
> >> > still
> >> > allows
> >> > subjects to know things on the basis of fallible, defeasible evidence.
> >> >
> >> > One salient feature of the Nogot/Haveit Gettier case is that the
> >> > reasoning
> >> > that
> >> > leads you to the belief that someone owns a Ford goes through a false
> >> > step,
> >> > namely the step where you believe that Nogot owns a Ford. So a possible
> >> > solution
> >> > to the Gettier Problem might be this: knowledge is justified true
> >> > belief--where
> >> > the reasoning your belief is based on doesn't proceed through any false
> >> > steps.
> >> >
> >> > Philosophers initially thought this was a promising solution. But
> >> > unfortunately,
> >> > Rich Feldman described Gettier-like cases where your reasoning doesn't
> >> > proceed
> >> > through any false steps, but intuitively you still don't count as
> >> > knowing.
> >> > So the
> >> > present solution doesn't get to the root of the problem.
> >> >
> >> > Feldman's case works like this:
> >> >
> >> > You see Nogot waxing a Ford, humming Ford ad jingles to himself, and so
> >> > on. On
> >> > that basis, you conclude that someone in your office is waxing a Ford,
> >> > humming
> >> > Ford ad jingles, and so on. This belief is true. On the basis of that
> >> > belief, you
> >> > conclude that someone in your office owns a Ford. As before, Haveit
> >> > owns a
> >> > Ford
> >> > so this belief is true.
> >> >
> >> > Once again it seems like you have a justified true belief that someone
> >> > owns a
> >> > Ford, which fails to count as knowledge. In this case it does not look
> >> > like your
> >> > reasoning proceeded through any false steps.
> >> >
> >> > ----------------------------------------
> >> >
> >> > Another kind of Gettier case where you don't seem to reason through any
> >> > false
> >> > steps is discussed in the Rosenberg dialogue:
> >> >
> >> > 3. You're in the meadow, and you see a rock which looks to you like a
> >> > sheep. So
> >> > you say to yourself "There's a sheep in the meadow." In fact there is a
> >> > sheep in
> >> > the meadow (behind the rock, where you can't see it).
> >> >
> >> > Here again you have a justified true belief that there is a sheep in
> >> > the
> >> > meadow,
> >> > which fails to count as knowledge. In this case, your belief doesn't
> >> > seem
> >> > to be
> >> > based on any reasoning at all. (You could argue the same for the
> >> > original
> >> > example
> >> > with the barn, too.)
> >> >
> >> > Another popular solution to the Gettier Problem is to say that you know
> >> > that P
> >> > iff you have a justified true belief that P, and there's no true
> >> > information "out
> >> > there" in the world that would defeat your justification for P, were
> >> > you
> >> > to learn
> >> > of it.
> >> >
> >> > This sounds good at first. In the Nogot/Haveit case, there is the
> >> > information
> >> > that Nogot is merely pretending to own a Ford. If you learn that
> >> > information,
> >> > that would defeat your justification for believing that someone in the
> >> > office
> >> > owns a Ford. So according to the present proposal, even before you
> >> > learn
> >> > that
> >> > information, the mere fact that it is "out there" in the world shows
> >> > that
> >> > your
> >> > justified belief that someone owns a Ford can't count as knowledge
> >> > (even
> >> > though
> >> > it happens to be true).
> >> >
> >> > In Rosenberg's sheep-in-the-meadow case, there is the information that
> >> > what
> >> > you're looking at is a rock. If you learn that information, that would
> >> > defeat
> >> > your justification for believing that there is a sheep in the meadow.
> >> > So
> >> > according to the present proposal, even before you learn that
> >> > information,
> >> > the
> >> > mere fact that it is "out there" in the world shows that your justified
> >> > belief
> >> > that there is a sheep in the meadow can't count as knowledge (even
> >> > though
> >> > it
> >> > happens to be true).
> >> >
> >> > In the fake barn case, there is the information that the region you're
> >> > driving
> >> > through has a lot of fake barns in it, and they look just like real
> >> > barns.
> >> > If you
> >> > learn that information, that would defeat your justification for
> >> > believing
> >> > that
> >> > you're looking at a real barn. Hence, even if it's true that you're
> >> > looking at a
> >> > real barn, according to the present proposal you don't know that you
> >> > are.
> >> >
> >> > --------------------------------------
> >> >
> >> > So far, this all sounds good. The present proposal also explains why
> >> > you
> >> > can't
> >> > have knowledge in another sort of case, first introduced by Gilbert
> >> > Harman:
> >> >
> >> > 4. Jill reads in the newspaper that the president of her country has
> >> > been
> >> > assassinated. In fact, this story is true. However, the president's
> >> > associates
> >> > have mounted a campaign to suppress the story, and they've been
> >> > broadcasting
> >> > false reports on all the television stations that the president is OK,
> >> > the
> >> > assassin actually only killed a bodyguard. Jill is blissfully unaware
> >> > of
> >> > all this
> >> > misleading evidence. The newspaper she read happens to be the only news
> >> > source
> >> > that's reporting the true events. All of Jill's peers, on the other
> >> > hand,
> >> > have
> >> > heard the misleading TV reports and aren't sure whether or not the
> >> > president was
> >> > really killed.
> >> >
> >> > Harman claims that this is another Gettier case: he says that Jill has
> >> > a
> >> > justified true belief that the president was assassinated, but she
> >> > doesn't
> >> > have
> >> > knowledge, because there is all this misleading evidence abroad in her
> >> > community,
> >> > which she has only managed to avoid by sheer luck.
> >> >
> >> > So far, so good. However, the current proposal also runs into
> >> > difficulties.
> >> >
> >> > Do we really want to say that if there's any potentially defeating
> >> > piece
> >> > of
> >> > information out there, that's enough to block your justified true
> >> > belief
> >> > from
> >> > counting as knowledge?
> >> > Consider a variant of Harman's assassination case.
> >> >
> >> > The president's associates are sitting in the TV studio, saying into
> >> > the
> >> > microphone "No really the president is OK, it was somebody else who got
> >> > killed."
> >> > The fact that they are saying this is a potentially defeating piece of
> >> > information. If you were to learn that the president's associates are
> >> > saying
> >> > this, it would defeat your justification for believing the president
> >> > had
> >> > been
> >> > assassinated. But suppose that in this case, unlike the earlier case,
> >> > the
> >> > associates' speech never gets broadcast to the public. (Maybe they're
> >> > just
> >> > joking
> >> > around before the TV cameras start rolling.) So all the newspapers and
> >> > TV
> >> > stations carry the correct report about the president's assassination.
> >> >
> >> > In this case, it seems like you should know. There is a potentially
> >> > defeating
> >> > piece of evidence out there (the fact that the associates are saying
> >> > what
> >> > they're
> >> > saying). But it's so remote, nobody knows about it except the
> >> > associates
> >> > themselves and a few TV crew. Perhaps this case is hard to assess. But
> >> > my
> >> > own
> >> > inclination is to say that in this case, you can know the president was
> >> > assassinated. The information about the president's associates in this
> >> > case
> >> > should not block your justified true belief about the president from
> >> > counting as
> >> > knowledge.
> >> >
> >> > -----------------------------------
> >> >
> >> > Here's another case, to make the same point.
> >> >
> >> > 5. You see Tom Grabit hide a book underneath his jacket and sneak out
> >> > of
> >> > Widener
> >> > Library. On the basis of this, you form the justified belief that Tom
> >> > stole a
> >> > library book. As it happens, your belief is true. However, unbeknownst
> >> > to
> >> > you,
> >> > Tom's mother was going around today telling people that Tom was
> >> > thousands
> >> > of
> >> > miles away, and that Tom's evil twin John was visiting Harvard. The
> >> > fact
> >> > that
> >> > Tom's mother said this is a potentially defeating piece of evidence. If
> >> > you were
> >> > to learn of it, it would defeat your justification for believing that
> >> > Tom
> >> > stole
> >> > the book. However, as it turns out, it really was Tom who stole the
> >> > book.
> >> > Tom has
> >> > no twin brother and his mother is a compulsive liar.
> >> >
> >> > In this case, too, it seems like you should count as knowing that Tom
> >> > stole the
> >> > book. The testimony of a compulsive liar, locked up in an asylum
> >> > somewhere, which
> >> > you never hear, should not block your justified true belief about Tom
> >> > from
> >> > counting as knowledge.
> >> >
> >> > In both of the preceding two cases, it seemed intuitively like you
> >> > should
> >> > count
> >> > as having knowledge. Yet in both cases, there was some potentially
> >> > defeating
> >> > piece of information "out there" in the world. So the present proposal
> >> > would say
> >> > that you don't have knowledge. That is a problem for this proposal.
> >> >
> >> > You may have noticed that, in the preceding two cases, although there
> >> > is
> >> > some
> >> > potentially defeating piece of information "out there," you would only
> >> > be
> >> > misled
> >> > by that information if you somehow managed to learn only part of the
> >> > truth. The
> >> > information about what the president's associates are saying would only
> >> > defeat
> >> > your justification if you were ignorant of the fact that they were
> >> > doing a
> >> > cover-up. The information about what Tom's mother said would only
> >> > defeat
> >> > your
> >> > justification if you were ignorant of the fact that she was a
> >> > compulsive
> >> > liar.
> >> > And so on. So you might be tempted to say:
> >> >
> >> > Hey, we can fix the present proposal. We'll say that you know that P
> >> > iff
> >> > you have
> >> > a justified true belief that P, and there's no true information "out
> >> > there" in
> >> > the world that would defeat your justification for P, were you to learn
> >> > of
> >> > it--unless there's also some second piece of information that would
> >> > counteract
> >> > that defeater.
> >> >
> >> > If you thought of this, that's good, you're on your toes. That's very
> >> > clever.
> >> >
> >> > But if you think harder, you'll realize it's not clever enough. For if
> >> > we
> >> > amend
> >> > the proposal in that way, then the proposal becomes incapable of
> >> > explaining any
> >> > of the Gettier cases. For in a Gettier case, your belief always happens
> >> > to
> >> > be
> >> > true, and that's a piece of information "out there" in the world that
> >> > would
> >> > counteract any evidence that tells against your belief.
> >> >
> >> > To illustrate this, consider the original Nogot/Haveit case. In that
> >> > case,
> >> > you
> >> > have a justified belief that someone owns a Ford, and this belief
> >> > happens
> >> > to be
> >> > true. Now, there is some information out there--the information that
> >> > Nogot
> >> > is
> >> > only pretending to own a Ford--that would defeat your justification for
> >> > believing
> >> > that someone owns a Ford. But, since your belief that someone owns a
> >> > Ford
> >> > is
> >> > true, there is also a second piece of information out there that would
> >> > counteract
> >> > that defeater. Namely, the information that Haveit does own a Ford. If
> >> > you
> >> > were
> >> > to learn both pieces of information--that Nogot is only pretending but
> >> > Haveit
> >> > does own a Ford--then you would remain justified in believing that
> >> > someone
> >> > owns a
> >> > Ford. So according to the amended proposal, you would count as having
> >> > knowledge.
> >> > But that's the wrong result. In the Nogot/Haveit case, intuitively, you
> >> > don't
> >> > know that someone owns a Ford.
> >> >
> >> > So it is difficult to explain why in some cases (the Nogot/Haveit case,
> >> > the
> >> > sheep-in-the-meadow case, the Gadwall duck/grebe case, Harman's
> >> > original
> >> > assassination case) the existence of some defeating evidence "out
> >> > there"
> >> > in the
> >> > world blocks your justified belief from counting as knowledge, even
> >> > though
> >> > it is
> >> > true; and why in other cases (the second version of the Harman case,
> >> > the
> >> > Tom
> >> > Grabit case) it does not.
> >> >
> >> > Sigh. Back to the drawing board.
> >> >
> >> > As you can see, it's very difficult to say what we need to add to
> >> > justified true
> >> > belief, to turn it into knowledge. We'll come back to this problem
> >> > again
> >> > in a few
> >> > classes.
> >> >
> >> > In the meantime, let me call your attention to another lesson we can
> >> > learn
> >> > from
> >> > all these Gettier cases. When we were discussing Austin, we saw him
> >> > saying
> >> > that
> >> > you don't need to rule out all the alternatives to P, to know that P.
> >> > You
> >> > just
> >> > need to rule out the alternatives that are somehow "relevant." Austin
> >> > understood
> >> > that to mean: you only need to rule out those alternatives you've
> >> > encountered
> >> > some evidence for.
> >> >
> >> > We can model Gettier cases with the Relevant Alternatives Theory too.
> >> > But
> >> > this
> >> > puts a new twist on the Theory. Consider the fake barn case. You really
> >> > do
> >> > see a
> >> > barn, but we think you fail to know it's a barn, because you aren't in
> >> > a
> >> > position
> >> > to rule out the possibility that it's a fake barn. It doesn't matter
> >> > that
> >> > you
> >> > don't know about the prevalence of fakes hereabouts. The mere fact that
> >> > there are
> >> > a lot of fakes around seems to be enough to make the fake barn
> >> > possibility
> >> > a
> >> > relevant one: a possibility you need to rule out, if you're to know
> >> > you're
> >> > looking at a real barn.
> >> >
> >> > So reflection on Gettier cases seems to show that alternatives can be
> >> > relevant--can be such that your inability to rule them out keeps you
> >> > from
> >> > having
> >> > knowledge--merely because your environment is a certain way, regardless
> >> > of
> >> > whether you have any evidence that it's that way.
> >> >
> >> > http://www.princeton.edu/~jimpryor/courses/epist/notes/gettier.html
> >> >
> >> > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> >> > news:h76dnWyOTa3qC-3cRVn-hw@comcast.com...
> >> >> 1. Suppose you're driving through rural Pennsylvania. As a matter of
> >> >> fact, the
> >> >> region you're driving through contains a lot of fake barns: mere
> >> >> wooden
> >> >> fronts
> >> >> that just look like barns from the road. But you don't know this, and
> >> >> have no
> >> >> reason to suspect it. You look off to your left and you see something
> >> >> that
> >> > looks
> >> >> like a barn, so you believe "That's a barn." In fact, it is a barn.
> >> >> It's
> >> >> one of
> >> >> the few barns in the region. But you're just lucky. If you had looked
> >> >> at
> >> >> a fake
> >> >> barn instead, you would have believed that it was a barn.
> >> >>
> >> >> 2. You have a justified belief that someone in your office owns a
> >> >> Ford.
> >> >> And as
> >> > it
> >> >> happens it's true that someone in your office owns a Ford. However,
> >> >> your
> >> > evidence
> >> >> for your belief all concerns Nogot, who as it turns out owns no Ford.
> >> >> Your
> >> > belief
> >> >> that someone in the office owns a Ford is true because someone else in
> >> >> the
> >> > office
> >> >> owns a Ford. Call this guy Haveit. Since all your evidence concerns
> >> >> Nogot
> >> >> and
> >> > not
> >> >> Haveit, it seems, intuitively, that you don't know that someone in
> >> >> your
> >> >> office
> >> >> owns a Ford. So you don't know, even though you have a justified
> >> >> belief
> >> >> that
> >> >> someone owns a Ford, and, as it turns out, this belief happens to be
> >> >> true.
> >> >>
> >> >> 3. You're in the meadow, and you see a rock which looks to you like a
> >> >> sheep. So
> >> >> you say to yourself "There's a sheep in the meadow." In fact there is
> >> >> a
> >> >> sheep
> >> > in
> >> >> the meadow (behind the rock, where you can't see it).
> >> >>
> >> >> 4. Jill reads in the newspaper that the president of her country has
> >> >> been
> >> >> assassinated. In fact, this story is true. However, the president's
> >> >> associates
> >> >> have mounted a campaign to suppress the story, and they've been
> >> >> broadcasting
> >> >> false reports on all the television stations that the president is OK,
> >> >> the
> >> >> assassin actually only killed a bodyguard. Jill is blissfully unaware
> >> >> of
> >> >> all
> >> > this
> >> >> misleading evidence. The newspaper she read happens to be the only
> >> >> news
> >> >> source
> >> >> that's reporting the true events. All of Jill's peers, on the other
> >> >> hand,
> >> >> have
> >> >> heard the misleading TV reports and aren't sure whether or not the
> >> >> president
> >> > was
> >> >> really killed.
> >> >>
> >> >> 5. You see Tom Grabit hide a book underneath his jacket and sneak out
> >> >> of
> >> > Widener
> >> >> Library. On the basis of this, you form the justified belief that Tom
> >> >> stole a
> >> >> library book. As it happens, your belief is true. However, unbeknownst
> >> >> to
> >> >> you,
> >> >> Tom's mother was going around today telling people that Tom was
> >> >> thousands
> >> >> of
> >> >> miles away, and that Tom's evil twin John was visiting Harvard. The
> >> >> fact
> >> >> that
> >> >> Tom's mother said this is a potentially defeating piece of evidence.
> >> >> If
> >> >> you
> >> > were
> >> >> to learn of it, it would defeat your justification for believing that
> >> >> Tom
> >> >> stole
> >> >> the book. However, as it turns out, it really was Tom who stole the
> >> >> book.
> >> >> Tom
> >> > has
> >> >> no twin brother and his mother is a compulsive liar.
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >
> >
> >
> >> Ed
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
>
>

Quantcast