Re: Endurantists vs Perdurantism

From: 1Z (peterdjones_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 10/21/04 

Date: 21 Oct 2004 07:47:22 -0700

"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<XcydnQ6IIOfnJOvcRVn-rw@comcast.com>...
> "1Z" <peterdjones@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:fd762132.0410200428.35c6d4f5@posting.google.com...
> > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message

> > > > > ...What matters for our freedom is what powers we have now. Of
> > > > > course, what powers we have as well as how we use those powers are
> explained
> > > > > by the laws of nature and antecedent conditions like everything else. But
> > > > > the explanation of how we came to have a power or we use those powers is
> > > > > perfectly compatible with reality of those powers. The crux is that your
> > > > > being free depends on what you are like now, not on how you got that way.
> > > >
> > > > Whether a particular act of mine is free or not is very dependent
> > > > on prvious circumstances. Contrast my choosing to rob a bank,
> > > > my robbing it at gunpoint, and my robbing it at under hypnotic
> > > > suggestion.
> > > >
> > >
> > > When he says, "being free depends on what you are like now, not on how you
> got
> > > that way" he merely mean that the current circumstances are all that are
> > > necessary.
> >
> > My counterexamples show that they are not.
> >
>
> You are saying something about an infinite regress of causation and that is
> beyond your experience. Therefore you are not talking deductive necessity but an
> inductive theory based upon probabilities.

Deductions are only as certain as their premises and inductions can
approach 100%. No sane person has any realistic reason to doubt that
there are causes leading to the present moment. This whole sceptical
doubnt thing is a waste of time. I thought this was about endurance,
erdurance
and immortality, anyway.

> You counter examples merely show that
> it is possible or impossible but doesn't determine which conclusively. Try again.

My counter examples show that causal history is relevant to our
normal attitudes about freedom.

> > > >
> > > > > Your freedom, to return to our example, to raise your hand and ask a
> > > > > question, or to leave your arm at your side and forgo asking the
> question,
> > > > > consists of your abilities, your powers, at this moment. What matters is
> > > > > whether you have those abilities, those powers at this moment. If you do,
> > > > > then you are free.
> > > >
> > > > Given determinism, I *can* only make that choice under a particular
> > > > set of circumstances, that I *do* make.
> > > > I only have the power to do otherwise in the sense that under
> > > > different circumstances, I would have done otherwise.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Determinism has not been justified as a given.
> >
> > I am not arguing for determinism.
> >
>
> I agreed that everything is cause

meaning "has a cause.."..?

> but claimed this doesn't show how everything is
> necessarily determined. You said "given determinism..." what do you mean by that?

"If determinism is true.."

> > > "Certain arguments advanced to prove the compatibility of free action and
> > > determinism are distinctive because they try to prove compatibility by
> showing
> > > that determinism is indispensable to free action. This view has taken a
> number of
> > > forms. One is an argument that the distinction between action and mere
> passivity
> > > has itself to do with causation. Earlier, when we were examnng the determmist
> > > case, we noticed that according to the determinist, the truth of determinism
> > > implies that people are more passive than active. If human action is the
> > > inevitable outcome of causal forces beyond the person's control, it would
> seem
> > > that he is more acted upon than actor. The person who pulls the trigger on
> the
> > > murder weapon appears active, appears to perform an action. But, according to
> > > some determinists he is not really active; instead, he is passively
> responding to
> > > causal forces that lie entirely outside of his influence. According to
> certain
> > > comptibilists, that is a complete inversion of the truth. For as they see it,
> the
> > > difference between passive response and action mudt itself be deliniated in
> > > causal terms."
> > >
> > > Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
> > > by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
> > > http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
> > >
> > > > > Perhaps you fear from earlier discussion that if determinism is true, you
> > > > > really lack those abilities or powers, your conception of them is a mere
> > > > > illusion. To relieve the fear, consider a thought experiment. Imagine
> that
> > > > > there is duplicate universe, exactly like the present one, atom for atom
> the
> > > > > same and indistinguishable, but with one difference. The duplicate
> universe
> > > > > has just popped into existence a few moments ago as a cosmic accident, a
> > > > > causally undetermined and random occurrence. In this other universe, you
> > > > > have a duplicate, exactly like you, atom for atom indistinguishable. Your
> > > > > duplicate thinks about asking a question, just as you do, and decides to
> do
> > > > > so. Your duplicate has no causal history, for the duplicate universe has
> > > > > just now sprung into existence. Whether your duplicate has freedom
> depends
> > > > > not on his or her causal history, but on what he or she is like now, on
> what
> > > > > abilities he or she now has.
> > > >
> > > > But in the duplicate universe, explanation of actions will be
> > > > false that are true in the real universe, since the explanation
> > > > referes back to things that never happenned in the duplicate
> > > > universe. Rational accountability is part of free will, surely.
> > > >
> > >
> > > But you have not established which is a real universe.
> >
> > By hypothesis, in the original example, the non-duplicate is real.
> > But the point remains valid hypothetically. The existence or absence
> > of the past *would* make a difference to the present and the future.
> >
>
> But you can't determine which is real and which is a duplicate in a deductive
> manner. In string theory universes bud into existence often. Suppose that these 5
> minute ago universes happen all the time and they each look like they were
> billions of years old when you looked at the evidence contained in them, like
> sediments and carbon dating and all that. Then if a universe came along that was
> actually as old as it appears it is still hard to claim which is real and
> non-duplicate.

It remains the case that actually saying which is which has nothing to
do with my point.

> So if there are two computers, and one computer has evidence that the information
> has been updated and changed regularly for 5 years. If everything on the second
> computer were set similarly if would also appear to be as old. A clone of its
> oldness.

> > > A duplicate universe
> > > doesn't necessarily mean a false universe or necessarily show this universe
> as
> > > true. Universes are true by what they do.
> >
> > I don't see what you mean by that.
> >
>
> Its like you brain right now. If it were duplicated exactly 5 minutes ago it
> would believe it was you with all your memories and with as much evidence that
> you have for the idea that you have been alive as long as you have been.

But its belief would be false. IF I am in a universe with a eal
past THEN my beliefs would be true.

> > > Again you are parading an inductive probability as a deductive necessity. If
> you
> > > can completely justify that blief in the universe cannot be mistaken then we
> > > could proceed deductively but until then its all inductive probability that
> > > necessarily goes outside of experience for evidence.
> >
> > I don't know what you mean by "belief in the universe". I am not going to waste
> > time arguing that the world was not created five minutes ago.
> >
>
> http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoHowa.htm
>
> 1. Suppose, that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, emperical
> beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification
> does not depend on that of any further emperical beliefs.
>
> 2. For a belief to be episemically justified requires that there be a reason
> why it is likely to be true.
>
> 3. A belief is justified for a person only if he is in cognitive possession
> of such a reason.
>
> 4. A person is in cognitive possession of such a reason only if he believes
> with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is
> likely to be true.
>
> 5. The premises of such a justifying argument must include at least one
> empirical premise.
>
> 6. So, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief depends on the
> justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting 1.
>
> 7. So, there can be no basic empirical beliefs including completely justified
> sceptical beliefs.
>
> The 7 propositions seem to eliminate the possibility of emperical
> justification of any and all emperical beliefs. But it can lead to this
> untruthfullness of human beliefs in three ways which deal with the apparent
> "regress" of one belief depending upon another which depends upon another
> and so on:

I reject 3. The justification of a true belief is whatever makes it
true.
The correct operation of the senses and artificial instruments is
enough
to justify beliefs based on them. Being able to understand ot account
for justification is another matter.

> If the regress of emperical justification does not terminate in basic
> emperical beliefs, then it must either:
>
> (1) terminate in unjustified beleifs
>
> (2) go on infinitely (without circularity)
>
> (3) circle back upon itself in some way.
>
>
> > > > > You need have no fear that his or her raising a
> > > > > hand to ask a question is not free on the grounds that the action is the
> > > > > result of conditions in the remote past. The duplicate universe has no
> past.
> > > > > You will not find any reason for denying, when your duplicate raises his
> or
> > > > > her hand to ask a question, that this is a free action. You will conclude
> it
> > > > > is free. But now consider. YOU are just the same, atom for atom, as your
> > > > > duplicate. Your internal and external conditions are indistinguishable.
> If
> > > > > your duplicate has an ability or power to accept or reject a motive to
> raise
> > > > > a hand, then you have that ability or power to raise a hand or not to
> raise
> > > > > it.
> > > >
> > > > But my duplicate lacks rational accountability as a result
> > > > of lacking history, and in that sense is NOT free.
> > > >
> > >
> > > But you have not shown how you belief that this universe has rational
> > > accountability in a deductive sense since you have not eliminated the
> possibility
> > > that this universe was created 5 minutes ago. You have to show this to be
> > > impossible in order to be entitled to make you prior deductive claims.
> >
> > I can maintain that free actions by definition require rational accountability
> > which in turn requires a proper causal history, without arguing that
> > anything actually IS rationally accountable. Although that is all
> > a bit abstract and silly, since the 5 minute hypothesis is silly.
> >
>
> But I am not claiming that causes are absent at any point.
>
> What matters for our freedom is what powers we have now. Of course, what powers
> we have as well as how we use those powers are explained by the laws of nature
> and antecedent conditions like everything else. But the explanation of how we
> came to have a power or we use those powers is perfectly compatible with reality
> of those powers. The crux is that your being free depends on what you are like
> now, not on how you got that way. Your freedom, to return to our example, to
> raise your hand and ask a question, or to leave your arm at your side and forgo
> asking the question, consists of your abilities, your powers, at this moment.
> What matters is whether you have those abilities, those powers at this moment. If
> you do, then you are free.
>
> Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
> by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/

Whatever. Under determinism I don't have the power to have done
differently than I actually did.

> > > > > It is your present abilities and powers that determine whether you are
> > > > > now free to perform an action. It does not matter to your being free
> whether
> > > > > those abilities and powers arose from cosmic accident or ancestral
> > > > > determination. Your causal history does not deprive you of your freedom.
> > > > > Your freedom is the product of your causal history.
> > > >
> > > > It is if my history is not itself entirely determined.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Isn't this the "compatibilist" argument? That our subjectivity is part of the
> > > cause.
> >
> > No, the compatiblist argument is that I can be free (or only be free)
> > if I am entirely determined. I don't agree. I think free action
> > require the 'right' combination of causality and indeterminism.
>
> Still, there are many philosophers who believe that determinism and moral
> responsibility are not incompatible, and are accordingly called compatibilists.
> Let us now turn to their arguments.
>
> First, let us take a closer look at our acceptance of the ordinary claim that an
> act was not done of the agent's free will. Does it really have anything to do
> with determinism? Compatibilists think that it does not. Here's why.
>
> When I say that I did not act of my own free will in such cases, I am not saying
> that my action was a determined event. I am saying that my action was coerced,
> either by some outside force, such as the gun pointed at my family, or by some
> inner interference with my normal decision-making processes, such as mental
> illness. I am saying that the action was not the product of the normal play of my
> wants and beliefs, but of something else. I am saying that I was forced,
> compelled, made to do it, that I had no real choice in the matter.
>
> Similarly, when I say that I did do something of my own free will, I am not
> saying that my action was an undetermined event. I am saying that my action was
> not coerced. I am saying that no outside force or internal aberration interfered
> with the normal play of my wants and beliefs. I am saying that I did have a real
> choice, and that I did what I did because I wanted to do it.
>
> This distinction, between doing something because you want to do it and doing it
> because you are coerced into doing it, remains whether or not determinism is
> true. There is a real and important difference between the professional bank
> robber and the teller who empties the till to save his family's lives. The first
> awakens in the morning as you and I do, showers, shaves, straps his holster on as
> he dresses, and goes to work. He is not insane, nor is he hypnotized or
> brainwashed. Nobody is forcing him to rob banks. He is just pursuing his career.
> The poor teller is doing no such thing. It is this difference that is marked by
> the phrase "of one's own free will"-not the difference between determined and
> undetermined events.
>
> But, the incompatibilist asks, is it really the professional bank robber's fault
> that he robs banks for a living? After all, if determinism is true he could not
> do otherwise. Even if his acts are the product of his own choices, even if he
> robs banks for a living because he wants to, if determinism is true, he robs
> banks because he has to. Every time he robs a bank, his actions are the only ones
> causally compatible with what came before. He cannot do otherwise. How can we
> hold him morally responsible?
>
> The compatibilist responds this way. Of course he could do otherwise. He could do
> otherwise if he wanted to. If he wanted to change professions, he could. Because
> he doesn't, he won't. That is what makes him deserving of moral blame and
> punishment. The teller, on the other hand, does not want to rob the bank, but he
> is made to anyway. His emptying of the till does not reflect badly on his
> character. The professional's robberies do reflect badly on his character. He
> wants to rob banks so he does. And that is why we hold him responsible for his
> robberies.
>
> But, the incompatibilist counters, is that fair? Does he really deserve to be
> held responsible? Does he really deserve moral censure? After all, even though
> his actions are the product of his character, if determinism is true, he did not
> make his character. That the teller's character is decent and the bank robber's
> not is merely a matter of luck. It is not the bank robber's fault that he wants
> to rob banks. His character is the product of heredity and environment. But if it
> is not his fault that he wants to rob banks, he cannot be held morally
> responsible for robbing them.
>
> The compatibilist's response to this point is a complicated one. In part, it
> deals with our notions of fairness. In part, it deals with the roles of morality,
> responsibility, and punishment in our lives, and the importance of various
> attitudes we can and do take toward others. The best way to approach it is to ask
> the question, "Why do we hold one another responsible for our actions?"
>
> Persons And Their World: An Introduction to Philosophy - Jeffrey Olen
> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0075543117/

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/det_compat.html

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