Re: The Road with no Branches argument
From: Ryan Tanaka (yidijm_at_hotmail.com)
Date: 10/22/04
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Date: 22 Oct 2004 10:13:20 -0700
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<1pSdnbZKSsaBP-XcRVn-3Q@comcast.com>...
I remember reading somewhere an interesting observation on how people
conduct themselves in day to day lives. It went sort of something
like this:
Say if we see three people, and they see a sidewalk in which they can
walk on.
The follower will conciously walk on the path that's layed out for
them.
The reactionary will make it a point to stray from the path on
purpose.
The independent thinker will be too distracted by the things around
them that they're not even aware that the path exists.
Ryan
-- http://www.ryangtanaka.com > Whenever we make a choice we are doing (or think we are doing) something like > what a traveler does when faced with a choice between different roads. The only > roads the traveler is able to choose are roads which are a continuation of the > road he is already on. By analogy, the only choices we are able to make are > choices which are a continuation of the actual past and consistent with the laws > of nature. If determinism is false, then making choices really is like this: one > ?road? (the past) behind us, two or more different ?roads? (future actions > consistent with the laws) in front of us. But if determinism is true, then our > journey through life is like traveling (in one direction only) on a road which > has no branches. There are other roads, leading to other destinations; if we > could get to one of these other roads, we could reach a different destination. > But we can't get to any of these other roads from the road we are actually on. So > if determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future; we can > never choose or do anything other than what we actually do. > > This is a powerful intuition pump, since it's natural to think of our future as > being ?open? in the branching way suggested by the road analogy and to associate > this kind of branching structure with freedom of choice. But several crucial > assumptions have been smuggled into this picture: assumptions about time and > causation and assumptions about possibility. The assumptions about time and > causation needed to make the analogy work seem to include the following: that we > ?move? through time in something like the way that we move down a road, that our > ?movement? is necessarily in one direction only, from past to future, that the > past is necessarily ?fixed? or beyond our control in some way that the future is > not. These assumptions are all controversial; on some theories of time and > causation (the 4D theory of time, a theory of causation that permits time travel > and backwards causation), they are all false (Lewis 1976, Horwich 1987, Sider > 2001). > > The assumption about possibility is that possible worlds are concrete > spatiotemporal things (in the way that roads are) and that worlds can overlap > (literally share a common part) in the way that roads can overlap. But most > possible worlds theorists reject both assumptions and nearly everyone rejects the > second assumption (Adams 1974, Lewis 1986). > > Determinism (without these additional assumptions) does not imply that our > ?journey? through life is like moving down a road; the contrast between > determinism and non-determinism is not the contrast between traveling on a > branching road and traveling on a road with no branches. > > If this intuition pump nevertheless continues to engage us, it is because we > think that our range of possible choices is constrained by two factors: the laws > and the past. We can't change or break the laws; we cannot causally affect the > past. (Even if backwards causation is logically possible, it is not within our > power.) These two premises are the basis of the best known contemporary argument > for incompatibilism: the Consequence argument. More of this later. > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ > http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/e/el/elbow_room.html > http://actiontheory.free.fr/Actionpuzzles.htm
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