Re: The Road with no Branches argument
From: Immortalist (Reanimater_2000_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 10/22/04
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Date: Fri, 22 Oct 2004 12:15:34 -0700
"Ryan Tanaka" <yidijm@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8db67b6f.0410220913.2b0e5654@posting.google.com...
> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<1pSdnbZKSsaBP-XcRVn-3Q@comcast.com>...
>
> I remember reading somewhere an interesting observation on how people
> conduct themselves in day to day lives. It went sort of something
> like this:
>
> Say if we see three people, and they see a sidewalk in which they can
> walk on.
>
> The follower will conciously walk on the path that's layed out for
> them.
>
> The reactionary will make it a point to stray from the path on
> purpose.
>
> The independent thinker will be too distracted by the things around
> them that they're not even aware that the path exists.
>
> Ryan
>
Moreover, the person does not have the sort of freedom we ordinarily desire and
believe ourselves to have. The man believes that it is up to him whether he stays
or goes, and so believes that he is free. But he is not free. Though the person
desires to remain in the room, desires at the higher level to have that desire,
and so accepts that motive, he lacks freedom. Metalevel acceptance of a motive,
though necessary, leaves something out.
What is missing? In the example, the power to leave. The man is deceived about
his situation. He thinks he is free to leave, but he is not. He is not in charge,
though he mistakenly believes that he is, for he is not able to leave the room.
We require not only metamental transcendence of our motives but the power to
determine the outcome. In order to be free, I must have both the metamental
ability to consider my motives and the ability to determine which motive
prevails. To have these abilities, I must have the internal power to accept or
reject motives for action, and I must have the external power to perform, or
refrain from performing, the considered action. I must, moreover, not be deceived
about my powers. Unlike the man locked in the room who believes that he has the
power to leave when he does not, we are free when we have the powers we conceive
ourselves to have. If, contrary to my conception of my powers, someone else has
the power to control my thoughts or movements, then I lack the powers that are
necessary to freedom. Freedom is like knowledge in one respect. An undefeated
match between the internal conception of our powers and the truth about those
powers is essential to freedom.
To put the matter briefly, when my powers are as I conceive them to be, with
respect to some action, that is, when my metalevel powers suffice to determine
whether I accept or reject the motives for action, and when my first-level powers
suffice to determine whether I perform or refrain from performing the action,
then the action is within my control. If I prefer to accept a motive and act upon
it, then I do accept it and perform the action. If I prefer to reject the motive
and not act upon it, then I do reject it and do not perform the action. What
happens is within my control because I have the powers I conceive myself to have
with respect to the action. In that case I am free with respect to the action.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
> --
> http://www.ryangtanaka.com
>
> > Whenever we make a choice we are doing (or think we are doing) something like
> > what a traveler does when faced with a choice between different roads. The
only
> > roads the traveler is able to choose are roads which are a continuation of
the
> > road he is already on. By analogy, the only choices we are able to make are
> > choices which are a continuation of the actual past and consistent with the
laws
> > of nature. If determinism is false, then making choices really is like this:
one
> > ?road? (the past) behind us, two or more different ?roads? (future actions
> > consistent with the laws) in front of us. But if determinism is true, then
our
> > journey through life is like traveling (in one direction only) on a road
which
> > has no branches. There are other roads, leading to other destinations; if we
> > could get to one of these other roads, we could reach a different
destination.
> > But we can't get to any of these other roads from the road we are actually
on. So
> > if determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future; we can
> > never choose or do anything other than what we actually do.
> >
> > This is a powerful intuition pump, since it's natural to think of our future
as
> > being ?open? in the branching way suggested by the road analogy and to
associate
> > this kind of branching structure with freedom of choice. But several crucial
> > assumptions have been smuggled into this picture: assumptions about time and
> > causation and assumptions about possibility. The assumptions about time and
> > causation needed to make the analogy work seem to include the following: that
we
> > ?move? through time in something like the way that we move down a road, that
our
> > ?movement? is necessarily in one direction only, from past to future, that
the
> > past is necessarily ?fixed? or beyond our control in some way that the future
is
> > not. These assumptions are all controversial; on some theories of time and
> > causation (the 4D theory of time, a theory of causation that permits time
travel
> > and backwards causation), they are all false (Lewis 1976, Horwich 1987, Sider
> > 2001).
> >
> > The assumption about possibility is that possible worlds are concrete
> > spatiotemporal things (in the way that roads are) and that worlds can overlap
> > (literally share a common part) in the way that roads can overlap. But most
> > possible worlds theorists reject both assumptions and nearly everyone rejects
the
> > second assumption (Adams 1974, Lewis 1986).
> >
> > Determinism (without these additional assumptions) does not imply that our
> > ?journey? through life is like moving down a road; the contrast between
> > determinism and non-determinism is not the contrast between traveling on a
> > branching road and traveling on a road with no branches.
> >
> > If this intuition pump nevertheless continues to engage us, it is because we
> > think that our range of possible choices is constrained by two factors: the
laws
> > and the past. We can't change or break the laws; we cannot causally affect
the
> > past. (Even if backwards causation is logically possible, it is not within
our
> > power.) These two premises are the basis of the best known contemporary
argument
> > for incompatibilism: the Consequence argument. More of this later.
> >
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/
> > http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/e/el/elbow_room.html
> > http://actiontheory.free.fr/Actionpuzzles.htm
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