Re: The Road with no Branches argument
From: BuddhaThu (softspokenbuddha_at_yahoo.com)
Date: 10/28/04
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Date: 28 Oct 2004 13:19:21 -0700
Dear Immortalist,
What you are saying is correct. Human actions and physical actions are
different. But if you would be so kind as to tolerate some
comparisons, I would like to offer a less than human and more logical
exposition of what you are saying.
Take for instance the EPR paradox.
Two systems. Two coins. We designate them as system A and system B.
Each have a value of .5.
This .5 is within the physical structure of both these two coins. It
is not a belief state. It is most certainly a point of knowledge. It
tells us one of two sides will be picked. It designates to us the
choice values within the physical system. This number is forever cast
in stone. There is no way this number will change. It is governed by
***absolute certainty*** of the laws of probability. This number will
be known for each coin ***before*** we start the tossing experiment.
As both coins get tossed within the four dimensional universe, they
enter into the continuum of the real number line, where although it
gets delimited between 0 and 1, its inference parameters are also
***infinite.*** It is operating on a subsystem of the .5 within a
superimposition state. It is guided and made possible by .5, but it
cannot be self-equated with it. So the numbers from those two choices
values pre-supposing infinite time will look like this. .564547.,
.465465455, .564654765432135413445 etc..
So two choice values are predetermined. But infinite freedom can
operate within each coin with the numbers operating on the continuum.
There is no way for you to pre-determine the numbers on the real
number line. Keep tossing it until the universe dies a cold hard death
and you will never know. But the choices will always be at .5, one out
of two choices will be picked.
Now imagine those two coins moving very, very far apart. In fact, they
are light years apart. Now suppose that we at one point in time deploy
a stopping principle and add up our averages. According to people in
the EPR, system A cannot be used to infer on system B.
A and B are now both independent systems. You must take your inference
based on the semantics or modal form of logic within the logic of
relevance where with each number of finite flips, ***the transition
carries with it a level of communication independently to each coin
flip.*** R is relevant taken at time a, b, c, where relevance is
carried throughout and communicated to a, b, and c to each single
coin, termed as Rabc.
A and B are now individually and independently separated and
relativized. It is no longer relevant to the point of interaction
where we infer .5 to both coins. It is relevant to each point of flip
as one add up the averages of each individual coin.
This is a classic thought experiment used to illustrate something
about branching time mathematics. It is also meant to tell us that
Quantum Theory is incomplete, for although that .5 is known
throughout, it gives us ***no pre-determined knowledge of our
universe.***
I believe that people in EPR is quite correct, but that they have
woefully misconstrued the thought experiment. First, what is happening
here is an implicational paradox. The logic of relevance tells us that
they should not have anything to do with each other, but within
themselves. Following the rules of strict implication from Kripke or
entailment from Belnap and Anderson, their two mutual systems do not
have anything to do with each other. They only have something to do
with themselves. Their antecedents can only be used to entail their
own systems and not the systems of each other. Internal related
content over syntax is sought after for grammatical meaningfulness
within their systems.
It is no longer the truth tables of True then False therefore False,
or False then True therefore True. We need to look at the content of
the antecedent and consequent of each mutual system and make sure that
they are related to the relevant contexts. They have their own
intrinsic value and therefore, they cannot infer to one another. They
must be used to infer within themselves. They can only be relevant to
themselves.
This is the case even when they are within the same light cone and
only 5 yards away. It has nothing to do with Bell's Inequalities about
hidden variables relating to temperatures, curvature of space etc… It
is the nature of the math. Statistical mathematical systems cannot be
used to infer one another. ***They must be used to infer on a possible
physical cause, esp. if their math are not mutually exclusive.*** Why?
Abstract mathematics cannot cause, but they can help us lower the
search parameters for a physical cause. If those averages were to run
on similar grounds, then I would have to suspect that there is a
common energy wave connecting them. They have a mutual destiny with
each other. Otherwise, in the classic Humean argument, they are but
mere associations. Coincidences. That is all.
It is my conjecture that people in EPR have misconstrued their paradox
based on the context of one to one relation A=A not aRb. The first one
expresses identity. The two coins are identical coins because of their
value choices of .5. But this not the case. They are two physical
systems with their own .5's, and therefore must be designated within
their own intrinsic independence. They are aRb.
They will be incompatible to each other unless you can mark a real
physical relationship. Again, mathematical probabilities cannot be
used to infer on other mathematical probabilities. It must refer to a
possible common link within the physical system.
So what does this mean by analogy? Two people. Each two choices will
have infinite freedom. Either we infer that they travel alone or they
travel together, it cannot be decided by the math. It must be decided
by physical choices that they made to link to one another, -- that
even if in the same vicinity, if there is no common physical link,
their numbers can only be seen as mere coincidence. If they are linked
by an energy wave, even if they travel a billion trillion miles from
each other, they must be see as one system.
Possible worlds are not ‘concrete ones.' This is a grammar error.
Possibilities are open, but they are never concrete. Only physical
relationships between two worlds that are actualized, (if they are
indeed actualized), can be concrete.
Determinism is not based on math. It is based on a real physical link.
I maybe a mathematician and a grammarian, but I am also a romantic.
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<1pSdnbZKSsaBP-XcRVn-3Q@comcast.com>...
> Whenever we make a choice we are doing (or think we are doing) something like
> what a traveler does when faced with a choice between different roads. The only
> roads the traveler is able to choose are roads which are a continuation of the
> road he is already on. By analogy, the only choices we are able to make are
> choices which are a continuation of the actual past and consistent with the laws
> of nature. If determinism is false, then making choices really is like this: one
> ?road? (the past) behind us, two or more different ?roads? (future actions
> consistent with the laws) in front of us. But if determinism is true, then our
> journey through life is like traveling (in one direction only) on a road which
> has no branches. There are other roads, leading to other destinations; if we
> could get to one of these other roads, we could reach a different destination.
> But we can't get to any of these other roads from the road we are actually on. So
> if determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future; we can
> never choose or do anything other than what we actually do.
>
> This is a powerful intuition pump, since it's natural to think of our future as
> being ?open? in the branching way suggested by the road analogy and to associate
> this kind of branching structure with freedom of choice. But several crucial
> assumptions have been smuggled into this picture: assumptions about time and
> causation and assumptions about possibility. The assumptions about time and
> causation needed to make the analogy work seem to include the following: that we
> ?move? through time in something like the way that we move down a road, that our
> ?movement? is necessarily in one direction only, from past to future, that the
> past is necessarily ?fixed? or beyond our control in some way that the future is
> not. These assumptions are all controversial; on some theories of time and
> causation (the 4D theory of time, a theory of causation that permits time travel
> and backwards causation), they are all false (Lewis 1976, Horwich 1987, Sider
> 2001).
>
> The assumption about possibility is that possible worlds are concrete
> spatiotemporal things (in the way that roads are) and that worlds can overlap
> (literally share a common part) in the way that roads can overlap. But most
> possible worlds theorists reject both assumptions and nearly everyone rejects the
> second assumption (Adams 1974, Lewis 1986).
>
> Determinism (without these additional assumptions) does not imply that our
> ?journey? through life is like moving down a road; the contrast between
> determinism and non-determinism is not the contrast between traveling on a
> branching road and traveling on a road with no branches.
>
> If this intuition pump nevertheless continues to engage us, it is because we
> think that our range of possible choices is constrained by two factors: the laws
> and the past. We can't change or break the laws; we cannot causally affect the
> past. (Even if backwards causation is logically possible, it is not within our
> power.) These two premises are the basis of the best known contemporary argument
> for incompatibilism: the Consequence argument. More of this later.
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/
> http://www.campusprogram.com/reference/en/wikipedia/e/el/elbow_room.html
> http://actiontheory.free.fr/Actionpuzzles.htm
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