Re: AI versus Human Consciousness
From: Raan (RaanOne_at_One.org)
Date: 01/07/05
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Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2005 04:20:16 -0500
"Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@optonline.net> wrote in message
news:o3oDd.264$VB.100@fe12.lga...
>
> "Raan" <RaanOne@One.org> wrote in message
> news:OcmDd.29166$7n1.1078341@news20.bellglobal.com...
> >
> > "Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@optonline.net> wrote in
> message
> > news:P0lDd.223$J%5.178@fe12.lga...
> > >
> > > "Raan" <RaanOne@One.org> wrote in message
> > > news:RANCd.9755$7n1.704886@news20.bellglobal.com...
> > > >
> > > > "Anthony Cerrato" <tcerrato@optonline.net> wrote in
> > > message
> > > > news:sFLCd.8445$go5.1706@fe12.lga...
> > > > >
> > > > > "Raan" <RaanOne@One.org> wrote in message
> > > > > news:wUaCd.3746$7n1.177263@news20.bellglobal.com...
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "Albert" <albertwagner@cox.net> wrote in message
> > > > > > news:8EVAd.16111$ql2.4796@okepread04...
> > > > > > > Raan wrote:
>
> [snippage]
>
> > > > > I agree. But there is a problem with the application
> of
> > > > > science to the hard problem of consciousness--a
> > > meaningful
> > > > > qualitative explanation of qualia as a universal
> > > phenomena.
> > > > > This is because the "feeling of red" and like things
> is
> > > > > relative to each individual mind/brain--relative
> > > "feelings"
> > > > > can never be compared between two brains by the
> > > scientific
> > > > > method. Experiments cannot be repeated for one
> thing.
> > > Also,
> > > > > no observer can observe oneself and certainly cannot
> > > compare
> > > > > such feelings to those of another brain. While the
> > > physical
> > > > > processes that lead to such qualia can be
> investigated
> > > and
> > > > > cataloged for comparison, this will never tell us
> > > exactly
> > > > > what the "feelings" are that they create in that
> other
> > > > > brain. We need to be satisfied with a reasonably
> > > complete
> > > > > catalog of the physical subprocesses (memory,
> > > biochemistry,
> > > > > and neural organization) that create those
> "feelings."
> > > This
> > > > > is quite
> > > > > enough to define them to the extent possible.
> > > > > ...tonyC
> > > >
> > > > And just what is the feeling of red anyway? Can you
> > > isolate it?
> > >
> > > No, that's why it is a hard problem.
> > >
> > > > Is it
> > > > something you can observe apart from the perception of
> > > red? Is it in fact
> > > > in any way an observation? Or could it rather be an
> > > intention?
> > >
> > > It is not an observation in my sense of the use of a
> word--I
> > > take observation as a result accruing from one of the 6
> > > known (traditional) physical senses. Maybe "[physical]
> > > perception" would be a more general term. If you mean to
> > > count any specific , or even general, process involved
> in
> > > the activity of the brain as an "observation," then all
> bets
> > > are off and anything would count. I don't know how the
> word
> > > intention would possibly apply to an observation in the
> > > scientific sense. Maybe just calling it the general
> sense of
> > > things like the "feeling of red" is better.
> > >
> > > >The very
> > > > concept of qualia is ill defined at best. See my
> other
> > > post about the
> > > > limitations of science and the true nature of the hard
> > > problem in this
> > > > thread.
> > >
> > > I'm not sure if I remember your other post, but I
> certainly
> > > agree that qualia is, indeed, ill-defined. I only use it
> > > because it is a convenient code and is widely used in
> the
> > > literature, probably since, although not well-defined
> people
> > > still know what it means more or less.
> > >
> > > That's the whole point, or at least part of it, in my
> saying
> > > that " 'feelings' can never be compared between two
> brains
> > > by the scientific method." Science is indeed limited in
> this
> > > area.
> > > Cheers, ...tonyC
> > >
> >
> > Points all well taken.
> > I meant to suggest that it is volition that is primary in
> the understanding
> > of consciousness and not any kind of sensation of a
> feeling of red.
>
> OK, let's consider volition--which as I take you to mean,
> the putative thing which is more commonly called, "free
> will/action". I believe free will/action (FW) is a total
> misnomer; FW is merely an artifact of the functioning
> brain--it is, in essence, an illusion. That is only an
> opinion, and in fact there is no way to prove, using
> science, that FW conclusively exists. (Of course, like
> qualia, it can not even be well-defined.) We can only use
> science, with reasoning, to support different theories which
> might suggest the truth. Truth, will however, always remain
> just a matter of opinion.
>
> > Too
> > many analyses make of the brain a passive receptor even
> those that admit of
> > dynamical processes within perception. To my way of
> thinking the brain is
> > driven by urge and desire and will, not some passive
> response to stimulus.
>
> But it is not at all, passive. It is only passive with
> respect to the illusory artifact called FW. I propose that
> responses are the result of a very complex dynamic process,
> which involves the brain's optimization of responses
> consistent with the survival traits inhereted through
> evolution, and the experiences and events of one's lifetime
> as mediated by memories, sensory perceptions, emotions (and
> one's memories of them.) BTW, this is no less "noble" that
> what is generally thought to be to be true FW; in fact there
> is no operational difference between them.
>
> > What has science to say about the nature of volition that
> does not fall into
> > an etiology instead of a teleology?
>
> And what's wrong with that?
>
> >After all the latter is only now being
> > considered as valid theory.
>
> No true science or scientist ever deals with
> teleology--purpose in never spoken of except insofar as it
> pertains to causality.
>
> >The quantum notion of reverse causality is
> > getting more and more attention. I do not suggest some
> pseudoscientific
> > idea incorporating buzz words catch phrases and
> double-talk.
> > Any thoughts on the subject?
>
> Sounds like you are saying scientific reductionism is a
> false doctrine--what exactly are you saying? Yes, there are
> thys of quantum mechanics (QM) which utilize degrees of
> "reverse causality," although I wouldn't call it that
> exactly. The Transactional Interpretation (TI) of QM
> proposes backwards-in- time-communication of waves for ex.
> but I don't understand your implication though--so what?
> Causality still rules in the macro- universe as far as we
> know. Cheers, ...tonyC
>
If, as I suggest, consciousness is more a matter of volition than
perception, dynamic or otherwise, and it is based on teleological
principles, then scientists can never offer a scientific comprehension of it
unless a case can be made for a theory something like that of reverse
causality.
--
></>
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