Re: An instance of Russell's paradox?
- From: "A.T." <andrzej-tomaszewski@xxxxx>
- Date: 3 Sep 2005 07:38:11 -0700
george wrote:
> A.T. wrote:
> > Hello,
> > I have been studying Prolog for a while,
> > and stumbled across several
> > difficulties which I seem to be unable to
> > overcome on my own. Since I
> > am doing it all solely for the purpose
> > of understanding FOL
>
> Prolog is seriously not a good choice for that.
> "Negation-as-failure", "operational semantics",
> and a host of further caveats are relevant.
> On the plus side, if you actually understand
> all of these, you will understand more than
> "solely" FOL.
>
> > (and Russell's PM straight after that)
>
> Russell's PM is NOT the same thing as classical
> FOL and there IS A REASON why modern treatments
> DON'T look like PM! Seriously, unless you have
> to write a paper on the history of science or something,
> PM is simply not worth bothering with.
>
> > I have let myself choose Sci.Logic as
> > the addressee of my questions.
>
> I pity the f__....
>
> > 1. Can all algorithms be enumerated,
>
> Yes, but that depends on a definition of "algorithm"
> due to Church and Turing, NOT Prolog or PM. It also
> depends on a broad natural definition of "can" (this
> field invites a narrower technical definition).
>
> > or will that be another
> > formulation of Russell's paradox
>
> only if you can formulate the enumeration algorithmically.
> But precisely because that assumption (that there is an
> algorithm for performing the enumeration) leads to
> contradiction, you canNOT "effectively" enumerate the
> algorithms (even though it must in some sense be abstractly
> possible to enumerate them, since they are all finite and
> there are therefore only a denumerable number of them).
> In Turing-speak, they are denumerable but not "recursively"
> enumerable.
>
> > (with the list of all algorithms being
> > another way of expressing the set of all sets)?
>
> Sort of, yes. If you could list all the algorithms
> by using an algorithm, then, yes, you would have a
> Russellian paradox. But the class of all sets is
> not a set, and the list of algorithms (despite the
> fact that it exists) is not the output of one of
> those algorithms.
>
> > 2. Can all predicates be generalized as having
> > infinite arity, e.g. a
> > predicate "philosopher(socrates)." as being
> > "philosopher(socrates, ..., ...)."
>
> No. The classical paradigm admits only finite
> arities. Given that there is no finite bound
> upon these finite arities, it might
> seem that allowing denumerable arities wouldn't
> hurt anything, but it does. Even in some infinitary
> logics, arities are still restricted to being finite.
I can only excuse myself by saying that I am a proponent of Alan
Turing's views on intelligence, views that I would _necessarily neglect
unsolicited:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/
Views which if _understood, make everything else empty twaddle. And
only that.
Thank You very much indeed and I truly am very sorry.
Tom
.
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