Re: Why are rules of inference not laws of sentential calculus?
- From: Jim Spriggs <jim.sprigs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 2 Oct 2005 16:25:31 +0000 (UTC)
andrewspencers@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> Tarski says on p. 47 of "Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology
> of Deductive Sciences",
> "Besides the rules of definition, of which we hve already spoken, we
> have other rules of a somewhat similar character, namely, the RULES OF
> INFERENCE or RULES OF PROOF. These rules, which must not be mistaken
> for logical laws, amount to directions as to how sentences already
> known as true may be transformed so as to yield new true sentences. In
> the proof carried out above, two rules of demonstration have been made
> use of: the RULE OF SUBSTITUTION and the RULE OF DETACHMENT (also known
> as the MODUS PONENS RULE)."
>
> He had previously already stated several laws of sentential calculus in
> both natural and formal language, including for example the law of
> hypothetical syllogism: "if p implies q and q implies r, then p implies
> r", i.e. "[(p->q) ^ (q->r)] -> (p -> r)" (prefixed by universal
> quantifiers for p, q, and r). He then says on p. 48, only in natural
> language,
> "The rule of detachment states that, if two sentences are accepted as
> true, of which one has the form of an implication while the other is
> the antecedent of this implication, then that sentence may also be
> recognized as true which forms the consequent of the implication."
> He doesn't state this rule in formal language, but wouldn't it be
> "[(p->q) ^ p] -> q"?
>
> So, if something like "[(p->q) ^ (q->r)] -> (p -> r)" is a logical law
> (i.e. law of sentential calculus), then why is "[(p->q) ^ p] -> q" not?
It's probably a hopeless task, but I will try another approach.
Consider this inference:
p -> q, p
---------- . . . . . . . . . . . . (1)
q
which (you claim) is somehow the same as the formula
((p -> q) ^ p) -> q . . . . . . . . (2)
One can describe what is going on here as follows. Take the premisses
("p -> q" and "p" in the example) and conjoin them with "^". Form the
conditional with that conjunction as the antecedent and the conclusion
as the consequent. Now (important result):
The inference is valid iff the conditional is tautological.
While that is true, there is a problem with the above procedure. How
will you form the conjunction if your language has no symbol for
conjunction (no "^", "&", or whatever)? There are sentential calculi in
which the only connectives are "~" (for "not") and "->", there is no
"^". I anticipate you replying that you will adopt this definition:
A ^ B is defined to be ~(A -> ~B).
But what if your language does not have "~" (or some symbol playing its
role)? There are such languages. Tarski himself studied the so-called
"pure implication" calculus in which the only connective is "->". In it
(1) is a valid rule and is adopted as a rule of inference. (2) isn't a
tautology, (2) isn't even well-formed.
Incidentally, there is a logical calculus in which the transformation
from (1) to (2) gets studied. It's called Gentzen's sequent calculus
and the transformation looks like this
p -> q, p => q
====================
(p -> q) ^ p => q
=====================================
=> ((p -> q) ^ p) -> q
The two steps from the stuff above the ===s to the stuff below them are
justified by rules in his calculus. I don't know any introductory texts
in which the sequent calculus is studied. There is
Kleene, S C "Introduction to metamathematics" Elsevier
but that is an advanced text. Gentzen's paper was translated in (two
numbers of) the American Philosophical Quarterly. Precise reference
somebody? It's also translated in
Gentzen, G; ed Szabo, M E "Collected Papers" North-Holland
[If you ever become interested in modal logic _and_ you like
\Lukasiewicz's notation, you might look at
Zeeman, J Jay "Modal logic" OUP
which has a very clear discussion of sentential sequent calculus
(classical and intuitionistic) but only as a prolegomenon to modal
logic.]
Another point, there are valid inferences of sentential calculus of this
kind
infinite set of formulae |- formula
(though Tarski probably doesn't discuss them) you can't turn that into
(conjunction of those infinitely many formulae) -> formula
because classical sentential calculus doesn't have infinite
conjunctions. [There is such a thing as infinitary logic (invented by
Scott and Tarski (ITMA)), but that's another story.]
--
I don't know who you are Sir, or where you come from,
but you've done me a power of good.
.
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