Re: Penrose vs the Robot
- From: "abo" <dkfjdklj@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 17 Nov 2005 09:29:36 -0800
Daryl McCullough wrote:
<snip>
>
> I claim that Penrose *cannot* produce such a statement. Penrose
> suggests that S can be constructed as follows:
>
> Let T be the set of all statements in the language of Peano
> arithmetic that the robot considers unassailably true. Then
> since the robot's brain is a Turing machine, T is an r.e.
> set, so T is actually definable in PA. Then we can let S
> be the sentence "T is consistent". If T is indeed a consistent
> extention of PA, then by Godel's theorem, S is not provable
> by T.
>
> But I claim that there *is* no such theory T, and so there
> is no such statement S. The existence of such a theory T
> does not follow from the fact that the robot has a Turing
> machine brain.
Unless you are claiming that "considers unassailably true" is
meaningless for a robot (a claim I would have some sympathy for,
whether for a robot or humans), I don't see how you can claim there is
no such theory T. T is just a set of statements which is (1) a subset
of the set of all stements in PA; and (2) whose elements satisfy the
condition of being unassailably true for the robot. So, again unless
your claim is that there is some problem with "unassailably true", by
Separation T exists. Or am I missing some subtlety here?
.
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