Re: Godel's incompleteness theorem vs Church's/Turings work



george wrote:
Frederick Williams wrote:
Incompleteness and undecidable are different things.

No, they're not.
In order for any theory-of-the-kind we're talking
about to be incomplete, there must necessarily be
statements in its language that it does not decide.

Take a toy case: a theory whose language consists of the propositional
atoms P, Q, and R, plus the truth-functional connective, whose sole
axiom is (say) P & Q, and whose logic is a standard natural deduction
system for propositional logic.

This theory is (i) negation incomplete [it doesn't decide whether R or
not-R, for example]. But (ii) it is a decidable theory -- i.e. the
question is "X a theorem?" for any sentence X in its language is
algorithmically decidable e.g. by a truth-table test on "(P & Q) -->
X".

Moral: the fact that there are statements in a theory's language that
it doesn't decide does NOT entail that it is an undecidable theory.

This is illustrated by FOL:
No, it isn't.
FOL is a logic.
PA and all the things Godel was talking about
are THEORIES not NOT logics.

Both off-message here! (i) You can think of FOL as the theory whose
logic is first-order and whose set of non-logical axioms is null. But
(ii) of course -- as was pointed out -- FOL (although complete in the
sense of being having a deductive system that is complete with respect
to the standard semantics) is not a negation-complete theory (it
doesn't settle every sentence X in its language!).

You earlier also characterized FOL as "undecidable".
That is inappropriate. "Undecidable" does not reasonably
DIRECTLY apply to anything as big as a theory, let alone
something even BIgger like all of FOL. "Undecidable" is
properly and directly applied to ONE INDIVIDUAL sentence.

Not so. It is entirely standard to talk of theories being undecidable.
And appropriately so -- the issue is whether there exists an algorithm
that applies *theory-wide* to detemine the theoremhood of arbitrary
sentences.

.



Relevant Pages

  • Re: The Promise of Forth
    ... but that can simply reflect the difficulty with language. ... And when your language includes internal contradictions, ... But when you find contradictions in your ... But there are nonstandard logics that can accommodate this just as there are non-Euclidean geometries. ...
    (comp.lang.forth)
  • ESSLLI 2009 - Final Call for Participation
    ... The European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information ... Non-deterministic Multi-valued Logics - Arnon Avron and Beata Konikowska ... Foundations and main properties - Philippe de Groote and Sylvain Salvati (Introductory course, ... An introduction to minimalist grammars - Greg Kobele and Jens Michaelis (Advanced course, ...
    (comp.specification.z)
  • Re: The Promise of Forth
    ... logical contraditions, it's sloppy. ... but that can simply reflect the difficulty with language. ... But our common culture still holds logic in a superstitious regard it manifestly doesn't deserve. ... (there are many "logics" these days, just as there are many "geometries") ...
    (comp.lang.forth)
  • WoLLIC 2010 - Call for Papers
    ... WoLLIC 2010 17^th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation /* ... Each meeting includes invited talks and tutorials as well as contributed papers. ... It is sponsored by theAssociation for Symbolic Logic, the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics, the The Association for Logic, Language and Information, the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science ... Proposed contributions should be in English, and consist of a scholarly exposition accessible to the non-specialist, including motivation, background, and comparison with related works. ...
    (comp.specification.z)
  • Re: Question regarding incompleteness in formal systems without sufficient power for arithmetic.
    ... LOGICs have INFERENCE RULES as OPPOSED to axioms. ... It does nto say that FOL generically is incomplete: ... IN THE LANGUAGE of PA and is unprovable FROM THE AXIOMS ...
    (sci.logic)