Halting Problem for Humans
- From: stevendaryl3016@xxxxxxxxx (Daryl McCullough)
- Date: 21 Oct 2006 11:22:23 -0700
The Halting problem is ultimately about the failure of prediction.
No program can have perfect ability to predict the future behavior of
all other programs. Here I'm going to illustrate the problems with
perfect prediction using humans instead of programs.
Suppose that we have game in which two players, call them "Peter" and
"Daryl" are asked yes/no questions. The rules stipulate that the only
legal answers are "yes" and "no" (if neither answer seems appropriate,
then the players must respond with silence). Assume that the players
are intelligent and will attempt to answer the questions correctly,
but most importantly they will never intentionally answer a question
incorrectly---if they are not sure about the answer, then they should
refrain from answering, rather than risk making an incorrect answer.
The rules are that both players get to see both questions. Afterwards,
they are taken to separate answwer rooms to figure out their answers. No
interaction between the players is allowed. So there is no possibility
that one player's answer can influence the answer given by the other.
Each player must answer only using the knowledge that he brings into
the answer room.
Okay, that's the background. Now here are the questions:
Peter is asked: Will Daryl answer "yes"?
Daryl is asked: Will Peter answer "no"?
I think it is clear that there is nothing paradoxical about
the questions. Peter must use his knowledge about Daryl in
order to answer the question, and Daryl must use his knowledge
about Peter.
We can analyze the possibilities here (and presumably Peter and
Daryl can do the analysis).
1. If Daryl and Peter give the same answer (either both "yes"
or both "no") then Daryl is mistaken, and Peter is correct.
2. If they give opposite answers (one "yes" and one "no") then
Peter is mistaken, and Daryl is correct.
3. In light of 1&2, if both answer, then one of them is mistaken.
So, it is clearly impossible for both Daryl and Peter to
have perfect ability to predict the future behavior of the
other.
This formulation seems to be completely about the limitations
of knowledge and reasoning ability. There is nothing paradoxical
going on. And in particular, there doesn't seem to be the
escape clause: Daryl (or Peter) knows the answer, but he can't
say it. If he knows the answer, there is nothing at all preventing
him from saying it. One player's answer has no causal effect on
the other player.
This game is similar to the following one-player game: Someone
asks Daryl to answer the following question with "yes" or "no"
(and to make no other responses)
Will the next answer you give be "no"?
In this case, Daryl cannot correctly answer the question, but
it is possible for him to *know* the answer (and keep it to
himself). He can refuse to answer at all, in which case, he
can know that the correct answer is "no".
In my two-player version, there is nothing preventing a player
from saying the answer if he knows it.
--
Daryl McCullough
Ithaca, NY
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- From: george
- Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- From: Peter Olcott
- Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- From: LauLuna
- Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- From: abo
- Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- Prev by Date: Re: A implies I
- Next by Date: Re: Logic of uncertainty, early explorations.
- Previous by thread: A kind of fun question.
- Next by thread: Re: Halting Problem for Humans
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|