Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God
- From: "David" <da5id65536@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 31 Jan 2007 01:08:22 -0800
I've recently seen some definitions of "free will" which seemed to
miss the point--from my point of view. Here's what I mean by "free
will."
proposition E = "I'll get up at 8."
proposition C = "E and not-E are both possible"
C is what I mean by "free will."
(1) C.
(2) God knows everything.
(3) God knows C.
In short, either I don't have free will, or God doesn't know when I'll
get up tomorrow morning.
I had a prof. in college that tried Boethius's idea that God lives in
a timeless realm on me. So what? The issue is not **when** God knows
something. It's whether that knowledge is infallible. If God knew/
knows/will know/timelessly knows that I won't get up at 8, and God
infallibly knows everything, then I won't get up at 8.
A bit off the subject, but if this is a deterministic universe (if
everything that happens is inevitable), I can' t be right--though some
people would give me an argument on this point too.
Does anyone see a good reason to argue with my definition of "free
will"? I can see I'll have to point out that my "will" isn't always
completely free all the time, but I do believe I often make choices.
I do believe I can get up at 8--or not.
David
.
- Follow-Ups:
- Re: Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God
- From: LauLuna
- Re: Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God
- From: Daryl McCullough
- Re: Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God
- Prev by Date: Re: Is Validity Just a Hypothetical or Conditional Characteristic?
- Next by Date: Re: Request for clarification of what is a non first-order definable set.
- Previous by thread: Re: Announcement: New release of free online calculator
- Next by thread: Re: Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God
- Index(es):
Relevant Pages
|