Re: Reflections on Free Will and Proposed Perfect Knowledge of God

Yes. "Possible" means "actually possible." why wasn't that your
default assumption?

I see what you're getting at. I argued the way I did precisely
because it helped me avoid a discussion of degrees of self control.
Certainly believers in free will want the possibility of some degree
of self control. I argued the way I did in order to stress (1) the
possibility of choice (in a deterministic universe all occurrences are
inevitible, including psychological ones--free will needs an
indeterministic universe) as well as (2) the notion of conscious
decision (Hmm. Because A and B, now would be a good time to get up.)
In short, "possible" means physically possible (not predetermined by
deterministic physics) and pschologically possible (mental self
control).

I might buy your definition if you only require my will to be one of
the causes of my behavior, not necessarily the only one or "ultimate"
one (that "ultimate" needs a lot of unpacking). You can't force me to
argue for an unreasonable propostion just to make it easier to argue
against me.

David

On Jan 31, 9:05 am, "LauLuna" <laureanol...@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Jan 31, 10:08 am, "David" <da5id65...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:



I've recently seen some definitions of "free will" which seemed to
miss the point--from my point of view. Here's what I mean by "free
will."

proposition E = "I'll get up at 8."
proposition C = "E and not-E are both possible"

C is what I mean by "free will."

(1) C.
(2) God knows everything.
(3) God knows C.

In short, either I don't have free will, or God doesn't know when I'll
get up tomorrow morning.

I had a prof. in college that tried Boethius's idea that God lives in
a timeless realm on me. So what? The issue is not **when** God knows
something. It's whether that knowledge is infallible. If God knew/
knows/will know/timelessly knows that I won't get up at 8, and God
infallibly knows everything, then I won't get up at 8.

A bit off the subject, but if this is a deterministic universe (if
everything that happens is inevitable), I can' t be right--though some
people would give me an argument on this point too.

Does anyone see a good reason to argue with my definition of "free
will"? I can see I'll have to point out that my "will" isn't always
completely free all the time, but I do believe I often make choices.
I do believe I can get up at 8--or not.

David

I think your definition is ambiguous.

What do you mean by 'possible'?

Logically possible? Physically possible (= possible given the actual
state of the universe and its laws)?

Free will demands a still stronger concept of possibility:

namely, that E and not-E are both possible, given the actual state of
all beings and given all causal laws.

But possibility is not enough for free will: E, for instance, could
finally happen by hazard, unrelated to your will.

So, I propose the following definition:

(DF) free will is the capacity of acting having one's will as the
ultimate cause of one's behavior.

So, the will has to be absolutely unconditioned. And since the will
(the act of wishing or deciding) can be regarded as a class of
behavior, the will has to be the cause of itself.

If I act in some way only because I wish it so but my wishing happens
to be so by chance (unrelated to my will), I wouldn't say I enjoy free
will.

According to DF, the existence of people with free will implies the
existence of a plurality of beings sharing the divine quality of being
'a se'.

That's why I think the existence of free will is hard to accept.

Regards

And since the will is itself a behavior

.