Re: Is wittgensteins colour exclusion problem formalizable?
- From: "translogi" <wilemien@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: 4 Mar 2007 06:32:38 -0800
On Feb 28, 3:22 pm, "J P" <gms2...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Feb 28, 3:08 pm, "translogi" <wilem...@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:They are both objects no doubt about that,
On Feb 26, 7:24 pm, "J P" <gms2...@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
The simple answer to that that it is an "Axiom".
The same answer.
If it is an axiom, postulate or assumption and it ends with a
contradiction maybe you should check its validity.
JP
Objects are simple. (TLP 2.02)
Objects are the atoms of tractarian logic.
More extended:
Everything basicly consists of objects, they are the substance of the
world.
TLP 2.023 Objects are just what constitute this unalterable form.
So after digging to the bottom you will find objects, they are the end
of the dig.
(not for nothing it is called logical atomism.)
This all doesn't mean that objects don't have properties, although
properties are just an other kind of object at the end of it.
I guess here is where you introduce a new term, "property", that is
not defined in your previous definition of object, IOW you contradict
TLP 2.023.
You should define the relationship between objects and properties and
especially you should define what color is, a property or an object,
otherwise a contradiction is the normal conclusion of these axioms.
JP.
Properties are just a special kind of objects.
the definition af a relation between objects is just that they are put
next to eachother.
there is nothing more to it.
(maybe the serial arrangment but that is another worry)
A car (object) that is big (property) is not a new object.More interesting is how objects combine, they are just put in a
organised row, predicates/properties are also just objects (or
combinations of objects.)
I think that is completely wrong.
It may be interesting from an axiomatic point of view but it is not
the way natural language works.
The natural language is serial and because of this every object, term
(noun) will be differentiated thru properties (adjectives) from
identical objects, but that does not mean that a new term, object will
be created.
A car (object) that is big (property) is not a new object. The "car"
is the identical part and "big" is what differentiates it from other
identical objects (cars).
It would have been nice if it was so simple.
JP
IT IS,,,
It differentiates from (small) cars and so occupies a different place
in logical space so it is a different object.
Witgenstein had a very low opinion of natural language.So it directly becomes something like second-order-logic. Lambda logic
(does that excist) ect.
But Wittgenstein didn't work that out any further.
he sadly looked more into identity and so on.
But thanks for your post
BTW I am not talking as much about W in my replies as I am talking
about natural language.
IOW the validity of W's axioms should be checked against natural
language.
JP
for him sentences give a (real or false) picture of the world.
Meta language is forbidden, (senseless, nonsensical)
That is why at the end he wants you to trow it {the tractatus] away )
it is al nonsensical.
luckely it is, but I have to write an believable sensical essay on it.
.
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