Re: Knowledge in Action (Reiter) - example 2.1.1
- From: Chris Menzel <cmenzel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2007 18:57:16 +0000 (UTC)
On Sun, 11 Mar 2007 17:40:38 GMT, Neil Madden <nem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> said:
Hi all,
I have just started reading Raymond Reiter's "Knowledge in Action:
Logical Foundations for Specifying and Implementing Dynamical
Systems", and am finding it hard to understand an early example. The
author is explaining why first-order logic is insufficient to define
transitive closure of a graph, G, and says that the following "naive"
definition is incorrect:
T(x, y) <=> G(x, y) \/ (Ez).(G(x, z) /\ T(z, y)).
(Hopefully that is readable: E is existential quantification here).
The author then describes a counter-example (example 2.1.1):
"Consider the directed graph with two vertices a and b, and with a
single directed edge G(b, b). Consider a structure with universe {a,
b} that interprets G as {(b, b)} and T as {(a, b), (b, b)}. In other
words, the structure represents the graph G (by declaring that there
is an edge from b to b, and no other edges), and it assigns true to
T(a, b) and T(b, b). It is easy to check that this structure is a
model of the above naive definition for transitive closure. ..."
I must be missing something in the semantics, because I don't see how
a model of T given the above definition can allow T(a, b) to be true,
as there is no edge in G that involves a at all.
T(a,b) is simply true by stipulation in the new structure. The problem
is that the new structure satisfies the naive definition. The naive
definition is supposed to pick out, for any graph <V,E>, its (unique)
transitive closure. What Reiter's example shows is that the naive
definition lets in too much. In particular, the TC of the directed
graph <{a,b},{<b,b>}> is just itself. However, the graph
<{a,b},{<a,b>,<b,b>}> also satisfies the naive definition. (I do find
his argument for this above a little unclear -- he uses "G" both as a
name for a graph and as a binary predicate.) Hence, the naive
definition has "unintended" models, which Reiter goes on to argue can
only be ruled out in second-order logic.
.
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